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Most previous research on the role of U.S. state policy in shaping unionization outcomes 
has emphasized presence or absence of “right-to-work” laws as the key explanatory factor. This 
dissertation emphasizes the role of state economic development programing in driving the 
variation in unionization observed across the American states. It also revisits the role that foreign 
direct investment plays in regard to union power.  
I first discuss the variation in private sector unionization levels among the 50 states. I 
then provide a literature review on two key types of economic development policy, 
entrepreneurial and locational. I revisit previous scholarship on foreign investment, positing that 
it has a positive association with unionization, contrary to the commonly-accepted view of many 
scholars.   
I then empirically test these hypotheses using two original models of unionization 
outcomes measured at both macro and micro units of analysis. First, I present an error correction 
model with time-series cross sectional data on state private union density from 1983-2004. Here 
I find that “demand-generating” entrepreneurial development strategies exert a negative long-
term impact on annual change in union density, while foreign direct investment exerts a positive 
shock to it. Next I use logistic regression to test for the variables’ impact on individual-level 
union election outcomes. Here I find that foreign firm nationality and entrepreneurial policy both 
exert a positive impact on likelihood of unions to win certification elections. Neither presence of 
a “right-to-work” statute or locational economic development strategies demonstrate significant 
effect on the long-term decline of union density or on likelihood of union election wins.  
Finally, I consider the impact of economic development and unionization on state income 
inequality from 1983-2004 using an error-correction model. Private sector union density has a 
negative independent association with inequality, and entrepreneurial policy increases inequality. 
In the presence of higher levels of entrepreneurial activism, however, private union density 
losses its significant impact in equalizing the income distribution. I close by discussing some 
normative implications of the proliferation of economic development policies and conclude that 
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This dissertation addresses the dynamics of unionization, usually considered as a 
sociological and economic process, from a political framework. As a scholar of political science, 
I contend that unionization in America is shaped first and foremost by political factors, namely 
policies pursued by the individual states. Union strength continues to vary across the states even 
in a day and age of waning union power overall. The underlying cause for this is federalism, 
which gives states power to craft unique policies to promote their individual economies. The 
varying economic policies enacted by states condition the ability of unions to organize and grow 
within them. These policies are legislated and implemented by 50 unique state governments, 
which differ in regard to partisanship and ideology. Specific economic policies are the factors 
most directly influencing union outcomes, but federalism, partisanship, and ideology condition 
which policies will be enacted.  
 Most policy-oriented research on variation in state unionization levels emphasizes the 
role of labor relations policies in impacting the union organizing environment. The presence of 
“right-to-work” laws are the most widely cited policy variable in examinations of state labor 
union strength. While this dissertation does not intend to refute the argument that “right-to-work” 
laws have historically affected state labor movements, it does argue that others policy factors 
need to be explored to fully understand the cross-sectional variation in state unionization 
outcomes in recent decades. Labor relations statutes can only go so far in explaining why private 




 The primary contribution of this project is that it emphasizes a policy variable which has 
been relatively untapped to study comparative differences in growth and decline of unionization 
rates. I hypothesize that variations in economic development policies, which states enact to grow 
their business and labor sectors, are likely to influence labor union strength across the states. 
While scholars have considered these policies’ impacts on job growth, foreign investment 
attraction, and other important economic factors, their relationship to unionization has been 
under-examined. In keeping with custom, I will also discuss and consider variation in state labor 
relations laws as a controlling variable in this study. 
A secondary focus of my research will consider the role of the international economy in 
shaping unionization outcomes.  Sociology and economics perspectives highlight inward foreign 
investment as a key determinant of changes in unionization levels.  The amount of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has been analyzed frequently as a factor impacting state unionization. 
However, the measure specifications of FDI range greatly, from those that account for FDI as a 
stock variable (accumulated levels of assets) to those which measure it as a flow variable (new 
quantities of inward investment in a given year). My examination considers FDI differently, as 
the quantity of jobs attributable to inward investment as a percentage of the state labor force, a 
measure that had been used with less frequency. Moreover, the nationality of individual firms 
experiencing unionization attempts has also received limited attention as a determinant of labor 
election outcomes. I examine foreign investment from both the “macro” perspective of FDI jobs 
in the states and the “micro” perspective of individual firm nationality. This coupled approach - 




 To empirically analyze federalist variation and state levels of unionization, I offer a 
dynamic time series analysis to account for changes in union density rates over a two decade 
time period, from 1984 to 2004. This model emphasizes economic development policy as the 
critical independent variable.  I also conduct a cross-sectional analysis of individual firms 
experiencing unionization attempts to uncover if foreign firms differ from American firms in 
their likelihood to organize. This second model helps to better explore the role of foreign 
investment in impacting new organizing.  
 Finally, I offer an examination of why unionization and economic development policy 
matter to citizens’ economic prosperity by examining differences in income inequality across the 
states. Unionization and economic development policy affect the distribution of income in the 
state economies and impact equity. Moreover, I find that certain types of development programs 
effectively disable unionization as a force in advancing the interests of the low-income workers. 
 An underlying theme of this research is the search for an economic development strategy 
that is compatible, rather than at odds with unionization. In recent years, states such as Ohio, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin have passed legislation that limits the power of unions to 
compel dues from workers covered under union-negotiated contracts. Leaders passing these bills 
cite promotion of economic development and business attraction as the main motivation. Most 
southern business and political leaders have endorsed this view for decades.  
Other states appear to retain a union-friendly approach in their labor relations policies, 
which could also indicate that the economic development strategies these states enact will be 
favorable to unions. The bigger question that this dissertation asks is if there is an economic 
development strategy currently in use by state governments that actually includes and preserves 
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the role of unions in shaping economic outcomes. Is it possible that encouragement of economic 
growth and job creation can run parallel to maintaining union-friendly policies, or is there simply 
no room for unions in economic development strategies pursued by states? 
 The layout of this dissertation is as follows: In Chapter One, I will demonstrate that states 
display regional variation in unionization rates, and I will review the literature contending that 
“right-to-work” statutes account for this regional variation. In Chapter Two I will discuss 
differences in two major state economic development policy orientations and posit their 
relationship to varying unionization levels. In Chapter Three I will review literature regarding the 
relationship of foreign investment to unionization outcomes and offer some statistical analysis to 
tentatively refute the finding that foreign investment and firm nationality hinders unionization. In 
Chapters 4 and 5 I will offer two multivariate regression models to test my hypotheses regarding 
economic development, foreign investment, and unionization outcomes. Chapter 4 will present a 
time series model, using “macro” state union density as the dependent variable. Chapter 5 will 
present a cross sectional logit model, using union wins in individual election contests as the 
dependent variable.  Chapter 6 will utilize state union density along with economic development 
orientation as independent variables to explain variation in income inequality. In the concluding 
chapter, I will offer final thoughts on the compatibility of state economic development strategy 







Chapter 1: Variation in State Unionization Levels 
The story of unionization in the United States is clearly one of decline. Research 
confirms an overwhelmingly consistent trend- union density rates have fallen markedly since the 
late seventies, and most of this loss has occurred in the private sector (Mayer 2004, Farber 2005, 
& 2001, Slaughter 2007, Hirsch and MacPherson et al. 2001). The dwindling of private sector 
union membership is apparent from the state as well as national perspective. When analyzing the 
twenty year change from 1984 to 2004, not a single state in the union gained in the percentage of 
the private sector labor force organized, and all but four experienced a drop in the total number 
of private sector workers who were union members (Gordon 2015).1 The overall conclusion to 
be drawn by these numbers is that the strength of the American union movement, at both a 
national and state level, has been substantially eroded. 
Even though the decline in private sector union density is common to all states in recent 
decades, noteworthy variations in the proportion of unionized state workforces remain. As of 
2004, the last year in my study, a quarter of American states retained private sector union 
densities of 10% or more, with a high of 16% in Hawaii. A larger group of states had private 
sector union densities lower than 5% with North Carolina, the least unionized state, having less 
than 2%. There is a strong regional association to the variation between the most and least 
unionized states. Table 1 presents 2004 private sector union density data for all states 
individually, as well as by regional grouping (Hirsch and Macpherson 2004, BLS 2004).  States 
in the Far West, Midwest, and Mideast (Middle Atlantic) tend to display the highest private 
sector union rates, with regional averages reaching above 10%. The Southeast, Rocky 
                                                 
1 States that increased membership were Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, and Washington. 
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Table 1. State and Regional Private Sector Union Density, 2004 
Regional Grouping Union Density (%) 
  







Regional Average 11.3 
  






Regional Average 11.6 
  
Mideast  
New York 15.1 












North Dakota 4.1 
South Dakota 2.9 







Table 1. Continued. 
Regional Grouping Union Density (%) 
  
New England  




New Hampshire 4.8 
Vermont 4.2 
Regional Average 6.5 
  






Regional Average 4.5 
  
Southeast  


















South Carolina 2.6 
North Carolina 1.6 





New Mexico 3.4 
Texas 2.7 
Regional Average 3.4 
Source: Hirsch and Macpherson 2001 and updates listed 
at www.unionstats.com, and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Mountains, and Southwest show the lowest rates regionally.  The Plains states fall somewhere in 
the middle, displaying substantial range in private sector unionization- between 11 and 3% - but 
averaging at about 7% for the region. Interestingly the New England states, once renown for 
their labor union strength, only averaged about 6% in private union density as of 2004. (New 
England retains relatively high rates of overall union density due to the prevalence of public 
sector unionization in these states.) It has been common for analysts to draw marked distinctions 
between “strong labor” states, concentrated in the Northeast (and Midwest and West), and “weak 
labor” states of the South and Rocky Mountain regions (Farber 2005).  However, given the 
waning power of industrial unions in the New England states, it is important to recognize that 
most private sector unionization in the Northeast is now concentrated in the mid-Atlantic region. 
This regional variation in unionization is a function of economic, demographic, and 
political factors. Examining the composition of states’ industrial sectors and work forces help to 
understand some of the differences in state level unionization. Regional variation in union 
strength relates to “legacy effects” of industrial development patterns in the states. Historically, 
union organizing has been most successful in industries such as transport, warehousing, 
shipping, and durable goods manufacturing (Mayer 2004; Sanyal 1990), and these industries are 
prevalent in the Pacific, Mid-west and Northeastern states. “Light” manufacturing such as textile 
production, as well as agriculture and lower-skilled services, have proven to be less lucrative 
organizing targets and were the major industries in the Southern states for much of the 20th 
century (Mayer 2004). Thus, northern and western states featuring heavy manufacturing, 
utilities, and transport employment as a higher proportion of their workforce experienced more 
unionization in the successful years of the labor movement (1940’s-1970’s) than did southern 
states with lower proportions. 
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The demographic characteristics of state labor forces are also likely related to union 
membership levels. Black workers are more likely to be union members than white workers or 
Hispanics, and men are slightly more likely to be union members than women, although the gap 
between men and women has declined in recent decades (Mayer 2004). The higher proportions 
of black and male workers in some state labor forces may exert an independent positive effect on 
state union density, although other associated state-level variables, such as lack of union shop 
protections, may obscure the demographic impacts of race and sex in the South.  
Most political science research on unionization differences have focused on partisanship, 
ideology, and policy variation across the states. American federalism promotes a diversification 
of the state institutional environments in which labor unions operate. Each state elects its own 
unique set of leaders empowered with discretion in policy areas that impact the political 
economy, including labor relations. Partisanship of state legislatures and executive offices, along 
with the ideological orientations of elected branches, are variables that condition the organizing 
and bargaining capacity of unions. Comparative researchers, borrowing from themes in 
sociological literature, stress the role of working class “power resources” as tools used by non-
elites to enable routes of representation to political and economic decision making (Korpi 1983, 
Hewitt 1977, Hicks and Swank 1984). The presence of ideologically left governments, to provide 
a political voice to working people, and labor union movements, which coordinate their 
participation in both market wage setting and policy-making favorable to their class interests, are 
the key power resources (Kelly and Witko 2012, see also Radcliff and Saiz 1998).  
The causal relationship between left governments and union strength is bi-directional. 
Labor unions undergird the organization of left-leaning political parties, generate left candidates, 
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and secure left votes in the electorate. But the ideological orientation of governments also impact 
the union “opportunity structure” because it impacts labor relations regulations and the amount 
of public resources channeled to protect worker organizations (Kelly, Witko and Young 2013, 
Stephens and Wallerstein 1991, Bronfenbrenner 2009). Even in the United States, where the 
ideological spectrum is shifted right, the partisan composition of the Congress and the President 
matters to union density outcomes (Dark 1999; Kelly, Witko, and Young 2013).  At the state 
level, where the Democrat Party is sometimes centrist or even conservative, the average 
ideological scores of state legislators better explain variation in union density. Time series 
regression analysis reveals a positive association between left state government power and state 
unionization levels when combining private and public sectors (Kelly, Witko, and Young 2013).   
While partisanship and ideology of governments is an underlying variable affecting 
unionization, it is arguably labor, employment, and economic policies pursued by state 
governments that offer the most direct causal link to the strength of state labor movements. 
Policy differences provide clear evidence for the role of federalist variation in social outcomes. 
Labor relations laws known as “right-to-work” statutes, which differ widely across the states, are 
the classic policy variable utilized in the study of unionization (Farber 1984, Ellwood and Fine 
1987, Moore 1998), and are determined at a state, rather than national level. 
The legal foundations of union-management relations in the U.S. is based upon the 
National Labor Relations Act, a Depression-era law that guaranteed American workers in the 
private sector the fundamental rights to organize into unions and collectively bargain with their 
employers. While the National Labor Relations Act retains supremacy across the country, 
amendments passed in the late 1940’s give discretion to states in influencing the potency of 
11 
 
union organizing activities. The Taft-Hartley Act diluted the original NLRA organizing 
protections by granting states the authority to pass “right-to-work” laws, establishing “open 
shop” bargaining units (Taft Hartley Act 1947, 14(b)). Open shops allow workers covered under 
union contracts to opt-out of union membership and dues deduction, thus eroding the revenue-
raising potential for labor organizations. This is in contrast to states operating with “union shops” 
which give unions legal authority to mandate dues payment, post-hiring, for employees covered 
under union-negotiated contracts.2  The discretion given to states in regard to mandating union 
dues payment contributes to the regional variation in labor strength previously discussed. As of 
2004, the last year of my study, about 22 states were open shop “right-to-work” states, 
concentrated in the southeast, west Plains, and Rocky Mountain regions. The remainder of states, 
including the District of Columbia, had union-shops and were located in the north-east, upper 
mid-west, and Pacific Coast regions.  
Variation in these differing labor regulatory systems impact labor union recruitment in 
the private sector significantly. “Right-to-work” states consistently rank among the lowest in 
terms of union density figures; for instance, in 2004 every one of the bottom 16 states in terms of 
private sector union density levels, all under 7%, were right-to-work states (Mayer 2004, see also 
Davis and Huston 1995). Union density levels are strongly associated with average wage levels, 
with union shop states exhibiting higher per capita income levels than open shop states (Mishel 
2000). Moreover, the upward pressure that unions place on wages has spill-over effects for all 
employees. Even non-union workers in the private sector earn more in states with union shops, 
                                                 
2 A third type of bargaining unit, the “closed shop,” was prohibited under Taft-Hartley. The closed shop requires all 
employees to be members of the certified union before hiring. Only pre-established union members would be 
eligible to become employees in this arrangement.  Some industrial relations professionals argue that the 
construction industry still works under a closed shop system.  
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whereas union to non-union wage differentials are greater in “right-to-work” systems (Farber 
2005). Moreover, states with greater union density spend more on education per pupil, income 
support supplements, and total government social program spending (Radcliff and Saiz 1998), 
further magnifying the positive externalities generated from union activity in the wider economy. 
Efforts to strip private sector workers of union rights tends to coincide with restrictions 
on public employees’ union security guarantees as well, as recent examples in Indiana, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin demonstrate (see Greenhouse 2011, Davey 2015).  Federalism allows near-total 
discretion to states in providing rights to state and municipal workers to join unions, to engage in 
collective bargaining, and to strike (Supreme Court of the U.S., National League of Cities vs. 
Usury, 1976). States vary significantly in the degree of protections they have legislated for their 
public employees to engage in labor activities (Freeman and Valletta 1988, Farber 2005).  States 
with private sector “right-to-work” laws, namely those in the south, often correspond to the states 
which lack strong public employee bargaining rights and union security guarantees in the public 
sector (Farber 2005). While public sector unionization is outside the scope of this project, the 
link between “right-to-work” policies and limited public employee labor protections reaffirms 
the significant impact that federalist variation has in setting institutional constraints on unions. 
While scholars heavily focus on “right-to-work” (RTW) statutes as a major determinant of state 
union strength, there are limits to the degree to which this policy variable explains the erosion of 
unionization in recent decades. Table 2 lists all states, in ascending order of private sector union 





Table 2. State Private Union Density and Right-to-Work Status 





Hawaii 16.2 No  -5.1 0.7 
Michigan 15.9 No  -9.2 -1.5 
New York 15.1 No  -8.5 1.0 
Washington 13.2 No  -6.6 -1.8 
Illinois 12.1 No  -7.8 -0.3 
New Jersey 11.6 No  -7.2 0.2 
Minnesota 11.1 No  -6.4 -1.4 
Alaska 10.9 No  -6.5 2.2 
Missouri 10.9 No  -9.0 -1.1 
Ohio 10.5 No  -10.5 0.3 
West Virginia 10.5 No  -13.4 0.1 
Wisconsin 10.4 No  -10.2 0.7 
Nevada 10.0 Yes 1951 -11.2 2.0 
Pennsylvania 9.7 No  -11.4 -1.2 
California 9.4 No  -7.4 0.3 
Indiana 9.0 No  -15.1 1.0 
D.C. 8.8 No  -5.7 -1.8 
Rhode Island 8.8 No  -5.1 -0.4 
Oregon 8.1 No  -10.6 -0.4 
Delaware 7.7 No  -5.8 -0.1 
Massachusetts 7.7 No  -7.4 -0.3 
Kentucky 7.5 No  -9.6 0.1 
Connecticut 7.3 No  -6.3 0.3 
Iowa 7.2 Yes 1947 -7.5 0.1 
Kansas 6.1 Yes 1958 -4.3 -1.0 
Maryland 6.0 No  -7.6 1.4 
Maine 5.9 No  -7.2 -0.3 
Alabama 5.7 Yes 1953 -8.0 0.3 
Montana 5.5 No  -8.1 0.2 
Wyoming 5.3 Yes 1963 -6.1 0.3 
Colorado 5.2 No  -4.7 0.1 
Nebraska 5.0 Yes 1947 -6.3 -0.5 
Tennessee 4.9 Yes 1947 -6.2 -1.6 
New Hampshire 4.8 No  -2.5 -0.8 
Louisiana 4.8 Yes 1976 -4.0 0.0 
Georgia 4.3 Yes 1947 -5.4 -0.6 
Vermont 4.2 No  -2.2 0.9 
North Dakota 4.1 Yes 1947 -3.9 -0.5 
Mississippi 4.0 Yes 1954 -4.9 1.1 
Arizona 3.9 Yes 1947 -3.3 0.0 
Idaho 3.7 Yes 1985 -3.8 -0.4 
Oklahoma 3.5 Yes 2001 -5.0 -0.6 
Virginia 3.4 Yes 1947 -6.5 0.0 
New Mexico 3.4 No  -4.8 0.0 
Arkansas 3.2 Yes 1947 -5.9 -0.1 
South Dakota 2.9 Yes 1947 -4.3 -0.2 
Utah 2.9 Yes 1955 -6.3 -0.2 
Florida 2.8 Yes 1943 -3.1 -0.3 
Texas 2.7 Yes 1993 -3.5 0.4 
South Carolina 2.6 Yes 1954 -0.9 -1.5 
North Carolina 1.6 Yes 1947 -3.2 0.2 
Sources: * National Right to Work Committee 2015.    ** Colin Gordon. “Mappings of Union Membership”, www.unionstats.com 
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law was enacted. It also lists the annual change in union density for 2004, as well as for the two 
decades preceding 2004.  
 Clearly, the most unionized states tend to be those without open shop laws, which seems, 
on first glance, to support the classic theory that “right-to-work” statutes explain state level 
variation in union membership. However, when looking at the annual and 20-year change in 
union density, in tandem with the year a state’s RTW statute was enacted, the relationship 
appears less conclusive. Almost all states with RTW statutes passed them fifty to sixty years ago, 
and only three states passed laws during the two decades of my study.3 Once the laws were 
passed, they remained static for all states; in other words there has been no back-and-forth 
fluctuation between union shop and open shop status upon enacting a RTW statute. Yet the 
twenty year change for all states between 1984 and 2004 was one of decline. Thus, union density 
changed for all states, but right-to-work status remained static for most states. Moreover, 
regarding annual change in union density, states do show variation in recent years, with some 
increasing and others decreasing. RTW status appears to have little relationship to this annual 
change in states, as those which gained, as well as those which lost, are a “mixed bag” of open 
shop and closed shop states.4 So while labor relations policy may relate to cross-sectional 
variation between states, it lacks clear relevance when examining variation in over-time change. 
It may be hypothesized that the impact of RTW laws are long-term, explaining union density 
rates five to six decades after their passage, even though the argument for long-range impacts of 
                                                 
3 Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin passed RTW laws in more recent years outside my study 
4 This lack of relationship can also be observed in more recent years with states that passed RTW laws after my 
period of study. Michigan lost members since the passage of RTW. However, Indiana actually gained membership 
in the year after enacting their RTW law. See Davey 2015. 
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RTW laws on union strength have been refuted (Moore 1998, Farber 1984).  Even if one accepts 
this argument, it still does not adequately account for differences in recent years among states in 
the annual change in private union density. 
Tables of descriptive statistics can not properly analyze dynamic changes in variables 
over time. One contribution of my later chapters will be the presentation of a time series 
regression model which better captures historical change in union densities across the states. In 
any case, the static nature of right-to-work laws in the years under study immediately motivates 
the search for other variables which do change over time, which could better account for annual 
union density change.  
In addition to labor relations statutes, employment policies also vary across states and 
may factor into unionization levels, at least indirectly.  States design distinct employment-
insurance programs and worker safety programs (Hansen 2001). They operate their own 
departments of labor and employment security agencies to enforce state-generated employment 
laws, such as minimum wage provisions. While states are bound to guarantee most employees a 
minimum wage as established by the federal government, states do retain discretion to set the 
wage floor higher, if they choose. States in the south and Mountain West typically have no state 
wage floor and thus only honor the minimum federal rate; compared to northeastern and West 
Coast states which feature state minimum wages that best the federal rate (Department of Labor, 
Wage and Hour Division, 2015). Minimum wage rates are usually thought of as an effect of 
unionization. However, higher base level wages raise the “starting point” from which contract 
wage bargaining begins, helping unions to achieve even higher wages for their members. This 
enriches union dues revenues and union reputation among workers, which could in turn lead to 
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higher unionization potential. States also have discretion in the administration of worker’s 
compensation programs, including the frequency of denying claims, provision of resources for 
monitoring fraud, and the determination of benefit levels (Lemov 1997).  More pro-worker 
provisions assist unions in their ability to win claims for their members affected by job-related 
injuries. Union reputation and membership recruitment may be enhanced in states with high-
level worker compensation standards. 
For scholars concerned with the impact of policy on state unionization, labor relations 
and employment laws are “natural” factors to explore. They have a straight-forward relationship 
to working conditions, wages, and protections for the labor force and clearly affect policy areas 
that are central to labor unions. However, the limitations of labor relations policies to adequately 
explain trends in unionization require policy-oriented scholars to cast a wider net in their 
research. Policies that focus on “bigger picture” development of the state macro-economy are 
likely to influence labor force dynamics and unionization capacity, but have received less 
attention. Economic development policies, which provide government resources and planning to 
cultivate state business and labor sectors, are a major area of interest in federalist studies in 
recent decades. As will be discussed in the next chapter, projects to evaluate the intended 
economic consequences of such policies- such as job growth and increased investment from 
outside the state - have been prolific. Other scholars of federalism focus on assessing the 
disadvantages that may have emerged from economic development policies, particularly their 
negative impact on revenues for public-sector services. While scholars fairly frequently 
acknowledge a general relationship between economic development and unionization in broader 
discussions of income equality and jobs quality, there has been little examination of the causal 
relationship that development policies may have on the labor movement. 
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In reality, union movement vitality is determined by a complex interplay of political, 
social, and economic factors. Policy-oriented scholars should not attempt to explain it as a 
function of labor relations policies alone. Economic development policies have a wide reach on 
the state macro-economy, which sets the overall conditions in which unions must organize. Some 
of these conditions include: the prevailing array of industries in the state economy, the degree of 
expansion of the state economy, and the specific terms and conditions of new jobs created. In 
some cases, economic development policies may even directly address unions with the intent to 
support or subvert them, as will be discussed. 
              The central research question of this dissertation – “What is the causal impact 
 of economic development policy on unionization outcomes in the states?” – is essentially 
empirical in nature. However, allow me to offer an alternate framing of the question, which is 
perhaps more normative in its approach: “Is there an economic development strategy that 
actually aligns with the agenda of the union movement? Which states, if any, use development 
strategies that are compatible with unions and their efforts to nurture economies of shared 
wealth?” As I shall discuss in Chapter 2, a state government’s orientation to development, and its 
perception of labor as a cost or an asset to business, may impact the overall favorability of the 
state economy to labor union growth. This matters because the relationship between unionization 
and economic development policy may have a significant impact on the equity of income 
distribution in the state economy, as will be examined in Chapter 6. 
 Finally, since unionization is an economic, as well as a political phenomenon, it is also 
necessary to re-consider how the internationalization of the economy impacts state labor 
movements. Scholars have debated how the openness of a state’s economy, as determined by the 
amount of foreign investment entering the state, impacts union strength for several decades. 
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Chapter 3 offers a review of this literature and posits that in spite of the general assumption that 
inward foreign investment impedes unionization, it might actually present opportunities for labor 
unions. Moreover, consideration of inward foreign investment is critical to the greater discussion 
of how economic development impacts unionization, as increased inward investment is a 
















Chapter 2: Economic Development Strategy and Unionization Outcomes 
     Federalism enables distinct political economies to evolve across the 50 states (Eisinger 
1990; Amberg 2010). Labor force dynamics, including unionization of the workforce, are 
important aspects shaping state political economies. Public policies that impact the state labor 
force can be grouped into three major types: labor-management relations policies, employment 
protections, and economic development strategies.  Labor-management relations policies, as 
discussed in Chapter One, are the most thoroughly researched policy-factor impacting 
unionization outcomes, with right-to-work laws commonly associated with lower rates of 
unionization.  As for employment regulations, the second related policy factor, their relationship 
with unionization is an endogenous one. Unionization has positive externalities on state wage 
rates and employment protections for the entire labor force –including non-union workers 
(Radcliff and Saiz 1998). State policies establishing minimum wages, employer unemployment 
taxes, strong safety and occupational standards and worker compensation protections are 
products of union efforts to lobby policy-makers and support pro-worker candidates. However, 
the presence of strong worker protection laws also has a feedback effect on unions in their ability 
to service their own members. Union contract enforcement of wage and safety provisions is 
much easier if a minimum level of worker protections is already backed by the full force of state 
law. 
Economic development is an area that has received less attention than labor and 
employment regulations as a policy determinant of unionization and is critical to understanding 
state variation in union outcomes. This chapter will first review the variation in economic 
development policy approaches and compare two major types of strategies. Next, it will 
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summarize the findings about the impacts of these strategies on state job growth, wage rates, and 
availability of public funds. It will then discuss the Saiz economic development indices, the 
primary metric available to measure economic development policy, which tracks the intensity of 
states to engage in two major types of strategies. I will then posit possible impacts that the two 
economic development approaches have on unionization outcomes and craft tentative hypotheses 
for later testing. Lastly, this chapter will present a descriptive statistics comparison of three 
example states as an illustration of the differences in policy and unionization levels between 
states using the different types of economic development approaches.  
I contend that economic development strategies to target and/or grow new business 
investment exert an impact on unionization outcomes that is independent and distinct from the 
impact of state labor relations policies. Admittedly, at some level investment and development 
strategies are inter-related to state labor laws and employment programs. For example, state 
efforts to keep unionization low through “right-to-work” laws have themselves been classified as 
a definable economic development strategy by some scholars (Leicht and Jenkins 1994).  
However, this dissertation concurs with scholarship that recognizes the distinction between 
economic development policy and labor and employment policy and conceptualizes them 
separately.  The former utilizes positive incentives and resource provision to attract and/or grow 
capital in the state economy, while the latter prioritizes regulation of business actions that 
specifically target unions and employees (Eisinger 1988). Labor and employment policies 
directly enforce union and/or worker protections, and given this, it is no wonder that they have 
received much attention as factors impacting unionization outcomes. However, economic 




First of all, economic development policy cultivates the firm and industry mix operating 
in the state, which in turn determines the environment within which labor unions organize and 
bargain. For example, one state might offer an investment incentive to lure durable goods 
manufacturing industries such as those in the automotive sector, while another state’s incentive 
package could target lower-skilled manufacturing and service-sector businesses, while still 
another state program could promote start-up funding for emerging information tech businesses.  
The industry sectors nurtured under these approaches vary greatly, and unions may have more or 
less organizing potential in one industry versus another. The employment market’s shift away 
from durable goods manufacturing to service sectors in recent decades, especially to lower- 
paying ones in the retail, food, and hospitality industries, is noted as a factor confounding unions 
in their efforts to maintain membership and achieve growth (Farber and Kruger 1992 in 
Acemoglu et al 2001). 
Another way that economic development policy could affect unionization is that it could 
attract and/or provide incentives to firms contingent on the degree of collaboration or 
combativeness that firms are willing to display toward unions. Investment incentives could be 
awarded by state programs with the stipulation that recipient businesses remain “union free”; or 
alternatively, incentives could be designated for firms with a history of collaborative, non-
combative union relations. It is difficult to statistically substantiate this, as the details of 
bargaining are notoriously kept “sub rosa” in most deals that state officials strike with investors 
(Mattera et.al. 2010)5. However, some qualitative research shows that conditioning of incentives 
                                                 
5 For example, I submitted Open Records requests to three states’ economic development programs during the 
course of research for this project.  Officials from two states, South Carolina and Tennessee, maintained that much 
of the records detailing the recipients of incentives could not be released, because the information was “proprietary.” 
Eventually, the state of SC provided some requested information. Tennessee did not provide any requested data. 
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packages based on how firms approach union relations does happen. Table 3, taken from a 
report conducted by the corporate-subsidy watchdog group Good Jobs First, displays a number 
of economic development programs in 2011 that included requirements specifically addressing 
unions and labor relations. For instance, some programs require that unions be given proper 
notice and participation in the implementation of skills and training programs, such as 
California’s Employment Training Panel, Kentucky’s Bluegrass State Skills Corporation, and 
New Hampshire’s Job Training fund. Most of the remaining identified requirements deny tax 
credits to companies that relocate as a means of nullifying existing collective bargaining 
agreements or use incentives in other ways that attempt to weaken unions (West Virginia 
Governors Guaranteed Workforce Program and the Missouri Rebuilding Communities program, 
for example).  It is important to note that these specific references to unions are not the norm in 
economic development programs surveyed. Moreover, the characteristics of the programs 
documented in this table do not imply that all of the state’s other development programs will be 
union-friendly. For example, it is conceivable that while California provides favorable treatment 
to unions in its Employment Panel program its other corporate subsidy programs contain 
provisions that attract businesses which are less amenable to union participation.  Still, the 
degree to which the highlighted program requirements relate to a unified union-friendly strategy 
has implications on the strength of the labor movement in the overall state economy. 
The before mentioned cases highlight ways that some economic development programs 
attempt to safeguard the status of unions. In contrast, the unionization attempt during 
Volkswagen’s (VW) construction of a new automotive factory in Chattanooga, TN is a recent 
example of how a state government used incentives to discourage companies from allowing 
union participation in their operations. Law-makers from Tennessee, including U.S. Senator Bob  
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Table 3. State Economic Development Program with Labor Relations Provisions 
State Program Labor Relations Provisions 
CA Employment Training Panel Prior to presenting a funding application, the 
employer needs to notify appropriate collective 
bargaining units. 
CO Enterprise Zone Program Labor agreements must be maintained when a 
company is approved for participation. 
DC New E-Conomy Transformation Act of 
2000 (NET 2000) 
Qualified employees cannot include those employed 
as the result of a strike or lockout. 
IL Film Productions Services Tax Credit Rules state that “if any of the provisions in this section 
conflict with any existing collective bargaining 
agreements, the terms and conditions of those 
collective bargaining agreements shall control.” 
KY Bluegrass State Skills Corporation A company has to notify a union, if there is one, about 
an application for assistance, and an employer cannot 
ask a job applicant about his/her union affiliation or 
sentiment toward organized labor; it is also prohibited 
to deny a job based on an applicant’s affiliation with a 
union.  
MI Michigan Economic Growth Authority 
(MEGA) Tax Credits 
The state may not discriminate against a company on 
the basis of its collective bargaining status. 
MN Job Skills Partnership Program The program must be consistent with existing 
collective bargaining agreements covering health and 
human services workers.  
MO New Jobs Training If there is a bargaining unit in a facility, the employer 
has to formally request the bargaining agent for 
written comments on the proposed training program. 
MO Rebuilding Communities If a recipient company’s relocation violates or 
terminates a collective bargaining agreement at its 
previous location, the company is not eligible the tax 
credit. 
NH Job Training Fund The committee that reviews applications must include 
a member representing labor. 
WA New Jobs in Rural Counties and CEZ 
Tax Credit 
No recipient may use tax credits approved under this 
program to decertify a union. 
WV Governor’s Guaranteed Work Force 
Program 
Funds may not be awarded or reimbursed to any 
business or industry for the training, retraining or 
upgrading of skills of potential employee with the 
purpose of replacing or supplanting employees 
engaged in an authorized work stoppage. 
 
Table taken from Mattera, Philip, Thomas Cafcas, Leigh McIlvaine, Andrew Seifter, and Kasia Tarczynska. December 
2011. "Money for Something: Job Creation and Job Quality Standards in State Economic Development Subsidy 





Corker, openly threatened the German firm, stating that its incentives package could be reduced 
according to whether or not the United Auto Workers successfully organized the facility during 
the May 2014 union recognition election (Pare 2014).  Tennessee press uncovered that Governor 
Bill Haslam, while not publically vocal about the organizing attempt, conditioned the provision 
of a $300 million incentive package to VW on the facility remaining union-free in insider 
communications (Williams 2014). Democratic State House representative Mike Turner described 
the Haslam administration’s efforts to influence VW’s labor relations position candidly: “They 
put a gun to their head and said, 'Look, this is what we are going to give you if you do it our way, 
and we are going to jerk it away if you don't.’” (Quoted in Williams 2014).  Moreover, Governor 
Haslam has since called for a second secret-ballot union election, in an attempt to block VW’s 
recent promise to voluntary recognize the UAW union as a representative of the workers through 
an alternative card-check agreement (Schelzig 2014). 
Such examples suggest that economic development policies are a means for states to 
foster a political economy that is more or less favorable to macro-level union density growth, as 
well as a tool to roadblock specific unionization attempts at the micro-level, even when a 
corporation may originally be tolerant to a union presence. The following sections detail major 
differences among states’ economic development strategies and begin a discussion of how 






Entrepreneurial and Locational Economic Development Strategies 
Economic development strategies have been classified in different ways. The 
classification scheme most corroborated by research is the distinction between entrepreneurial 
and locational development strategies, as named by American States scholar Martin Saiz. His 
grouping is based closely around the comparison of “supply” and “demand” side strategies first 
identified by Peter Eisinger in his important work The Entrepreneurial State (Saiz 2001a, 
Eisinger 1988, Gray and Hanson 2012; see Jenkins et. al. 2006 and Langer 2001 for alternative 
economic development classifications). This project uses the Eisinger/Saiz categories as the basis 
for examining federalist variation in state economic development policies. 
The entrepreneurial development orientation, utilized increasingly throughout the past 
two decades, utilizes state actors to buoy the competitiveness of existing business sectors through 
modernization measures and development of supportive relationships between work force 
training and finance entities. It also targets new industries for growth in emerging sectors if key 
supply-side inputs are locally available for exploitation. The major goal of the entrepreneurial 
strategy is to encourage business creation and wealth generation throughout communities based 
on core capacities that are already present in the state economy (Anderson 1993). Its prioritizes 
high-technology and research innovation to create a more “value-added” business environment 
for the state economy, one that optimizes consumer and commercial demand in contrast to other 
strategies which prioritize lowering input factor costs for business (Eisinger 1988). Development 
of an advanced and educated workforce capable of supplying high-skill labor to preferred 
industry sectors is a major objective of the entrepreneurial strategy. 
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            The state-level executive branch plays a particularly important “trustee” role in 
entrepreneurial economic development (Saiz 2001b, Hart 2007). Governors act as direct 
ambassadors between business enterprises and the higher education system to ensure that 
business labor needs are met.  For example, Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam’s recently enacted 
Tennessee Promise program, which provides all graduating high school seniors in the state two 
free years of community college, was the result of direct consultation between the executive 
branch and the Tennessee business community. In a series of “round tables” called by Haslam, 
Tennessee business leaders cited lack of skilled labor as a number one impediment to expansion 
and growth. (Office of Bill Haslam 2011).  The Tennessee Promise program was instituted to fill 
this gap in quality labor in emerging industrial sectors. Local governments also have a role to 
play in this strategy by partnering with state governments to support workforce development and 
entrepreneurial mercantilism programs. Such initiatives provide loans, education and training, 
information, and recruitment to develop workers and new business at the community level 
(Clarke and Gaile 1997).  With the entrepreneurial approach the labor force is viewed as a core 
asset. A highly skilled labor force is regarded as a tool to increase and attract foreign direct and 
inter-state investment.  Studies confirm that many foreign firms prefer to relocate to areas where 
laborers demand higher compensation in order to attract better skilled employees (Kucera 2002).  
 Still, it is important to understand that with the entrepreneurial orientation the primary 
motive for building a quality work force is to nurture the creation and expansion of industries 
from within the state (State Science and Technology Institute 2014). Entrepreneurial strategies, 
while likely increasing the attractiveness of the state to outside investors, prioritize the 
modernization of existing industries, the incubation of new businesses, and promotion of markets 
for their products (Saiz 2001b.) One of the key tools entrepreneurial programs use to cultivate a 
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“value-added” business sector is the establishment of public-private entities to raise venture 
capital from the private sector and to leverage it with public funds.  
      For instance, in the mid –nineties, the state of Missouri created the Missouri Technology 
Corporation – whose board is appointed directly by the Governor and legislative heads -  as a 
public-private partnership to promote growth of emerging bio-science companies in the 
agricultural sector.  (Missouri Technology Corporation 2015). The MTC oversees loan programs 
for four separate seed and venture capital funds, including the High-Tech Industrial Expansion 
Program. Consider some of the published objectives of this program related to workforce and 
employment dynamics: 
 “ Create a successful research or intellectual property licensing relationship 
with a Missouri-based university … or establish an internship program to 
provide career opportunities for high school and/or college students; and  
 Create and retain sustainable high-paying, private sector jobs.”  (Italics mine) 
Both Missouri-based companies or companies wishing to create new enterprises in Missouri are 
eligible, but the intent is to develop businesses that are not yet commercially viable, instead of 
luring up-and-running businesses from elsewhere (Missouri Technology Corporation 2014). It is 
also clear that development of a well-paid workforce is a priority of this public-private program. 
The emphasis on forming partnerships between higher education, private businesses, and 
bureaucratic agencies to promote economic development programs indicates that the 
governmental role in the private sector economy is likely to be quite substantial in states 
pursuing entrepreneurial strategies. Such policies require an extended period of time to yield 
tangible benefits and gains.  Elected officials will be less able to claim immediate successes from 
these policies in a time frame that is politically useful to them (Hart 2007, Brace 1993). 
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Moreover, such policies demand more in terms of coordination and information acquisition, as 
well as possible risk. Thus, there are impediments to adopting these approaches, and other 
strategies to development are probably easier and more politically feasible to implement (Brace 
2002). 
An alternative economic development orientation is the locational approach. Such 
strategies aim to ensure lower costs on the factors of production – land, capital, and labor – to 
enhance attractiveness. Maintaining low wages and payroll taxes, as well as subsidizing asset, 
land and financing costs to companies establishing operations in the state is part of this economic 
development strategy. There is a wide range of policy tools utilized in locational recruitment 
programs; in fact, incentives for business cost reduction are the most common characteristic of 
economic development programs throughout the states (Saiz 2001a). Direct provision of grants, 
loans, and financing incentives such as loan guarantees and revenue bonds are often utilized by 
state government to subsidize capital investment costs. Property tax abatement, land grants, and 
subsidized land-lease deals can be offered to defray real property factor costs to expanding 
businesses. Financing for generalized infrastructure improvements in hopes to create a more 
attractive investment environment is also a means of limiting production costs for new 
businesses (Saiz 2001a, Dubnick and Holt 1985). Indirect methods of subsidization reduce 
businesses labor costs, such as tax credits and exemptions on payroll contributions for workers 
employed in newly-created jobs (Brace 2002).   
It is important to note that many of these same policy instruments are used in 
entrepreneurial approaches, but to different ends. The presence or absence of a particular policy 
instrument such as tax credits or direct financing is not the defining feature used to classify an 
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approach as “locational” versus “entrepreneurial.” The Eisinger and Saiz classification is based 
upon “attributes” of programs, rather than policy instruments utilized, per se (Saiz 2001a).  Thus 
in addition to the low-factor-cost aspect of locational development, the level of discretion and 
involvement allowed to government officials in direct decision making is also critical.  
Locational approaches are designed to limit the amount of government planning and 
“intrusion” into the operation of the market. Even as the government takes on the role of a 
provider of positive incentives to businesses, it is also expected to offer these resources with a 
“few-strings-attached” attitude. While governmental entities using locational approaches are 
active in cultivating an easy business environment for potential investors, they are generally 
more restrained in making direct decisions that would strategically alter the discretion of private-
sector actors in the economy. Incentives that are a part of a locational strategy are designed to 
maintain low operation costs for businesses, through use of passive administrative tools such as 
tax exemptions, which limit government involvement in actual business operations (Saiz 2001a). 
Moreover, locational incentives are generally not targeted to specific business sectors (Saiz 
2001a, Eisinger 1988, Fosler 1988). In the locational strategy, governments refrain from directly 
engineering the mix of businesses that operates in the state economy, leaving that to market 
forces. 
Development programs often offer a combination of policy tools, but again, it is the 
attributes related to how these tools are used which indicates the orientation of the state toward 
entrepreneurial or locational development. The Directory of Incentives for Business Investment 
and Development in the United States, a comprehensive catalog that has been published 
periodically from 1983 to 2006, is the most reputable data source for economic development 
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program descriptions used in the subfield of state policy research (Saiz 2001, Gray and Hanson 
2012). The latest edition of the directory, published by the research consulting firm Friedman 
and Associates, provides qualitative summaries for thousands of state-level incentives programs, 
allowing researchers to link policy tools used by these programs to stated purposes of these tools.   
For example, the South Carolina Jobs Economic Development Authority offers industrial 
revenue bonds (IRBs) for the acquisition of land and other assets related to the construction of 
new buildings for manufacturing industries (Friedman and Associates 2006).  IRBs are issued by 
public-sector entities such as state or local governments on behalf of private corporations, for the 
purpose of lowering the interest that must be paid out as income to the bond-holders. Interest 
income received by investors in publically issued bonds is exempt from taxes by the federal and 
state governments, whereas privately-issued bond income is not exempt from taxes. Thus, 
issuing bonds through a government is a way for businesses to lower the amount of interest-
income that must be paid out to bond-holders over the life of the bond. Critics of IRBs describe 
them as “essentially private transactions laundered through a public entity” to subsidize the costs 
of investor returns on the bonds (Good Jobs First 2014.)   South Carolina’s IRB program has 
multiple attributes of locational development strategies. The issuance of the bonds clearly serves 
to lower capital acquisition costs for businesses to locate in the state. Moreover, there is no 
targeting of specific manufacturing industries noted in the program description for the bonds, nor 
are there any job-creation quotas or other substantial requirements listed (Friedman and 
Associates 2006).  In theory, any large manufacturing-based business wishing to expand 
operations into the state could apply for this bond assistance and be eligible to receive it. 
Moreover, the program suggests minimal involvement from the state in the actual working 
operations of the business.   
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Compare this to the Missouri Small Business Incubator Program, which also offers direct 
financing to lower the cost of business investment. However, its funds are targeted specifically to 
“incubator” organizations that promote small businesses in their initial start-up phases. Clearly, 
the use of funds is designed to encourage the creation of new businesses within the community, 
not simply to lower operation costs for existing, fully-operational enterprises. Moreover, the 
Incubator Program offers a credit to taxpayers who contribute to the fund. However, in this case 
the tax credit is not being used to lower a business payroll cost, as is often the case in locational 
incentive packages; rather it is an incentive to motivate businesses and individuals to contribute 
to a government-run fund. Additionally, the incubator sites receiving funds have to be approved 
by the state administrators as a part of the program (Friedman and Associates 2006). There is a 
much larger involvement of the government in the direct provision of this program and in 
determining the eligibility of recipients.  
Moreover, the goal of this program and others like it is to create the financing instrument 
for clusters of start-up businesses, operating collectively through the incubator organization. Left 
alone on the private market such enterprises would likely not even form, but the “protective 
business environment” offered by the state-sponsored incubator gives them a chance to emerge 
and grow (Friedman and Associates 2006). The program attempts to transcend market forces and 
offer new entrepreneurs a shot at survival, even if during the initial years of operation there is 
little profit to be made. The higher level of involvement of the government in the direct operation 
of a funding source, which is targeted specifically to start-up businesses, demonstrates core 
attributes of entrepreneurial programming.  
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Table 4 offers a summary of selected economic development programs operating during 
year 2006, providing additional examples of entrepreneurial and locational attributes. In some 
programs both classes of strategy-related attributes are discernible, illustrating the mix of 
approaches that can be present in each state’s economic development program.  
 In addition to corporate subsidies and funding tools, states also operate programs with 
more generalized objectives such as initial location, advertising, and communication with 
businesses and customers outside the state. While such activities are not officially tracked as 
“incentives” programs, they are important to states’ overall economic development strategies. 
Since they are often created to persuade existing businesses to invest in the state, these activities 
are typically associated with locational development. A primary example of state investment 
marketing is the location of branch offices abroad. States operated over 240 trade offices in over 
30 different countries, while spending almost $200 million on international marketing and 
recruitment efforts, NOT including incentives packages, according to some research (Conlan, 
Dudley, and Clark 2004). South Carolina operates offices in China, Germany, and Japan to 
encourage “mutually positive relationships between the state and foreign countries,” contributing 
to an impressive 1,200 foreign subsidiary locations in the state (SC Department of Commerce 
2014). Governors play a leading role in marketing for foreign investment by conducting field 
visits and leading regional delegations to foreign trade partners, such as Tennessee Gov. 
Haslam’s 2012 visit to Tokyo for its annual meeting of the Japan-U.S. Southeast Association 
trade group (Nashville Chamber of Commerce 2012). Governors have also been active in hosting   
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Table 4. Attributes of Selected Economic Development Programs, 2006 
 
 
Program State Program Description Analysis of Attributes 
Community Bank Tax 
Credit 
Missouri State tax credits provided to contributors and 
investors of a community bank.  
Entrepreneurial: 
Incentive targeted to grow a “value added” sector – banking. 
Investment eligible for credit must be made to a bank “created for a public purpose.”; bank 
investments purpose is to create/ expand new small businesses. 
Stated program purpose is to create investment in distressed areas that would otherwise not receive 
conventional funding on the private market. 
 
Locational: 
Tax credit tool is administratively passive. 




Missouri Job training program administered directly by 
state agencies to upgrade workers skills or train 
new workers when a facility modernizes 
production processes. 
Entrepreneurial: 
Customized employee training to enable modernization of facility or recruitment and training of 
employees in new jobs created by industry investment in new processes. 
 
Locational: 
Not specified to any particular industry sector or geographic location. 
Ethanol Producer 
Incentives 
Missouri Production-based grant to producers of ethanol. Entrepreneurial: 
Targeted grant to encourage production in an emerging industry.  
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Table 4. Continued. 
Program State Program Description Analysis of Attributes 
Local Industrial 
Development Bonds 
Missouri Municipalities and counties are allowed to issue 
state tax exempt general obligation or revenue 
bonds to finance industrial development projects.  
Locational: 
Non-targeted program is eligible to any manufacturing plant or warehouse approved by local 
government.  
Passively administered IRBs, not subject to public referendum. 




Missouri Creation of public-private corporation to operate 
loan programs for four separate seed and venture 
capital funds, including the High-Tech Industrial 
Expansion Program. 
Entrepreneurial: 
Program created by the MO General Assembly as a public-private enterprise. 
Targets emerging bio-tech industry. 
Provides funding for initial start-up of businesses which pose higher risk and would struggle to 
obtain funding on conventional private market. 






Provides Industrial Revenue Bonds to 
manufacturing entities to acquire land and 
equipment and to construct buildings.  
Locational: 
Program is non-targeted to include manufacturing, as well as healthcare, Educational, and solid 
waste disposal sectors. 
Passively-administered tax-exempt bond program.. 







Table 4. Continued. 
Program State Program Description Analysis of Attributes 




Exempts aircraft and other personal property of 
an air carrier operating a hub terminal facility in 
South Carolina from property taxation.  
Locational: 
Passively administered tax exemption. 
Advantages the enterprise via capital-asset factor cost reduction. 
 
Entrepreneurial: 
Targeted incentive specific to air-transport industry sector. 
Big Fee South 
Carolina 
Allows preferential local tax rates for firms that 
invest in South Carolina through negotiation of a 
Fee-in-lou –of-property- tax agreement. Reduces 
assessment ratio and millage rate of firm 
property as compared to rates assessed on other 
businesses. 
Locational: 
Passively administered tax abatement.  
Advantages the enterprise via capital and land factor cost reduction. 





Generally, construction contractors must pay 
sales tax on purchases. This incentive provides 
construction contractors of manufacturing 
companies tax-free purchases of parts that are 
used as components of manufacturing machinery. 
Locational: 
Passively administered sales tax exemption on purchases. 
Advantages both the construction contractor and the manufacturer who contracts with them via 
capital asset factor cost reduction. 
Not targeted to specific sectors of manufacturing industry. Actually extends incentives beyond 






Provision of tax credit on SC income tax, band 
tax, or insurance premiums tax to businesses 
investing in a community development 
corporation, a non-profit entity that is devoted to 
development of small businesses and residential 
properties in low-income areas.  
Entrepreneurial: 
Leverages private funds to grow capital in community development corporations to promote small 
business creation and growth. 




Table 4. Continued. 
Program State Program Description Analysis of Attributes 
Small Business Energy 
Loan Program 
Tennessee Provides low-interest loans to small businesses to 
install energy-efficiency improvements in 
existing operations. 
Entrepreneurial: 
Targeted to small business sector. 




Assistance Program for 
Small and Minority 
Owned Businesses 
Tennessee Provides loan guarantees for small businesses 
and minority/women-owned businesses in the 
telecommunications sector. 
Entrepreneurial: 
Incentive targeted to a “value added” sector - telecommunications. 
Incentive targeted to small business sector, and to women and people of color in particular. 
 








conferences in-state and establishing state global competitiveness agencies as cabinet level 
positions (National Governors Association 2002) to encourage foreign direct investment. 
However, state economic development marketing efforts are not only important for 
encouraging inward investment. Foreign trade offices are just as active in “demand side” 
messaging, working to connect customers and consumers in out-of-state markets to services and 
products manufactured within the state. Prospecting for export markets is likely to benefit 
emerging, home-grown industries even more than re-located enterprises, which may have a 
customer-base pre-established; thus marketing research programs are also compatible with 
entrepreneurial development. South Carolina’s Department of Commerce advertises an “export 
team” on its website ready-and-willing to mine for customer markets in foreign countries. 
Assistance is provided in organizing trade-related training seminars and providing trade 
counseling, market research on export potential and logistics, and coordination of international 
trade missions to conduct sales meetings (SC Department of Commerce 2014). These general 
day-to-day operations which enhance demand for in-state products are not offered as incentives 
direct to companies, but they serve as important support activities for both entrepreneurial and 
locational strategies of economic development, nonetheless. 
 
Impacts of Economic Development Programs on State Economies 
Given the enormous value of many corporate investment incentives packages, and the 
ever-pressing need for states to nurture dynamic and competitive economies in a global age, the 
research agenda to evaluate the tangible impacts of economic development programming has 
been prolific. Locational development programs have tended to receive more attention than 
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entrepreneurial ones, as the latter entail long-term strategies that are more complex to assess 
(Hart 2008). There is conflicting evidence regarding the effectiveness of either strategy in 
building stronger economies, but a more or less common conclusion is that locational approaches 
have resulted in significant disadvantages overall, even if they have yielded benefits for some 
communities. 
It is important to understand the scope of economic development programs in terms of 
monetary value. Previous scholarly research estimated the value of total state and local economic 
development expenditures at around $50 billion a year (Peters and Fisher 2004, Thomas 2000). 
A more recent investigation by the New York Times found that in aggregate states award $80.4 
billion in incentives each year, through at least 1,800 different programs (Story 2012). In reality 
the figure is probably much higher, as few states have strong legal requirements to provide 
public disclosure of the value of incentive packages, and even those that do probably under-
report the real cost of economic development programming (Mattera et al 2010). According to 
the New York Times project, Texas heads the list offering an estimated $19.1 billion a year in 
subsidies, amounting to over $700 per capita. Michigan, California, New York, and 
Pennsylvania each provide over $4 billion a year. Other states, such as Oklahoma, Nebraska, 
Vermont, and Alaska offer less in total incentives, but at a per capita basis the give-away is 
substantial (between $580 to $990 per citizen). The state of Tennessee is estimated to award 
almost $2 billion a year in incentives, or $249 per capita. These examples are illustrative of a 
four-decade trend of states adopting increasing numbers of tax incentive programs to aid inward 
investment. By the beginning of the 1990’s four in five states had instituted some sort of 
incentive package program, whereas in 1969 only about 20 to 30 percent had such programs in 
place (Brace 2002). While locational tax incentive programs are common and continue to grow, 
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entrepreneurial programs actually gained more momentum during the eighties and nineties, 
although in the past decades states have tended to shift emphasis once again to locational 
programs (Saiz and Clarke in Gray and Hanson 2012).  
A number of high-profile incentives packages provide provocative examples of states’ 
fascination with corporate subsidizing, many of them offered to bring automotive facilities to the 
southeast United States. South Carolina gave Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW) $130 
million in incentives to locate in Greenville in the early 1990’s, and agreed to lease land to the 
company for $1 a year (Brace 2002). Alabama lavished Mercedes Benz with an estimated $325 
million, even though much of the subsidy provision was controversial and arguably unethical 
(Brace 2002, Donahue 1997). Volkswagen was lured to Chattanooga in 2008 by over $550 
million in incentives from federal, state, and local sources combined, which equated to about 
$200,000 for each job created (Flessner 2014).  South Carolina offered $900 million in 
incentives to Boeing in a failed attempt to entice the aircraft manufacturer to Charleston in 2003. 
While the recruitment effort was not successful, the state was prepared to shell out $1.25 in 
direct financing and future tax breaks for every $1 Boeing invested in the project (Stech and 
Slade 2010).  
The rationale for these generous offers is that the potential for job growth, rising incomes, 
and the multiplier effect of business investment on the greater community justify the loss of tax 
revenues. However, the evidence that incentives programs have resulted in better economic 
outcomes is conflicting. First, there is the jobs debate. It is no surprise that politicians responsible 
for sealing investment deals are happy to boast about the number of new jobs created by high-
profile relocations (Hart 2007). Governor Haslam, for example, regularly takes credit for job 
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growth on the state’s Economic and Community Development newsroom website, releasing 
stories about new facilities expanding or re-locating to Tennessee (State of Tennessee Newsroom 
and Media Center 2014). Major plant expansions certainly make a mark on local economies 
fortunate enough to benefit from them. The 2008 VW deal included the promise of 2,000 new 
jobs to Chattanooga, and a follow-up report revealed that VW actually hired 2,500 since the deal 
closed, while announcing plans to expand hiring in the future (Flessner 2014).  It is clear that job 
growth is a real advantage of corporate subsidy packages when assessing investment deals on a 
case by case basis. 
However, academic researchers question the impact that such development policies have 
on the long-term trajectory of the state economy. According to Susan Hansen’s in-depth 
examination of “low-cost” development approaches in the age of globalization, such strategies 
actually had a significant negative effect on average income in states from 1970-95. Moreover, 
they largely failed to increase foreign direct investment and only decreased unemployment 
marginally (Hansen 2006, 2001).  While incentives packages may lure facilities and create jobs, 
there is usually no guarantee that such jobs will be high-paying or that they will include benefits. 
Many researchers emphasize that the quality of jobs created, the productivity of new jobs and 
innovation processes (Hall 2007), and overall raises in per capita income (Atkinson and Andes 
2010) are more meaningful indicators to evaluate the impact of locational incentives programs. If 
incentives packages actually contribute to “lower-end” employment and declining household 
income, the effectiveness of these policies, even if yielding job growth, is doubtful. Multiple 
studies suggest that tax incentives do little to create quality employment or efficient expansion of 
the labor force (Lynch 2004, Atkinson and Andes 2010, Christopherson and Rightor 2010).  
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In fact, many costly locational projects have failed to deliver sustained net growth in 
employment at all. In 2009 General Motors issued a list of sites set for closing due to its looming 
bankruptcy proceedings. According to a New York Times investigative report, 50 of those 
facilities were in jurisdictions where General Motors had received state and local incentives to 
locate or maintain existing facilities. The state of Wisconsin offered GM $150 million in tax 
breaks to continue operations in Janesville in 2009, but the company closed the facility.  The 
town of Moraine, Ohio lost a GM factory in 2008, after giving GM incentives in 1997 to expand 
operations.  At the time, local officials had been warned by company officials that locations in 
Louisiana and New Jersey were also being considered. It was later discovered that GM had never 
even been in active communication with leaders in either location (Story 2012).  Concerns over 
the security and duration of jobs created as a result of incentives deals has prompted outcries for 
greater accountability measures to ensure employment targets be met (Office of the New York 
State Comptroller 2006, National Governors Association 2002). Surveys of municipal leaders 
reveal increasing use of “clawback” agreements in incentive packages, which provide some 
compensation to communities when job growth does not occur as projected or when a recipient 
company exits the community after only a short period of generating local employment 
opportunities (Bartik 2004).  
 Another disadvantage to luring investment through locational strategies is that even if 
jobs are generated through such deals, the trade-off in lost revenues for public services exacts 
substantial costs on state economies. In Texas and Kansas the “low-cost path” of development 
contributed to a troubling erosion of public funds for education and social programs, even as 
companies were rewarded with generous exemptions from corporate taxes (Burkdull and Truman 
1999, Story 2012). Business locations may entail wide social costs as a result of environmental 
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degradation, population growth, public school overcrowding, and even public health concerns. 
Intel, for example, won a sizable incentives package from the state of New Mexico to locate a 
facility in Rio Rancho, but pollution from the plant was soon found to be a contributor to skin 
disorders among residents (Friedman 1996).  The concentration of subsidies to large corporations 
may disadvantage smaller businesses which rely on state spending for maintenance of roads, 
infrastructure, and public education to ensure productivity and quality employees (Brace 2002).  
Corporate subsidizing arguably harms the business community at a collective level because it 
causes public entities to misallocate total resources available that can encourage “bigger picture” 
economic growth (Burstein and Rolnick 1995).  
 The loss of public revenues and resources exacerbated by locational development 
approaches has been challenged by taxpayers in at least one state. Concerned citizens in Ohio 
argued that the state and the City of Toledo violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution by 
granting DaimlerChrysler incentives to expand operations at the beginning of the 21st century. 
The company had received a franchise tax credit from the state for the purchase of machinery, as 
well as a property tax waiver from the City on land acquisitions.  The citizens argued they had 
standing to contest the subsidy package because they would sustain injury due to the loss of 
revenues to fund vital public services.  In DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno (2005) the Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled that taxpayers have no legal standing to litigate state or local tax exemptions to 
corporations because they sustained only a generalized, rather than particularized injury 
(Denning 2005). This decision is a significant impediment for citizens in challenging the logic 
and equity of the practice of granting corporate subsidies.  The high court’s ruling essentially 
precludes possibility of the federal government intervening on this issue, even though it is clearly 
germane to inter-state commerce. 
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It is the competitive dynamic that federalism cultivates among the states that drives up 
the cost of the incentives give-away game (Hart 2007). While tax costs may not be of primary 
concern for firms when initially targeting relocation sites, if there are multiple appropriate sites 
available for investment, state incentives packages can contribute to firms’ ultimate re-location 
decisions. Companies know that many state leaders operate as if they are trapped in a prisoner’s 
dilemma, focused on the interests of their state individually, without careful consideration of the 
collective inter-state costs of “bidding wars” (Brace 2002). It is strategically in a company’s 
interests to dangle the possibility of incentives offers from neighboring states to optimize their 
bargaining position in another (Donahue 1997 in Gray and Hanson 2012). Pitting states against 
each other has created an unfortunate “race to the bottom” in some regions of the country, one in 
which  rival states are not only willing to sacrifice tax revenues for needed public services, but 
are also compelled to slash existing labor and environmental regulations in order to maintain a 
“business-friendly” climate . The adoption of locational incentive policies by neighboring states 
is a significant determinant of whether a state pursues “low cost” strategies to economic 
development (Siaz 2001b), and interstate competition for investment has contributed to the 
diffusion of policies which reduce labor wages and company employment costs (Hansen 2006). 
Concerns over the depression of worker protections and environmental standards in neighboring 
jurisdictions of states pursuing locational development strategies has led to calls for reform (Frey 
1999, Chapter 4). Coalitions of academics and policy practitioners (Pierce 1995), including the 
National Governors Association (Brace 2002), have united to discourage the “predatory 
competition” implicit in the locational approach.  Nevertheless, corporate subsidy provision as an 
economic development tool still features heavily in many states’ programs, in spite of questions 
about its success.  
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Given the rising doubts about the efficiency and effectiveness of locational “smokestack 
chasing” programs, entrepreneurial development approaches emerged in the eighties as an 
alternative (Brace 2002). However, the ability to directly evaluate the cost-effectiveness of 
entrepreneurial development programming is limited, since its policy instruments, such as 
greater public-private collaboration, are not always tracked directly in state budgets (Hart 2007). 
The impact of entrepreneurial programs has been found to have positive influences on 
productivity (Yilmaz and Dinc 2002), equitable income distribution (Langer 2001), and 
manufacturing employment (Saiz 2001b) in some larger N examinations. Case studies specific to 
individual economic sectors provide some favorable evaluation as well. For instance, tax credits 
in research and development to promote innovation enhancements generated an equal amount of 
private sector investment according to one case study (Wu 2005). Moreover, a California Small 
Business Loan Guarantee Program experienced positive employment growth for recipient firms, 
and was an overall fiscal gain for the state government (Bradshaw 2002). However, the targeted 
use of incentives to buoy the “value added” film and television industries has been quite costly to 
states without producing convincing returns (Christopherson and Rightor 2010). Even in the 
“successful” examples of entrepreneurial development a critical missing element is a finding of 
net gains in state employment or reduced unemployment. While entrepreneurial development 
may help to produce better quality jobs, there is less evidence to show that the overall labor force 
benefits from greater employment opportunities with this approach. 
Evaluation of the impact of development strategies is typically centered on job creation 
and erosion of public revenues, but the effect that economic development orientation has on 
unionization has received only scant attention. Susan Hansen provides a rare examination of this 
subject, finding that pursuit of “low-wage” strategies did negatively impact unionization rates 
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from 1975-1995 (Hansen 2006). This research project has not identified an already existing 
examination that directly assesses the impact of entrepreneurial development strategies on labor 
unionization. A contribution of this dissertation is that it examines both development strategy-
types side-by-side to uncover the unique influence, if any, they have on unionization.  
 One clarification is necessary regarding my consideration of locational development 
policies and unionization. Researchers sometimes conflate locational, supply-side approaches to 
development with presence of “right-to-work” laws, by definition (Grant et. al. 1995, for 
example).  Again, I underscore that economic development policy tools are more accurately 
conceptualized as separate from labor regulations. States may offer generous incentives to lower 
labor costs for businesses, while still allowing union shops. (The state of Michigan, prior to 
2010, is an example.) This study directly tests the impact of development approaches -as defined 
by the attributes of economic policy instruments offered by state programs- on union density 
rates, instead of defining “right-to-work” status as an element of the locational strategy. “Right-
to-work” laws will be examined as a separate controlling factor in my upcoming statistical 
analysis. 
 
Measuring Types of Economic Development Strategy 
 Empirical research into the impact of development policy on unionization outcomes 
requires the utilization of a proper measure which can capture the differences between the states 
in their propensity to use each approach. States generally do not embrace only one type of 
economic development strategy; in fact most states use locational incentives alongside the more 
“demand generating” initiatives to encourage entrepreneurism (Saiz 2001a), sometimes within 
46 
 
the same program. States also differ in the amount of economic development activism displayed 
using either locational or entrepreneurial programs (Langer 2001). Given that states employ a 
mix of approaches with varying degree of intensity, a straight-forward qualitative classification 
of state programs into mutually exclusive nominal categories is not appropriate.  
 Policy researchers have utilized various quantitative measures to gauge the differences in 
state programs relative to the major economic development orientations, usually basing them at 
least in part on Eisinger’s “supply side” and “demand side” distinction (Gray and Lowery 1990, 
Hansen and Berkman 1990, for instance). Jenkins and Leich coded programs into separate 
interval indices denoting labor regulation, industrial recruitment (locational), and entrepreneurial 
approaches in their 1994 study. However, their measures are limited to earlier decades (1971-90) 
and have been criticized for their inability to accurately track historical shifts in state 
development policy approaches (Grant et. al 1995). Researcher Laura Langer adopted the 
Eisinger conceptual classifications, creating ratio measures to test the impact of overall economic 
policy activism, supply-side policies, demand-side policies, and mixed approaches on income 
inequality (Langer 2001). However, Langer included only 16 of the most visible and frequently-
used incentive tools as cataloged in the Directory of Business Incentives (National Association of 
State Development Agencies 1998) guide to construct her measures.  
 Martin Saiz has provided the most empirically supported quantitative measure of state 
economic development orientation with his construction of two separate indices tracking 
entrepreneurial and locational development utilization (2001a). Like Langer, he used the 
NASDA guide to assess attributes of state programs, but he coded all incentives programs listed 
in the catalog according to a fuller range of related program attributes to create his interval-data 
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indices of locational and entrepreneurial approaches. The separate indices allow researchers to 
consider the activism of states in regard to both entrepreneurial policy and locational policy in 
the same model, as the measure is not constructed to categorize the state according to one or the 
another strategy. Saiz also subjected his indices to a confirmatory factor analysis, demonstrating 
support for the definition of these development types as unique, discrete concepts. Since the Saiz 
measures are interval level and do change longitudinally over time, they are able to be analyzed 
in multivariate regression and time-series models. 
 Even though the Saiz indices have methodological advantages and have been subjected to 
rigorous statistical standards, they do have some limitations. First of all, Saiz was only able to 
update his indices in years when the NASDA guide was published, which was approximately 
every 4 years, so the indices updates are sporadic.  Interpolation for missing years is necessary to 
deploy the measures in annual time-series analysis. Moreover, Saiz’ attribute-based coding of 
locational approaches is not always able to account for important variations in corporate subsidy 
programs. Some, though not all, locational tax credits for job creation do require quality 
standards, such as pay over an area minimum wage and provision of health benefits (Mattera et. 
al, 2011). All tax credit job creation programs that are not targeted to specific industries are 
coded as locational in the Saiz typology (Saiz 2001a), even though the higher job standards 
required in some state programs do not conform strictly to a “low” factor-cost objective. Thus, 
some nuances of locational development programming escape consideration in the Saiz indices. 
Despite these limitations, the indices are the most comprehensive source of historical data 
available for measuring different economic development policy types used by the states. 
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 Table 5 shows the 2006 Saiz indices tables for each development approach. States that 
are high in one development orientation tend to score lower on the other, but this is not absolute. 
The state of Tennessee, for instance, scores a little above average on both indices, while the state 
of Wyoming shows low levels and the state of Nevada shows high levels on both measures. 
Moreover, this table displays results for only two of the years available due to limited space. 
Looking across all years available, the state indices readings do change over time, demonstrating 
the dynamic temporal nature of the data. 
 
Predicting the Impact of Economic Development Strategy on Unionization 
 Given the unique means that entrepreneurial and locational strategies use to accomplish 
economic development, it is sensible to predict that their intensity of use could impact 
unionization levels differently. The two orientations regard labor in very different ways, with the 
locational approach viewing it as an input cost which must be minimized, while the 
entrepreneurial approach considers it as an asset which can add value to business. Additionally, 
the entrepreneurial approach prioritizes overall wealth generation to cultivate more consumer 
activity; and well-paid laborers contribute more to consumer demand than less affluent ones. The 
“bread and butter” function of unions is to elevate the wage and salary rates of workers, and 
union jobs pay significantly higher rates than non-union ones in the same sector, especially when 
considering benefits provisions (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014, Bryson 2014). Since labor 
wage rates feature so prominently in both economic development approaches, as well as being a 
critical issue to organized labor, the adoption and use of development approaches is likely 
associated with declines or increases in unionization. 
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Table 5. State Economic Development Strategy Indexes, 2006 & 2002  
 
Locational Index  Entrepreneurial Index  
       
State 2006 2002  State 2006 2002 
South Carolina 2.28 2.31  Nebraska 3 1.14 
Idaho 2.08 1.57  New Hampshire 3 3 
Oklahoma 1.87 1.71  Nevada 2.63 1.5 
Kentucky 1.86 1.96  New Jersey 2.59 2.47 
Arizona 1.8 1.2  Florida 2.38 2.35 
Nevada 1.75 1.75  Minnesota 2.29 2.22 
Hawaii 1.73 1.67  Wisconsin 2.26 2.21 
Connecticut 1.69 1.58  North Dakota 2.21 2.55 
Maine 1.68 1.68  Massachusetts 2.2 2.2 
Rhode Island 1.68 1.55  New York 2.2 2.15 
Montana 1.67 1.67  West Virginia 2.14 1.94 
North Dakota 1.63 0.95  Missouri 2.13 2.06 
Arkansas 1.62 1.56  Maryland 2.12 1.92 
Georgia 1.61 2  Washington 2.09 2 
Kansas 1.6 1.52  Pennsylvania 2.04 1.77 
North Carolina 1.58 1.5  Illinois 2 2.04 
Nebraska 1.57 1.79  South Dakota 2 1.36 
Colorado 1.56 1.4  Utah 2 2 
Mississippi 1.56 1.37  Iowa 1.95 1.75 
New Mexico 1.56 1.4  Texas 1.93 1.85 
Louisiana 1.55 1.71  Virginia 1.93 1.91 
West Virginia 1.48 1.35  Indiana 1.83 1.79 
Tennessee 1.47 1.47  Tennessee 1.8 1.8 
Alabama 1.43 1.36  US Mean  1.78 1.71 
Delaware 1.35 1.53  Louisiana 1.75 1.74 
US Mean 1.34 1.32  Oregon 1.74 1.7 
Virginia 1.33 1.41  Montana 1.67 1.6 
New York 1.32 1.28  Vermont 1.67 1.67 
Ohio 1.32 1.24  Connecticut 1.66 1.53 
Michigan 1.3 1.09  Ohio 1.65 1.62 
California 1.19 1.12  Oklahoma 1.65 1.57 
Florida 1.14 1.09  California 1.63 1.53 
Texas 1.13 1.3  Alaska 1.6 1.63 
Washington 1.13 1.13  Arkansas 1.57 1.76 
Iowa 1.1 1.05  Alabama 1.52 1.52 
Vermont 1.08 1.25  New Mexico 1.52 1.52 
Massachusetts 1.07 1.07  Delaware 1.5 1.67 
Alaska 1.05 1.16  Michigan 1.5 1.55 
Oregon 1.05 1.1  Kentucky 1.48 1.48 
Missouri 1.03 1.03  Hawaii 1.4 1.4 
Wyoming 1 1  North Carolina 1.37 1.7 
Pennsylvania 0.98 1  Mississippi 1.26 1.15 
Maryland 0.96 1  Wyoming 1.25 1.33 
Indiana 0.9 0.85  Rhode Island 1.21 1.28 
Utah 0.9 0.9  Arizona 1.2 1.2 
New Hampshire 0.82 0.82  Georgia 1.19 1.32 
Illinois 0.8 0.76  Kansas 1.19 1.68 
New Jersey 0.79 0.76  Maine 1.18 1.18 
Wisconsin 0.77 0.77  Idaho 1.15 1.71 
South Dakota 0.67 1.45  South Carolina 1.03 0.69 
Minnesota 0.64 0.89  Colorado 0.67 0.9 
 
Source: Data taken from tables published in Gray and Hanson 2012, 2008. See Saiz 2001. 
50 
 
Locational policies could challenge labor unions in their efforts to raise wages and as a 
result could place downward pressure on unionization rates. First of all, locational policies may 
be more likely to attract the particular businesses that desire low-cost employees, given the 
factor-cost reduction emphasis of corporate subsidy packages. Such firms, according to the  
“conventional wisdom” of many advocates of foreign direct investment, would actively resist 
and avoid unionization fearing the upward pressure unions place on labor costs (Leahy and 
Montagna 2001); and this could challenge unions in their success to win new members. These 
firms may also be more adamant in their attempts to challenge union representation where it 
already exists, seeking to layoff union workers and replace them with non-union labor, and may 
be combative with unions in wage negotiations (Bronfenbrenner 2000). In this scenario, union 
membership levels could drop due to the perceived ineffectiveness of unions to win wage gains 
and provide job securities for workers. 
Also consider another argument made by economists contending that increased business 
competition impedes labor unions attempts to raise wages. Locational approaches aim to increase 
the number of enterprises in existing, established industry sectors by luring investment into the 
state from elsewhere. Domestic firms would face increased competition from relocated firms in 
the state market and may experience tighter profit margins as a result. This could lead to less 
surplus available to pass on as wage increases, limiting “rent-seeking” opportunities for unions to 
redirect profits to labor (Acemoglu, Aghion, Machin and Violante 2001, referenced in Acemoglu 
et. al. 2001 explores this). Still, one must also keep in mind the role of competition from the 
labor perspective. Increased entry of firms into the state economy may also intensify companies’ 
demand for labor, pressuring firms to pay premium wages to attract or maintain workers who 
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could find job opportunities more plentiful. Thus, one could also argue that unions would benefit 
from an increase in “rent-seeking” opportunities due to heightened competition. 
Another way to think about the impact of locational development strategies on 
unionization is to consider how they could increase the demand for unionization among workers. 
Well-paid workers could find there is little to gain from unionization membership, but as wages 
slip and benefits are cut workers may become more motivated to collective action to resist these 
losses. Low-wage strategies of development may be a crucial catalyst to encourage greater union 
activism and organizing campaigns. Some historical analysis supports the argument that in 
circumstances of low job security and wage cuts unionization activity actually increases 
(Gregory 2009).  
However, the single direct examination of locational incentives policies and unionization 
that I have identified indicates a negative impact on union membership rates (Hanson 2006). 
Given this, and the likelihood that locational strategies attract non-union businesses, I offer this 
general working hypothesis: 
Higher levels of locational policy orientation will have a negative impact on state 
unionization levels. 
 
 As with locational development, one can posit a variety of causal links between 
entrepreneurial policy and unionization. Given the lack of extant research examining this 
relationship, hypothesis generation is rather speculative. A simplistic model would emphasize 
the “quality jobs” focus apparent in much entrepreneurial development programming and its 
possible association with higher levels of unionization. Since in the entrepreneurial orientation 
firms are encouraged to view labor as an asset rather than a cost, there may be greater 
willingness to pay higher wages. This could lead to increased collaboration and goal congruity 
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between firms and unions, and less hostility toward collective bargaining and union organizing in 
economies promoting entrepreneurial policy tools. This in turn could enhance unions in their 
ability to secure wage gains and entice more workers to join. Noteworthy examples from the 
practitioner literature demonstrate engagement between entrepreneurial innovation projects and 
unions. The Apollo Alliance, for example, is a “third-way” consortium of skilled trade labor 
unions and “green” manufacturing companies that collaborate to advance industrial growth 
through a “high wage, union jobs” model (BlueGreen Alliance 2014).  Tailored job training and 
apprenticeship programs, classified as entrepreneurial policy tools by definition, tend to utilize 
unions as providers of professional and skills development (see table at chapter’s opening).  
Anecdotal evidence from the state of Wisconsin demonstrated the use of entrepreneurial policies 
in numerous highly regarded initiatives, such as the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership 
and the Milwaukee Jobs Initiative, in producing jobs in union-friendly businesses (Center for 
Wisconsin Strategy 2011).  “Freelancers” in the software development, financial advising, and 
artistic trades have developed innovative approaches to securing job opportunities through an 
“entrepreneurial union” model, which has united 115,000 white-collar workers across all 50 
states (Wilkinson 2009). In these examples entrepreneurialism and unionization appear to walk 
hand-in-hand. 
 But an alternative argument is that high-wage development actually reduces demand for 
unionization among workers, namely because the willingness of firms to provide generous 
salaries could obviate the perceived need for union activism. This interpretation regards 
entrepreneurial development policy as a substitute for labor wage bargaining (Kaufman 2004).   
An additional, somewhat more complex theory, casts further doubt on the assumption that 
entrepreneurial development strategies are compatible with heightened union opportunity. The 
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“skills-biased technical change” premise contends that higher-skilled, higher-educated workers 
have increased their wage earnings at the expense of earnings by lower-skilled labors (Acemoglu 
2002).  Some prominent political economists contend that skills-biased change impacts 
unionization as well, by undermining the solidarity between skilled and unskilled workers. Union 
wage bargaining generally has the effect of compressing the wage earnings spectrum between 
the highest and lowest paid workers. In the innovation economy promoted by entrepreneurial 
development, highly skilled workers may find the cost of wage compression higher than the so-
called “outside option” of working non-union (Acemoglu et al 2001). A technically advanced 
worker may see no need to join a union to safeguard pay increases as the value of their skills on 
the market affords them wage gains beyond what union bargaining provides. The information 
technology and finance sectors, which entrepreneurial strategies often seek to promote, 
historically show some of the lower rates of unionization (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012) 
Additionally, the mindset of workers in “knowledge economy” sectors may be less amenable to 
collective identity-building that aids unionization. Such employees tend to be more assertive and 
individualistic in their approach to wage bargaining, even to the point of demanding premium 
wages above those made by their high-skilled peers (Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002). The 
opportunism displayed by many “quality job” employees may run counter to union growth. 
 I will start by advancing the more simplistic interpretation of entrepreneurialism in my 
hypothesis testing; that is, that the higher-paying jobs promoted by this approach will present 
opportunities for greater unionization. This is in contrast to the alternate skill-biased technical 
change theory, which suggests that entrepreneurialism could impact unions negatively. 





 Table 6 offers descriptive statistics of union elections outcomes and union density rates 
from three states based on data from the National Labor Relations Board for selected years. 
Missouri provides an example of a state that scores high on the use of entrepreneurial programs 
and low on the use of locational programs. In South Carolina the opposite is the case, as the state 
relies heavily on locational development and less on entrepreneurial development. Tennessee 
provides an example of a more balanced approach, using slightly above average amounts of both 
types of policies. The table shows that in Missouri unions conducted more elections, attempted to 
organize more workers, and actually organized more members than in either South Carolina or 
Tennessee. South Carolina experienced only 21 union elections, and contributed only 957 new 
members due to organizing activities, even though the actual win rate of union elections among  
those attempted was the highest of the three states. In Tennessee, numbers for both union 
organizing effort and actual new members fall between those of the other two states. Macro 
union density numbers are also supplied for the three states, tracking the percentage of the total 
state workforce that is unionized. A similar pattern appears. Missouri has the highest union 
density, followed by Tennessee, and South Carolina is last. 
These descriptive statistics are an early indication that entrepreneurial development 
policies may encourage greater levels of union organizing and membership growth.  In the 
chapters that follow, I will discuss the role of foreign direct investment as an additional critical 
variable which could impact unionization, followed by two multivariate regression models that 
statistically analyze the relationship of economic development strategies and labor organizing 
outcomes while controlling for other important factors. I proceed by predicting that high use of 




Table 6. NLRB Union Election Outcomes for Selected States (2005, 2007, 2009) 
  




Tennessee           
(Dual Focus) 
Union win rate 57% of 147 elections 71% of 21 elections  56% of 48 elections  
Employees eligible to vote 
for unionization 
8808 1209 3492 
New members unionized 6088 957 2633 
Union density * 10.8% 3.6% 5.5% 
Data from NLRB Election Reports, https://www.nlrb.gov/election-reports except where otherwise noted. 














victories, while high engagement of entrepreneurial programs lead to less union membership 


















Chapter 3: Foreign Direct Investment and Variation in State Unionization    
          The most important independent variable in this study is economic development policy 
strategy. However, a proper examination of the state economic development environment and 
unionization outcomes must also consider the role of inward foreign investment as a critical 
secondary factor. First of all, foreign investment is a popular variable-of-interest in much of the 
extant research on unionization. The “conventional wisdom” held among many global economy 
policy-makers for a number of years was that increased openness of domestic economies to the 
global market would accelerate the decline of the labor movement during the late 20th century, 
because international investors want to avoid setting up operations where unions are strong (See 
Rodrik 1996, Friedman, Gerlowski and Silberman 1992, Culem 1988 (in Kucera 2001).  This 
view has also been greatly challenged (Thelen 2001, Leahy & Montagna 2000, Oman 2000; 
Kucera 2001). I re-visit the question of whether or not inward investment causes declining 
unionization in this chapter and offer original evidence for why this argument is suspect.  
Another reason for the examination of foreign investment is that it is directly related to economic 
development policy, as increasing investment is an explicit goal of most economic development 
programs. There may be some important interactive effects revealed when considering how 
development policy in tandem with foreign investment influences unionization. At a minimum, 
the impact of foreign investment must be included as an important control variable in models 
attempting to account for the effect of economic development policy on unionization. 
          Inward foreign investment is a product of economic development activity. This is apparent 
when considering locational strategies, as the goal of this policy approach is to lure existing 
investment to relocate/expand into the state from elsewhere. It is expected that most locational 
programs are likely to prioritize direct marketing and recruitment of foreign investment into a 
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state. However, entrepreneurial development is probably just as likely to be a recruitment vehicle 
for foreign investment, even if the causality is not as direct. Entrepreneurial strategies seek to 
grow a “wealth economy” through nurturing new development in the human resource and 
industry sectors in which a state enjoys a comparative advantage. An affluent state economy 
could lure foreign investors for both demand and supply-side reasons, as will be discussed in this 
chapter. This project does not attempt to differentiate which of the individual development 
approaches is ultimately more successful in luring foreign investment. However, it does 
acknowledge the importance of considering foreign direct investment as a factor impacting 
unionization outcomes in the state, given its critical piece in the development of the state 
economy and its relationship to economic development policy. 
 
Trends in Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
          First, it is useful to define foreign direct investment (FDI) as it is used in this dissertation. 
My project utilizes the definition provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the most 
widely-used source of FDI data in the United States. It regards FDI as “an investment in which a 
resident of one country obtains a lasting interest in, and a degree of influence over the 
management of, a business enterprise in another country.” The BEA definition includes newly 
created and expanded business operations of foreign enterprises (greenfield investment), as well 
as those they gain through mergers and acquisitions (BEA 2008a, in US Department of 
Commerce 2008.)  I contend that merger/acquisition FDI is valid for inclusion in my analysis 
because the ownership transfer of an existing business is often a factor that unions consider in 
evaluating organizing targets, and some evidence shows it is related to pro-union organizing 
outcomes (Bronfenbrenner & Hickey 2004).  
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           Inward foreign direct investment has increased over the past decades, and in recent years 
in particular. Figure 1 provides numbers for balance of payment and direct investment position 
for years 2003 to 2011 (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014).  This measure examines the 
financial transactions and income flows between foreign parent firms and their affiliate sites 
located in the U.S. (BEA 2008b). The graph indicates that even through the recent years of 
economic recession the amount of financial transactions between overseas parent firms and their 
U.S. subsidiaries continued to increase.  
          Figure 2 provides foreign investment data related to the actual operations of U.S.-hosted 
affiliates, rather than intra-firm financial transactions between parents and their subsidiaries. One 
of the most important metrics tracked related to FDI business operations is the number of 
persons employed by foreign-owned firms. The table indicates that in the U.S. between 5 and 6 
million workers were employed by foreign-headquartered firms each year from 2007 to 2011. 
This represented about 4.5% of the national private sector workforce for years 2007- 2008 (U. S. 
Department of Commerce International Trade Admin 2008). The employment base of foreign-
owned firms in the United States rebounded upward between 2009 and 2011, after dropping 
from 2008.  The employment aspect of foreign investment is particularly important to this 
project, because union success and vitality is most often tracked as a function of the size of 
membership, and employed workers are potential union members. Of course, creation of jobs is 
also a highly emphasized goal of economic development policy and is cited by state elected 
officials as a motivator for prioritizing the creation of development strategies, as discussed in the 





Figure 1. Total FDI in the United States, 2003-2011 











State and federal leaders are acutely aware that foreign investment, distinct from inter-
state investment, is a major economic resource to be cultivated. They explicitly market to foreign 
investors in the competitive scramble with other states to attract new enterprises (See US 
Department of Commerce 2008, 7-8; Tennessee Department of Economic and Community 
Development 2013, National Governors Association 2002). Moreover, economic development 
programs openly cite federalist competition as one of the advantages of the U.S. market when 
advertising to international investors. Consider this excerpt from an “Invest in America” 
information bulletin, published by the US Department of Commerce in 2008: 
“The United States is unique within the global investment community with regard to the 
number, scope, and lead role that states play in attracting foreign direct investment. 
Individual states compete (often against each other) for investments on a global scale 
employing highly skilled investment officials and, in some cases, by maintaining field 
offices in major financial centers worldwide… considering the diversity and size of the 
U. S. economy, sub-national investment promotion agencies are in a unique position to 
offer tailored services that meet the needs of international investors….This decentralized 
system has successfully operated for decades and has yielded billions of dollars in 
international investment throughout the United States.” (italics mine) 
 
Given the growth of FDI in the U.S. national economy, the sizable number of workers 
employed by foreign-firms in the United States, and the active efforts of state policy makers to 
attract FDI to the states, it is critical to account for inward foreign investment when analyzing 
variation in labor union power across the country. Does entry of FDI present a challenge or an 
opportunity for the union movement? The purpose of the rest of the chapter is to present 
evidence that at the very least it is not an impediment to unionization, and as we shall see, it 






Foreign Direct Investment and the International Economy 
Most of the previous study in political science of how FDI impacts labor markets and 
trade unionism comes from the international relations subfield. The research focuses on how 
international openness and capital mobility influences national-level labor relations regimes. The 
oft-debated neo-liberal “convergence” theory stresses how international openness has pushed 
national economies to conform in regard to labor relations practices.  Its adherents hold that 
capital mobility has reconfigured the international economic system of the 20th century by 
creating a borderless world with a single trans-national market supplanting national-level 
economic and political organization as the key institutional instrument of control (Reich 1991, 
Ohmae 1995). In order to compete with other firms companies will seek new locations for their 
operations that offer a comparative advantage in terms of labor and regulatory compliance costs. 
Countries will be compelled to slash their extant regulations on factors of production due to 
competitive pressures from neighboring nation-states to attract business investment, which will 
trigger a domino effect, as all countries adjust their policies to keep labor wages and regulations 
low (Oman 2000; Collinsworth, Goold, and Harvey 1994 ). The consequence of this process will 
be a bottom-ended convergence of countries’ policies related to worker rights, environmental 
standards, and capital taxation. National-level governance structures will become less distinct in 
an unfortunate “race to the bottom”. 
One of the core assumptions of this argument is that capitalists across the globe view 
unions in the same way – as an unwanted interference - and will necessarily seek to avoid them  
to suppress labor costs and maintain control over personnel decisions (Freidman, Gerlowski, and 
Selberman 1992, 411).  Given that the United States consistently ranks as having the weakest 
labor protections among the developed countries (Kucera 2007), and most FDI to the United 
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States comes from developed countries in Europe and Asia (Harrod 2002,  175), some interpret 
firm relocations to the U.S. as a means for capital to flee worker regulations in ‘strong labor’ 
countries. But there is a great deal of debate over what really motivates corporations to expand or 
re-locate their operations overseas.  First of all, when examining the global economy in 
aggregate, foreign capital is more likely to flow into countries with superior worker rights 
enforcement than into those that do not have core labor protections (Rodrick 1997, Kucera 2002; 
Durham 2004). Most FDI is traded among the countries with advanced economies, which as a 
group have higher labor standards than those in developing countries (Drezner 2001). As for how 
firms evaluate the cost of labor, the relative productivity of the workforce, rather than unit labor 
costs is likely a more important consideration, which would favor the high- labor standard 
economies as an FDI destination (Harrod 2002, Krugman 1994). Perhaps most importantly, firm 
preferences are driven largely by demand-side considerations, such as improved access to 
lucrative consumer markets, rather than supply-side input costs (Whitley 1999, Spar and Yaffee 
1999). As noted earlier, much of the FDI in the United States is not the result of strategic 
location decisions at all, but rather the result of mergers and acquisitions of existing operations. 
There is no consensus finding that union presence is significant to multinational firms in their 
relocation decisions.   
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of neo-liberal convergence theory is that studies 
from both comparative and international political economists reveal that major differences 
endure across countries’ labor and capital policies, even after these countries have 
internationalized (Drezner 2001, Garrett 1995, Thelen 2001, Whitley 1999).  A “race to the 
bottom” in terms of collective bargaining coverage is not happening, at least not with all 
countries (European Commission 2008).  Comparative political scientists of the historical 
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institutional perspective contend that national governance and regulatory structures are necessary 
conditions for the long-term evolution of markets, and these structures set the path of national 
economies in persistent directions that are not easily diverted (Peirson and Skocpol 2002). Firms 
and business interests are actors embedded within national economies, and their behavior is 
constrained by the institutional arrangements and norms of the economy in which they arose. 
The nature of the labor relations regime operating in a country is a product of the path dependent 
development of the economy. Unique “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) can be found among the 
world’s advanced economies, challenging the view that nations will converge in regard to worker 
rights and employment policies (Hall and Soskice 2001, Streek and Thelen 2005, Jacoby 2005, 
Whitley 1999). This does not only have significance at the international level of analysis. 
Differences in the market economies of incoming foreign firms could impact unionization 
outcomes at the domestic US-state level, especially compared with home-based firms, as shall be 
discussed later in this chapter. While it is a comparative national politics invention, the Varieties 
of Capitalism approach may also have application to the question of how FDI impacts sub-
national labor markets in an American, federalist context; thus a more detailed look at this body 
of research is in order. 
VoC offers an accessible typology which groups post-industrial countries according to 
the “relational competencies” of their labor relations regimes (Hall and Soskice 2001, Chapter 
1). Two major ‘ideal types’ of economies identified are the Liberal Market Economy (LME) and 
the Coordinated Market Economy (CME). LME’s rely on market structures, pricing, and formal 
contracting to resolve coordination problems in the national economy, and require flexibility in 
their labor supply. Workers are encouraged to develop easily transferable, general skills which 
adapt well to lay-off and re-employment cycles. The United States and the United Kingdom are 
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the classic examples. On the other hand, the Coordinated Market Economy (CME) utilizes a 
variety of non-market structures to coordinate work processes, using inside networks and 
collaborative relationships to promote the core competencies of companies. Corporate strategies 
are arranged around the long-term development of high-quality capital-intensive goods, requiring 
a highly skilled workforce that must invest sizable resources in training specifically for the tasks 
required by the firm’s production regimen. This entails that workers will expect long-term job 
security with the companies that employ them. Sweden and Germany are two noteworthy 
examples of countries classed as CME’s (Hall and Soskice 2001, Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, 
Iverson 2005). 
These varying systems suggest different paths of historical development for labor unions 
and the roles they play in the different types of market economies. In LMEs unions are viewed as 
an interference to firm operations, potentially distorting market wage-setting and limiting firms’ 
abilities to shed redundant workers or reskill workers to other production needs. Labor relations 
dynamics between firms and unions are likely to be conflicting and contentious. In CMEs unions 
evolved into essential tools for promoting firms’ labor needs due to their role in setting 
standardized wage levels in return for job security for their members (Moene and Wallerstein 
1993), thus protecting both worker and firm investments in skill development (Thelen 2004; Hall 
and Soskice 2001). In CME’s unions have secured greater institutional recognition in state-
mediated, corporatist bargaining arrangements, rather than having to fight for legitimacy as is 
often the case with unions in LMEs, where governments play a more limited role in the 
mediation of private sector collective bargaining (Iverson and Cusack 2000). The recognition 
that unions and businesses may develop synergistic, cooperative relationships in some market 
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systems challenges the neo-liberalist assumption that all multi-national firms will necessarily 
resist labor organizing attempts. 
The VoC typology has empirical support. Unionization rates continue to be high in some 
countries, such as the Nordic states which are classified as CMEs, whereas in LMEs such as the 
US and United Kingdom union density has plummeted (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, Skruggs 
2002).  Moreover, we continue to see variation across post-industrial countries in the actual 
practice and enforcement of core labor rights provisions and employment protections with the 
United States and France ranking low, while Sweden, Finland, and Belgium - all classed as 
CME’s - rank high (Kucera 2002, OECD 2004, OECD 1994).  Union power in collective 
bargaining and ability to set binding industry-wide wage rates is notably higher in CMEs than in 
LMEs where union contracts are negotiated at individual company levels (Iverson and Cusack 
2000, Frege and Kelly 2004). Moreover, in LMEs labor regulations and union power has eroded 
more dramatically than in CMEs. Table 7 presents national union density rates for the advanced 
economies of North America, Europe, and Asia. Note that the five countries with the highest 
union density are all CMEs – mainly the Scandinavian economies. The English-speaking 
countries that comprise the Liberal Market Economy group show middle-range to low rates of 
unionization. The group averages listed demonstrate the noteworthy differences in CME (44%) 
and LME (22%) union density among the market economy types. Also note that the United 
States lags behind every other country in union membership levels, with the exception of France.  
To summarize, the validity of the neo-liberal convergence theory from an international 
relations perspective is questionable for several reasons. First of all, it does not adequately 
account for firm preferences in the international economy. The assumption that firms will 
necessarily resist unions and re-locate to avoid labor power is disputable. Secondly, advanced  
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Table 7. Trade Union Density, 2005 for Advanced Economies 
 
Sweden     76.52 CME 
Finland     72.43 CME 
Denmark     70.67 CME 
Norway     54.89 CME 
Belgium     52.87 CME 
Ireland     33.96 LME 
Italy     33.59 LME* 
Austria     33.33 CME 
United Kingdom     28.42 LME 
Canada     27.73 LME 
Australia     22.29 LME 
Germany     21.68 CME 
New Zealand     20.85 LME 
Netherlands     20.56 CME 
Switzerland     19.31 CME 
Japan     18.80 CME 
Spain     14.70 LME* 
United States     11.96 LME 
France     7.67 LME* 
LME Average Density     22.35   
CME Average Density     44.10   
     
* Hall and Soskice contend these economies have aspects of both CME and 
LMEs. However, they contend that their labor relations characteristics 
resemble LMEs. (Hall and Soskice 2000, 21). 









economies have not unanimously cut worker rights, nor has union membership declined sharply 
in all advanced countries. Different varieties of capitalism have been identified, with CME 
 countries maintaining strong trade union movements, while in LME countries unions enjoy less 
recognized legitimacy and labor regulations are weaker. Thus, the assumed outcome of policy 
convergence is not fully corroborated by empirical evidence when viewing this question from a 
comparative-countries perspective. 
 
Neo-liberal convergence theory applied to the study of American states 
           While it is often discussed in an international relations context, the “race to the bottom” 
argument is just as provocative when applied to the study of unionization in the federalist context 
of the American states. First of all it raises the question of how state-level unionization levels 
might impact the amount of FDI that states receive. Investors are aware of the variations in state 
regulatory and economic development strategies as a result of America’s federalist structure, 
largely due to the marketing efforts of states to lure them to invest, and use these differences to 
their advantage (Brace 2000). Union membership levels and labor and environmental 
regulations, alongside differences in capital taxation are routinely advertised by state officials to 
make their state appear as a more attractive relocation target than another (See South Carolina 
Department of Commerce 2014 for just one state’s example). But similar to the debates among 
international relations scholars, researchers of the American states disagree about the extent to 
which foreign firms make their relocation decisions based on union avoidance strategies. 
Overseas companies seek location targets in states where union reach is limited according to 
some state-level scholars (Lipit 1997, Brady and Wallace 2000). Nonetheless, there is a fairly 
consistent finding that FDI flows more freely into higher wage, higher-union density states than 
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into their lower-wage peers (Perrucci 1994, Hansen 2001). The degree to which the state 
economy is internationalized via inward FDI, import competition, and exporting has been found 
to be unrelated to differences in labor costs across the American states (Hansen 2006). Most 
foreign firms pay higher average wages than domestic firms, (U.S. Department of Commerce  
2011; Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall 2007), suggesting that maintaining the cheapest possible 
wage is not a salient concern to overseas companies. However, an alternate view could be that 
foreign firms keep wages high specifically to avoid union agitation. 
           The neo-liberal perspective not only predicts that unionization impacts the attractiveness 
of a state to investors, it also suggests that flows of foreign investment could negatively impact 
unionization levels over time. In their “race to the bottom” states would be compelled to slash 
labor standards and suppress labor power to remain competitive with other states to attract FDI 
and out-of-state domestic investment. Unions could find their power base shrinking as the state 
economy becomes more exposed to the international market.  
          Economists frame the historical decline of unions as a function of increased competition 
among firms, rather than focusing on governmental policy-making to woo investment as do 
political scientists, but the consequences predicted are similar. As foreign companies enter the 
domestic economy corporate profit margins shrink with more competition for consumer demand. 
Lower surplus returns to capital would hinder unions’ abilities to charge higher “rents” to 
redirect corporate profits to labor in the form of increased wages,  benefits and in particular, 
union dues revenues (Acemaglu, Aghion, Valante 2001, 233). The unions’ loss of leverage in 
wage bargaining could be most pronounced when there is direct product market competition 
between inward foreign investors and domestic firms; in other words when the motivation for 
investment is market access to consumer demand (Leahy and Montagna 2000).  Firm 
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competition would decrease union resources and impede union efforts to organize new workers 
and maintain their existing membership base. 6 
          Some empirical findings of social scientists confirm this economics perspective when 
analyzing the decline of unionization in the American states.  Inward FDI was found to diminish 
union success in recognition elections, union effort in number of attempted organizing drives, 
and union density (percentage of unionized workforce) in comparative studies of the American 
states (Brady and Wallace 2000, Slaughter 2007). But research in state labor factor costs show 
that union declines over the last three decades are about the same for states with the highest 
levels of FDI and those with the lowest levels of FDI (Hansen 2006, 65). 
           Drawing conclusions about the impact of FDI on unionization is further muddied when 
considering that union coverage rates are actually higher in foreign-owned facilities than in 
American-owned firms. Table 8 provides the latest governmental data on comparative 
unionization rates of foreign firms and all U.S. businesses. In manufacturing, retail trade, 
administration, support, and waste management and accommodation/food service categories, 
union share of employment in foreign firms is notably higher than it is in all U.S. businesses, 
while in wholesale trade and transport/warehousing, the rate is slightly lower. Overall, union 
share of employment in foreign firms is over 12%, compared with 8% for the total population of 
businesses. If inward FDI was really a critical factor in impeding union organizing, we might 
expect to find that foreign firms demonstrate a smaller share of union members in their total 
employment than businesses overall, but this is not the case. 
                                                 
6 However, Leahey and Montagna show that foreign firms would actually maximize utility by locating in centralized wage 
bargaining environments versus decentralized ones because of the competitive edge it provides them over internal firms. 
Centralized bargaining occurs in “strong labor” economies where unions enjoy greater institutional legitimacy. In the United 
States there are few industries where centralized collective bargaining still occurs. Almost all of the union wage bargaining in the 
American context occurs at a decentralized level. 
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by Unions  




by Unions  
All Industries   685.2 5,519.5 12.4 8.2 
Manufacturing   341.2 1,998.2 17.1 12.0 
Wholesale Trade   31.9 620.3 5.1 5.7 
Retail Trade   96.5 534.5 18.1 5.7 
Transporting and 
Warehouse   47.2 243.4 19.4 22.3 
Admin, Support, and 
Waste Management   50.4 536.5 9.4 4.2 
Accommodation and 
Food services   51.3 361.8 14.2 4.2 
Other Industries   66.7 1,224.7 5.4 8.0 
      
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, November 2009. "Operations of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies.", 



























The assumption of eventual convergence on labor relations policy as inward FDI 
increases is also suspect when examining the cross-sectional variation in state laws in our 
federalist system. The American political-economic system is actually a composite regime, 
according to one researcher, that can not be fully classed as a Liberal Market Economy, given 
sub-national differences in employment and labor development policies. Program innovation 
characterizes state economic development strategies, contributing to the diverse array of 
unionization levels, worker rights, and workforce development policies found across 
jurisdictions (Amberg 2008). As with countries in the global economy, previous research 
suggests that the American states do not show convergence in regard to labor power or 
employment policies, even given the high level of interstate competition for investment (Hansen 
2006). While some studies indicate that states cut labor standards in an attempt to compete with 
their contiguous neighboring states (Saiz 2001b), nation-wide the states continue to operate with 
varied approaches. Divergence in state unionization levels persists, following regional divides 
and historical “right to work” status, and the marked contrast in the labor relations regimes of 
union-shop and open-shop states have endured for decades. With the exception of Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Idaho no states adopted new “right to work” statutes for years in my study. (See 
Kelly, Witko, Young 2013).7 
Finally, the lack of labor standards convergence from an international perspective could 
create opportunities for unions to organize workers at a domestic level. Firms headquartered 
abroad, especially in CMEs, operate in national economies with less contentious management-
                                                 
7 The examples of Michigan and Indiana, outside my years of study, do demonstrate some recent movement to 
prohibit union shops and cut worker rights, but whether or not inward FDI is the cause is questionable. Changes in 
the party in power in the states, resulting in shifts in the states’ policy agendas, appear to be the critical factors, 
rather than competitive impulses caused by inward investment. 
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labor relations dynamics than are seen in the US, and this may affect the employment practices 
they bring to their subsidiaries hosted in the US domestic economy. As discussed, international 
firms may not make decisions on site locations based on union avoidance. Furthermore, the 
Varieties of Capitalism approach suggests that some foreign firms may actually be union-
friendly, viewing unionization of their workforce as an essential ingredient of their business 
model due to the legitimacy that unions enjoy in their originating economies. The recent 
Volkswagen union election in Chattanooga is a well-publicized example of this, with the German 
automaker openly expressing its desire to set up a works council structure that if successfully 
implemented, will recognize the United Auto Workers union as the official representing agent of 
its workers (Chambers 2014). 
           Admittedly, VoC chiefly emphasizes the differences that endure between companies 
operating within their domestic, home market environments. It does less to predict whether or 
not foreign firms will carry labor relations approaches developed in their home country to the 
United States upon relocation. However, applied industrial relations scholars have tackled this 
question.  “Forward diffusion” occurs as foreign firms utilize distinct personnel approaches upon 
relocation, traceable to their nation-of-origin (Ferner 1997, Edwards 1998, 2000, Guest and 
Haque 1996). For instance, American-owned firms display lower unionization in their European 
operations than do German and Swedish firms located outside their domestic economies, which 
tend to tolerate unions as an “employee voice” mechanism for their workers (Marginson 2008). 
In the United States, this indicates that firms lured from CME countries may be less combative 
toward unions, even as their American peers wage active resistance. Foreign LME firms might 
behave more like U.S. corporations and oppose unionization attempts in their American 
operations, as they share features of similar types of market economies. 
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          But there is also a strong argument for American exceptionalism regarding the degree of 
union hostility exhibited in the U.S. economy. When compared to the United Kingdom, Canada 
and Australia, which are also classed as LMEs, the U.S. has historically had notably lower levels 
of union density than any of these countries (Visser 1996 in Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Comparative research tracking the erosion of union membership levels over the past three 
decades indicates substantial differences between the U.S and Canada, which is arguably 
America’s most comparable peer country. By the end of the millennium Canadian union density 
still managed to hold at approximately 33%, compared to levels lower than 10% in the U.S. 
private sector (Riddell and Riddell 2004).  
         These paltry union density rates are the consequence of fierce counter-campaigns that 
American businesses wage in reaction to unionization attempts. America offers an exceptionally 
hostile union environment (Kelly, Witko, Young 2013). The “union avoidance” industry, which 
utilizes a host of sophisticated legal and human resources strategies to thwart labor organizing, is 
a unique American creation (Bronfenbrenner 2000). Over the past decades expensive media 
campaigns, “captive audience meetings”, and utilization of union-busting consultants have 
become standard tactics employed by U.S. management in response to labor organizing 
(Bronfenbrenner 2009, 2004; Martin 2008). This is the product of the particularly weak 
regulatory structure that U.S. labor statutes provide to safeguard workers’ rights to join unions, 
as reviewed in Chapter 1. Research in comparative labor economics reveals that the United 
States rates lower than any other advanced country in regard to enforcement and practice of labor 
rights standards (Kucera 2002). Moreover, the U.S. business sector’s hostility to unions is not 
limited to domestic operations. American companies display significantly higher levels of union 
avoidance in their overseas facilities than do subsidiaries with parents from Ireland, Canada, or 
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the U.K. (Marginson 2008). Comparatively, even those firms from foreign LMEs may be more 
tolerant to unionization than home-based firms in the U.S. 
           Ultimately, variation in labor relations among the world’s advanced economies could 
have two important influences on American unionization. First, it suggests that foreign firms 
overall may operate with a more union-friendly approach than U.S. firms, and that unions have a 
better chance in organizing in their facilities as a result. Secondly, it suggests that firms from 
CME countries may be the most favorable to union organizing among the group of foreign-
owned firms, due to the particularly strong legitimacy that unions enjoy in these firm’s home 
countries.  
 
Foreign firms and union outcomes in the U.S: A first analysis 
          In this section I conduct a simple bi-varate analysis to offer empirical support for the non-
negative impact that foreign nationality of firms has on American unionization outcomes. I 
highlight two ways to analyze quantitative data in regard to this hypothesis. First of all, at the 
macro level, one can examine the association between aggregate amounts of foreign direct 
investment and state level union density levels. This approach, using states as the unit of 
analysis, considers how overall totals in investment relate to union membership share in the state 
workforce overall. The macro-level perspective also allows us to better consider questions 
related to convergence. Do states with higher levels of FDI show similar low unionization 
levels?  Also, do states with the highest relative amounts of FDI show a consistent tendency to 
lose union members?  
          Macro-level FDI to states has already been considered as a factor impacting union density 
(Hansen 2006). However, FDI can be measured in different ways. The U.S. Bureau of Economic 
76 
 
Analysis tracks inward FDI in various forms. The value of FDI stocks, which measures the 
amount of assets attributable to foreign majority-owned affiliates in the United State is one 
metric most commonly used. Another approach to quantifying inward FDI is to measure the 
number of jobs in the U.S. economy offered by foreign-owned affiliates. I use the latter variant 
throughout my analysis because the jobs figure relates more directly to the dependent variable of 
union density, which is itself a percentage of the state workforce. Moreover, to account for the 
variation in the overall size of the state labor force, I use the percentage of private sector jobs in 
foreign-owned subsidiaries, as supplied by Brady and Wallace 2000, updated for recent years. 
          As a preliminary analysis of whether or not FDI is associated with macro-level state union 
density I offer Table 9. The first ten states listed on the table are those in the top quintile (the 
“Top 10”) of percentage of FDI jobs in the state labor force for 2004, the most recent year in my 
macro-level dataset. (I also supply data for Tennessee, for interest.) I have calculated the top 
quintile mean, as well as the mean for the rest of the states for FDI, total and private sector union 
density, and change in total and private sector union density between 2004 and 2005. The Top 10 
comparison to the remainder of states shows that in both measures of union density, the mean 
union density is higher in high FDI states than in the remainder of states. Moreover, in both 
private sector and total union density, the Top 10 states showed a mean gain, while the remainder 
of states show a mean loss in density. I also conducted t tests to evaluate whether the difference 
between the Top 10 and the remainder of states was significant on these measures. In all tests, I 
could not reject the null hypothesis that there was not a significant difference between groups. 
These early findings suggest that foreign direct investment is not related to lower union density 
levels; in fact the numbers reveal that higher levels of FDI jobs in the state labor force coincide 
with higher levels of union density. However, given the failed t-tests between group means, I fall 
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South Carolina 6.64 2.60% 1.50 3.10% -0.80 
New 
Hampshire 6.53 4.80% -0.80 9.90% 0.50 
Connecticut 6.22 7.30% 0.30 15.30% 0.70 
Delaware 6.16 7.70% -0.70 12.40% -0.50 
Massachusetts 5.72 7.70% -0.30 13.50% 0.40 
New Jersey 5.49 11.60% 0.20 19.80% 0.70 
Hawaii 5.42 16.20% 0.70 23.50% 2.40 
Rhode Island 5.34 8.80% -0.40 16.40% -0.40 
North Carolina 5.16 1.60% 0.20 2.80% 0.20 
Maine 4.74 5.90% -0.30 11.30% 0.60 
Top Quintile 
Mean 5.74 7.42% 0.04 12.80% 0.38 
Remainder of 
States Mean 3.16 6.98% -0.03 10.99% -0.03 
Tennessee  4.69 4.9% -1.60 6.7% -1.30 
*FDI Jobs data from Brady and Wallace 2000 and updates. 
**Union Density data from Hirsch and MacPherson 2001 and updates, www.unionstats.com. 
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short of demonstrating that FDI has a statistically significant impact in either direction on state 
level union density. In any case, the “race to the bottom” premise - convergence toward lower 
state unionization as FDI rises- receives no support. Of course, a full multivariate analysis is 
warranted to provide stronger support for the validity of these findings, and this will be presented 
in Chapter 4. 
A second way to analyze quantitatively the question of how foreign firm ownership 
impacts union outcomes in the U.S. is to use the individual union recognition elections as the 
unit of analysis. This approach looks for the association between the nationality of the business 
where a unionization attempt occurs and whether the union won or lost the recognition election.   
There are a handful of studies of micro-level union election data from previous decades, but their 
findings present a puzzle.  One concluded that that foreign firm nationality has no significant 
impact on unionization election outcome, (Sanyal 1990),  another that foreign firms elections 
have lower pro-union vote share than American firms (Greer and Sherarer 1981), and another 
that foreign firms are less likely to result in union victories than American firms (Bronfenbrenner 
2000). But due to the data noted earlier, that average union membership levels in foreign firms is 
higher than in American firms, these findings should be not be taken as the final word.8  
          One of the unique contributions of this dissertation is my construction of an original data 
set, tracing union recognition election outcomes for recent years (2005, 2007, and 2009). These 
elections are reported and posted on the National Labor Relations Board’s website monthly, and 
are available for at least the most recent two decades. The fifth chapter of this dissertation 
                                                 
8 Moreover, there has been little analysis to account for differential impacts of firms from foreign countries, either 
individually or in groups. Most of the research has simply looked at the “foreigness” of the business, rather than 




presents a detailed multivariate regression analysis of this data set, along with a detailed 
description of the case selection methods utilized to construct it. For now, I wish to introduce 
some preliminary descriptive statistics from this data set, to shed light on how firm nationality 
relates to frequency of pro-union votes. In addition, I present data on union vote share in the 
elections. Please note that in Table 10 that follows only union elections with 50 or more eligible 
employees have been included. 
           Table 10 breaks down union elections by three categories of firm nationality – FMNC  
(Foreign Multi-national Company), USMNC (American Multi-national Company) and Domestic 
(companies with operations solely based inside the United States). The multi-national and 
domestic distinction is important because multi-national operations by definition are more 
capital-mobile. These firms can present a more credible threat to offshore existing operations as 
a response to unionization drives than can domestic firms, which lack existing overseas facilities. 
Threat of closure is a major scare tactic used by union-avoiding firms (Bronfenbrenner 1997). 
Unions have even at times shifted to public sector and service industry organizing to sidestep the 
“exit” threat often wielded by U.S. owned multi-nationals (Gapasin and Bonacich 2002, 182). 
My presentation of the data accounts for the possible impact of capital mobility threat by listing 
win rates for union elections according to separate ownership categories. FMNCs actually posted 
the highest win rates, with almost 60% resulting in union wins, even given their capital-mobile 
operations. USMNCs show the lowest rate with about 37% of elections in this category resulting 
in success for the union; while Domestics, as expected, posted a higher share of union wins 
(about 47% of elections) than multi-national American firms. Still, FMNC is the only category 
with union victories in the majority of cases. The vote share data parallels the statistics on 
election outcomes, indicating that FMNCs had the highest mean percentage of the three groups  
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Table 10. NLRB Union Election Outcomes, Years 2005, 2007, 2009 
      
  
Frequency of Election Outcomes 
  
  Win Loss Total 
% Wins per 
Category 
Foreign Multinationals 128 86 214 59.8% 
U.S. Multinationals 92 157 249 36.9% 
Domestic 245 272 517 47.4% 
All Firms 465 515 980 47.4% 
          
  
Mean Union Vote Share* 
  





  All American Firms     50.5%    
U.S. Multinationals     45.7%   
  
U.S. Domestics     52.8%   
     
All Firms     52.2%    
        
Total N   980   
 
* F= 19.38 (p<.00) for foreign firms compared to all American firm. ANOVA analysis confirms that means for the 
Foreign and All American groups are significantly different.                                                     
 F= 18.18 (P< .00) for the three way comparison of FMNC, USMNC, and Domestic categories. ANOVA analysis 
confirms that the group means for vote share are not all equal. Bonferroni, Scheffe, and Sidak multiple comparison 
tests each provide support that the difference between means are significant for all three groups (p<.05). 
 







at 58%. Moreover, a variety of multiple-comparison means tests confirm that the FMNC average 
vote share is significantly higher than the average vote share for both USMNCs and Domestics. 
A multivariate analysis is needed to draw more accurate conclusions about the impact of 
corporate nationality on union organizing success in the U.S., but these descriptive numbers 
reveal initial support for the argument that foreign-owned firms present an opportunity for union 
organizing, as opposed to an obstacle.  
          The models I present in the next three chapters will allow for firm nationality and FDI to 
be analyzed alongside state economic development strategy and for possible interactive effects of 
these variables. In this chapter, I offer a brief comparison of descriptive statistics from three 
example states as an introduction of how foreign ownership operates in a federalist framework to 
influence state unionization outcomes.  
          Table 11 repeats the data on the percentage of union elections won by unions, the total 
number of potential new union members eligible to vote in unionization elections, and the 
number of new workers successfully unionized for years 2005, 07, and 09 for three illustrative 
states, as was provided in Chapter 2.9 It adds numbers specific to elections held among the subset 
of foreign-owned firms for comparison. Important labor force characteristics are also listed for 
each state to provide context for interpreting the unionization data.  Results indicate that in 
Missouri foreign firms account for thousands of attempted and successfully unionized  
workers, while in both South Carolina and Tennessee, attempted new and won union members 
total only in the hundreds. Tennessee, notably, has a labor force size roughly equivalent to 
Missouri’s, with a much smaller number of newly unionized workers. South Carolina has a 
smaller state labor force size, but the latest numbers indicate that it has a larger number of  
                                                 
9 These numbers are inclusive of elections with less than 50 eligible employees. 
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Win Rate 57% of 147 
elections  
 
71% of 21 
elections  
56% of 48 
elections  
Employees eligible to vote 
for unionization 
8808 1209 3492 
New members unionized 6088 957 2633 
Foreign Firms 
Win Rate 70% of 27 elections  100% of 6 
elections  
66% of 9 elections  
Employees eligible to vote 
for unionization 
2839 574 760 
New  members unionized 2165 574 391 
Market Economy Impact LME firms- 13 wins   
CME firms - 6 wins 
 
LME firms -6 wins 
CME firms- 0 
wins 
 LME firms - 2 
wins CME firms - 
4 wins 
State Labor Force Characteristics 
Size of state labor force* 
3,042,539 2,119,888 3,018,429 
Union density ** 
10.8% 3.6% 5.5% 
Foreign-owned firm jobs, 
2011*** 
 88,300 114,100 123,900 
Foreign-owned firm share 
of state labor force, 
2011*** 3.90% 7.50% 5.40% 
 
* Bureau of Labor Statistics. Average of monthly labor force totals for Jan 2005- Dec 2009. 
** Macpherson, et. al, www.unionfacts.com. Average of annual union density percentages for 2005-2009. 
*** Taken from Organization for International Investment on-line database.   This is the best available data.  Jobs 




employees working for foreign-owned firms than does Missouri. Thus, the difference in 
Missouri’s higher numbers of newly unionized workers does not appear to be related simply to 
the size of its labor force. To the extent that unions do organize in South Carolina, foreign-owned 
firms have a higher union win rate than American firms do. In fact, all of the FMNC union drives 
in South Carolina produced pro-union outcomes, even though there are few of them. In 
Tennessee, like the other states, the majority of elections at foreign-owned firms are successful 
for unions, although they are few in number.  
These descriptive statistics introduce two hypotheses that I will test in the next two 
chapters regarding the relationship of firm nationality to unionization outcomes. 1. State 
economic development policies have impact on the ability of unions to organize successfully in 
both foreign and American firms, with locational strategies having a negative impact, and 
entrepreneurial strategies having a positive impact. These descriptive statistics reveal that the 
states engaging heavily in locational development may demonstrate less new member growth 
and union organizing activity than in states with an entrepreneurial development approach.  2. 
Foreign firms, regardless of the state economic development strategy policy used, will have 
higher unionization success than domestic and multi-national American firms. This is consistent 
with the higher success rates observed in the subset of foreign firm elections in all three states.  
I also supplied some descriptive information in the table regarding the impact of market 
economy of origin of foreign multi-national firms with union elections. The Varieties of 
Capitalism approach suggests that U.S firms, embedded in our Liberal Market Economy, are 
likely to display more hostility than firms that originate in other advanced countries (since the 
market economy of at least some of these countries is the union-friendly Coordinated Market 
Economy).  This is supported by the comparison of win rates of US and Foreign firms. However, 
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VoC also suggests that the foreign-owned firms that would contribute the most union victories 
would be those originating from CMEs. The descriptive profiles here indicate that in two of the 
states, LME-originating firms contribute more victories than do CME-originating ones. 
Tennessee is an exception with four CME firm wins. Of course, the number of observations 
shown is are too small to draw solid conclusions about market economy origination as a 
predictor of union election outcome. A more complete multivariate analysis, as conducted in 
Chapter 5, will examine market economy impact in greater detail. These numbers do paint a 
picture of the U.S. as an exceptional case in terms of unionization. U.S. firms appear to be less 
advantageous organizing environments than even those foreign firms headquartered in other 
LME countries.  
 
Chapter Summary 
           Foreign investment and firm nationality are key factors that must be considered in the 
examination of the how opportunities to unionize vary between the U.S. states. Since foreign 
investment is such a significant part of our domestic economy and our labor market in particular, 
it could have a substantial influence on state labor union outcomes. This chapter has reviewed 
some of the perspectives commonly-held by scholars on how foreign investment may impact 
unionization outcomes in a competitive federalism framework. My findings here indicate that 
FDI does not appear to be driving the American states in a common direction of declining 
unionization. While most states have lost union density over the past decade, there is not 
sufficient evidence to show that inward FDI is the force behind that decline. States continue to 
show variation in their labor relations approaches and union density rates, often revealing that 
states with the higher levels of FDI are the more unionized ones.  This chapter also considered 
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how ownership nationality of a firm impacted the relative chances of a union drive resulting in a 
win for labor. Early analysis shows that union victories occur more, not less frequently in 
foreign-owned subsidiaries than in American-owned firms, both those with multi-national and 
wholly domestic operations. Moreover, the variation in labor-management relations that 
countries display suggests that foreign firms may operate with less resistance than American 
firms due to higher levels of legitimacy and collaboration that unions experience in other market 
economies.  Though it is still to be analyzed more thoroughly, the data in this chapter illustrates 
that American-owned firms offer less opportunity for union victory than do the foreign-owned 

















Chapter 4: A “Macro” Model of Unionization 
 
 Unionization as the factor of interest in this dissertation has multiple dimensions. One 
way to think about unionization outcomes is how “widespread” union membership is throughout 
the labor force. This is a “macro perspective” that considers the degree to which unions have 
been successful in recruiting a substantial share of workers in the economic system overall. 
Another way to assess the success of union outcomes is to consider unions’ ability to achieve 
official recognition as the agent of employees in the individual workplaces that they attempt to 
organize. This perspective understands unionization as an activity that recruits new members 
workplace by workplace. In this “micro” approach union outcomes are not evaluated according 
to their impact on the mass labor force, but rather their ability to successfully achieve their 
intended purpose – new organizing – on a case by case level.  
 At the outset it should be acknowledged that the factors that influence union outcomes 
from a macro-perspective may not necessarily be the same ones that impact union outcomes at a 
micro level; or factors that influence the former in one way may conceivably affect the latter 
differently. For this reason I offer a coupled approach to examine the impact of economic 
development policy and foreign ownership on unionization outcomes. The dual examination will 
present a fuller picture of how these critical factors influence state unionization levels. 
 In this chapter I will empirically test for the macro level impact of economic development 
policy and foreign investment on the union density (share of unionized workers) of the state 
workforce. A state’s orientation toward economic development policy has ramifications on the 
long-term evolution of its economy’s industry composition, which could in turn create more or 
less opportunity for unions to grow their labor force share. Additionally, aggregate levels of FDI 
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may create more competition in the overall economy between firms which could impact 
opportunity for unions to increase the percentage of union workers.  
Thus, state union density levels will vary both cross-sectionally (across states), and 
annually (for each state), with case-year as the unit of analysis. The set of individual cases for 
each year is consistent; that is, each panel is composed of the 50 American states. This 
examination of macro union density outcomes requires a methodological approach that is 
appropriate for analyzing longitudinal, panel data. It must also control for the impacts of other 
critical variables, such as right-to-work status, party in power, and degree of state policy 
liberalism, that theoretically affect labor union strength.  
 
Methods 
 OLS (ordinary least squares) regression is the standard approach for statistically 
analyzing data to assess the individual independent impact of multiple independent variables on 
an outcome of interest when that outcome is measured with interval-level data. Union density, in 
particular the change in union density, generally qualifies as interval level data. The change in 
union density, since it is expressed as a percentage point increase or decrease, may vary 
continuously from -100 to 100%.  Prior examinations of the change in union density as the 
dependent variable handle it as an interval-level measure (Kelly and Witko 2012).10 
However, the efficacy of standard OLS regression results rests on assumptions about the 
underlying data being analyzed, which can be problematic for its application to the analysis of 
                                                 
10 Some researchers claim that a quasi-MLE Bernoulli model (see Papke and Wooldridge 1996) or a “beta” MLE 
model (see Mullahy 1990 in Papke and Wooldridge) is necessary for examining dependent variables that are 
fractional or percentage-based, because such variables are only capable of ranging from 0 to 1. However, my 
analysis uses the annual change in union density as the dependent variable, which can be positive or negative and 
thus is not constrained to the range of 0-1.  
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longitudinal panel data. One serious issue in using OLS with times series data is the problem of 
‘serial correlation’ – that is, the error of an observation at one point in time is correlated to the 
errors of historical observations of that same case in the past. What this means in the context of 
yearly state union density percentages is that, for example, the error of an observation for 
Tennessee in year 2003 is associated with the errors of observations for Tennessee in the years 
prior to 2003. When serial correlation is present and the assumption of independent errors is 
violated, use of OLS regression can result in “inefficient” standard errors of the coefficient 
estimates, which make significance testing less accurate (Box and Tiao 1975). In particular, use 
of OLS on time series data may lead to flawed models that report significant relationships 
between variables, when in fact the relationships are NOT significant (Berman 2002).  Model 
estimations with inefficient standard errors could also result in significance tests that fail, when 
in fact a statistical relationship does exist between variables.  
There are a number of ways to deal with serial correlation in time series data to make the 
application of regression analysis feasible. One approach, regarded as the “old fashioned” 
method by some analysts, corrects the regression model of serial correlation by using modified 
standard errors, with subsequent testing for the presence of any remaining serial correlation 
(Beck 2001, Box and Jenkins 1970). Another approach is to directly capture the actual dynamics 
of the change relationship over time, which will be discussed shortly.  
An additional concern about the independence of observations assumption in longitudinal 
panel data is that correlation is also present due to multiple observations from the same unit. In 
the case of my data set, unit effects may be present due to multiple yearly observations from each 
of the fifty states.  If only one set (year) of cross-sectional data for the states was present the 
correlation between cases from the same state would obviously not be a factor, but with time-
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series panel data this is a problem. Error correction modeling, which I will use, may include 
adjustments in standard error estimates to correct for unit-related correlation. I will utilize panel 
corrected standard errors in my models to address the dual problem of serial and panel-related 
correlation.  
Perhaps the most serious problem that crops up in time series data is the threat of 
“spurious regression” results, related to regressing one non-stationary series on another (Granger 
and Newbold 1974).  Non-stationary time series are those which do not have a tendency to revert 
to an equilibrium mean over time. In some cases of non-stationarity, the series’ variance is 
variable and dependent on time; while in other cases the variance is constant. The most 
pernicious problem involves the former situation. In such a case two unrelated, non-stationary 
series analyzed through OLS may generate models which erroneously report a significant causal 
relationship, when there is not one in reality. Regression of such unrelated series upon one 
another is a flat violation of OLS regression and should be avoided.  
However, in the latter case a slightly different problem arises. These series include a 
deterministic trend that is constant and independent of time, so there is in fact a tendency for 
both series to return to an equilibrium when disturbed. However, the equilibrium for the outcome 
variable is a moving target that is dependent on the value of the explanatory variable. In this 
situation, where data series are “co-integrated,” models that account for causal effects on an 
outcome variable by including lagged values of the explanatory and outcome variables are 
inconclusive. In the presence of two or more co-integrated series, standard lagged dependent 
variable (LDV) models are likely to find no significant relationship between variables, when in 
fact there is one (Engle and Granger 1987, Freeman 1983).  Thus, searching for causal 
relationships between two non-stationary and also co-integrated series is not a violation of time 
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series regression analysis, but the activity requires special modeling strategies beyond standard 
LDV inclusion to arrive at accurate results about significance.  
 In the case of both spurious regression threats and co-integration challenges, tests are 
needed to detect variables comprised of non-stationary data. Moreover, upon identification of 
non-stationary data, analysis is needed to determine if the data is co-integrated, which requires 
adjustments to the method of analysis, or non-related, which makes it inappropriate for analysis 
in the same model. 
I use an error correction model (ECM) strategy to address the problems of serial 
correlation, unit effects, and non-stationarity. Such models are based on a theoretical 
interpretation that an observation at a given moment is actually a dynamic function of 
observations at previous moments (Keele and Kelly 2006, Beck 1985). ECMs are widely 
regarded as an appropriate model for fitting data with co-integrated series (Ostrom and Smith 
1992, De Boef and Keele 2008). Error correction is a necessary condition of co-integrated data 
since both the outcome and explanatory variable do tend to revert back to an equilibrium when 
disturbed, in contrast to non-stationary random series which do not exhibit an error correction 
process. Moreover, the estimation of an ECM reveals whether or not an error correction process 
is significant, which helps to distinguish non-stationary co-integrated series from non-stationary 
random series. One additional benefit of ECMs is their flexibility. Although they are capable of 
modeling co-integrated data accurately, their use is also appropriate with stationary data that has 
no co-integration (DeBoef and Keele 2008). Since they assist in the detection of “prohibited” 
non-stationary series and can adequately accommodate co-integrated or stationary series, they 
are a good fit for almost all time series data analyses. 
91 
 
The ECM equation estimates the change in the dependent variable (∆Y) caused by a 
change in X, rather than the actual value of Y given a value of X. Thus, my model’s dependent 
variable is the annual change in state private union density. ECMs estimate two coefficients for 
each independent variable – a differenced value and a lagged value.  The coefficient on the 
differenced value of X (the annual change in the X variable), applies to the initial impact of the 
change in X to the change in Y, which occurs entirely at one point in time (Kelly and Witko 
2012). But as pointed out earlier, this approach also models the dynamic nature of the change 
relationship, accounting for how it endures and eventually decays over time (Keele and Kelly 
2006).  The coefficient on the lagged value of X applies to the impact of X on the change in Y 
that is felt over this longer time span. In my model if the value of a differenced or lagged 
independent variable coefficient estimate is negative, the variable has an independent effect of 
decreasing the annual state private union density. If the value of an independent variable 
coefficient estimate is positive, the variable has an independent effect of increasing the annual 
state private union density.  
Finally, the ECM model also includes a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable (that is, on the right side of the equation).  Its coefficient gives the “error correction 
rate”, which quantifies how the change in X impact on Y decays over its duration. A failure to 
obtain significance on the lagged dependent variable suggests that an error correction process is 
not occurring, which is a clue that data is non-stationary and not co-integrated. The ratio of the 
coefficient of the lagged independent variable to the error correction rate provides the long run 
multiplier (LRM), which is the total long-term impact that a change in X has on Y. Thus an 
examination of the coefficients on both the lagged dependent and lagged independent variables 
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sheds light on the dynamics of the change relationship. Error correction modeling reveals that 
change is a process that unfolds over time, as well as a discrete event. 
 
Data and Measures 
 The data set for my macro-level analysis is derived from Nathan Kelly and Christopher 
Witko’s time series regression of state income inequality (2012). Kelly and Witko used total 
state union density as an independent variable in this study, with additional “power resource” 
indicators such as state policy liberalism, partisan composition of Congress, and President’s 
party also tapped. In my examination, I use Kelly and Witko’s governmental power resource 
independent variables, as well as several control variables used in their dataset. However, I add a 
number of independent variables which are central to my study that were not included in their 
analysis; namely, economic development policy activism and foreign direct investment jobs. For 
my dependent variable, I use state union density in the private sector, rather than total union 
density. 11 
 The source of the state private sector union density data is from Hirsch, Macpherson, and 
Vroman 2001 (and updates). The researchers derive their union density percentages from Current 
Population Survey and Bureau of Labor Statistics data tracked since 1964. The Hirsch et al data 
sets include percentages for national-level union density, as well as disaggregated figures for 
each of the fifty states, in addition to industry and occupational grouping. Moreover, they also 
develop separate state level measures of both private and public sector unionization. The Hirsh et 
al data program is one of the most comprehensive sources of longitudinal union density data 
                                                 
11 Thank you greatly to both Nathan Kelly and Christopher Witko for use of their data set. 
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available for social science researchers and has been made accessible for a wide audience on the 
website unionstats.com. 
 The years of study for my analysis are 1983 to 2004. I use these years because they 
correspond to the same range of years in which my dependent variable and key independent 
variables, entrepreneurial policy activism and locational policy activism, are available. The interval-
level measures of economic development policy come from the two separate indices for 
locational and entrepreneurial policy developed by Martin Saiz, discussed at length in chapter 2. 
Saiz’s coding was based off the attributes of economic development incentive programs as 
cataloged in the NASDA State Incentives Guide, a comprehensive list of incentive programs 
published periodically in years 1983, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 to 2006. Since the catalog 
was not published every year, Saiz’s indices are only available periodically, in the years the 
NASDA guide was also available. Clearly, this creates a problem of missing data for all years in 
between. I do not wish to lose data for those years, since the state union density figures and other 
key independent variable measures are readily available. Thus, I use interpolated data for the 
missing years on both indices. The interpolations are based on a linear estimation approach.12 
                                                 
12 The Saiz indices are well-respected in social science and economic development literatures as measures for 
tracking temporal change in development policy, despite their intermittent availability (Hanley and Douglass 2014, 
Gray and Hanson 2012, Saiz 2001a, 2001b, Hart 2008). A recent examination called the Saiz measures “a 
particularly rigorous” typology (Hanley and Douglass 2014), while also acknowledging some drawbacks. However, 
previous use of these measures have been mostly for descriptive purposes. Saiz does use them in regression 
analyses, as measures of both independent (2001a) and dependent (2001b) variables. While Saiz refers to these 
analyses as “pooled time-series models”, he does not include corrections for serial correlation and does not model 
the dynamics of the causal relationship. Instead he simply controls for “unit effects” by including dummy variables 
for each year of observations. My project attempts to offer an examination of the dynamic change relationship 
between development policy and union density. While I do use interpolated values for some years due to the lack of 
available annual values, my use of error correction modelling offers a more complete time-series analysis than is 
possible without the inclusion of annual interpolations. 
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 My other critical independent variable is inward foreign direct investment for each state. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, FDI is measured in various ways. The U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis tracks the number of jobs in the U.S. economy offered by foreign-owned affiliates, as 
well as the amount of assets (including inventory, facilities, machinery, and revenues on hand)  
owned by foreign-owned affiliates.  I use the jobs figure because it complements the key 
dependent variable of private sector union density, which is derived from the number of jobs that 
are unionized. Of course, the size of the state labor force is going to impact the number of FDI 
jobs possible in a workforce. (In other words, low-population states will necessarily have low 
numbers of FDI jobs.) To correct for this, I use the percentage of state labor force jobs 
attributable to foreign-owned subsidiaries, as calculated by Brady and Wallace 2000 and updated 
for recent years. Like the union density measure, this percentage-based indicator accounts for the 
share of the workforce associated with the factor of interest, as opposed to a flat count of 
workforce jobs. 
An important control variable to test for the impact of left governments as a power 
resource to increase unionization is state government liberalism. This was the key explanatory 
variable in Kelly, Witko, and Young’s analysis of variations in state union density (2013).  The 
liberalism variable measures left power in state governments by accounting for ideology and 
policy liberalism of the state’s national level legislators, weighted by partisan control of the state 
legislature (Berry el al 1998 with updates). Researchers recognize that using Democrat party 
control of state legislatures alone is a poor proxy for the collective ideological orientation of the 
state legislature, since many Democrat leaders, especially in the South, have historically been 
rather conservative and not necessarily pro-labor (Kelly, Witko, and Young 2013). Higher levels 
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of state government liberalism are predicted to be positively associated with the annual change in 
union density.  
I do include partisan variables for national government to control for Democratic 
President and percent Democrats in Congress, to account for the historical shifts in national-
level party in power over time.  Given the federalist structure of the United States political 
system, both national-level governments and state level governments impact the conditions that 
unions must organize within. Unlike legislatures at the state level, partisanship of Congress at the 
national level is a fair indication of ideological orientation; national-level party platforms do 
support the identification of Republicans as a center-right, pro-business party and Democrats as a 
center-left pro-labor party (Kelly and Witko 2012).  Higher values of both of these variables are 
associated with greater Democratic control and are predicted to be positively related to 
unionization.  
  Indicators to account for general economic conditions that could impact unionization 
levels are included.  State unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics) is anticipated to be 
negatively related to the change in union density, as labor surplus is sometimes a confounding 
factor in organizing unions. The alternate view is that increased concerns among workers about 
job certainty could actually motivate more interest among them to join unions.  Still, in times of 
high unemployment unions could lose existing members or face decreases in the number of 
potential new members, so I predict that unemployment will have a negative impact on 
unionization.   High levels of the state economic growth rate (Bureau of Economic Analysis) is 
expected to increase unionization, because a growing economy likely creates new jobs, which 
could grow the ranks of labor.   
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I include a variable to account for the size of the state manufacturing sector (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 2014), expecting to find that positive changes in the manufacturing share of 
the state economy will result in higher union growth rates, as union recruitment and wage 
bargaining efforts historically have been most successful in the manufacturing sector. This 
variable also controls for union loss as a result of de-industrialization in states that originally had 
high levels of manufacturing. These states potentially have more union jobs to lose, given the 
legacy effect of heightened union recruitment in the manufacturing sector during the more 
successful years of the labor movement. Related to this, I also included a variable for the original 
private sector union density of the state in 1983, the lag of the first case-year of my study. High 
unionization in the past may entail a positive legacy effect on current levels of unionization, and 
if so, this variable will control for it.  
I include two variables related to demographic characteristics of the state population as 
controls. The variable for the proportion of non-whites in the state population (US Census) is 
provided to account for the past finding that people of color, particularly blacks, are more likely 
to be union members, than are whites. I also add a logged variable for the total state population. 
Since we know from research that unions have struggled to obtain membership gains overall (see 
Chapter 2), we would expect that the higher the growth rate of the state population, the lower the 
total share of unionization in the labor force. While population increases may actually have the 
effect of increasing the number of union members, unions are less likely to maintain their 
percentage share of total workers in states which are growing population-wise.  
Finally, I include a dummy variable indicating the presence (coded 1) of a right-to-work 
law to control for the impact of state labor relations policies on union membership levels 
(Department of Labor. Also see National Right to Work Committee, www.nrtwc.org.)  If the 
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typical argument is correct, the presence of such a law will be significantly related to losses in 
union members. In the case of the time-series error correction model being estimated, the 
independent variables are expressed as the impact of the change of the independent variable (the 
differenced form of the predictor variable) on the impact of the change of the dependent variable 
(the differenced form of the dependent variable). Thus a positive change in “right-to-work” 
status means a change from having no such law to adopting one. The adoption of a RTW statute 
is expected to result in a negative change in union density.   
Table 12 on the following page is provided for reference, listing the basic form of the 
variables used to estimate the model, along with the measure specification and the data sources 
for each. Again note, ECMs estimate coefficients for both the differenced and a lagged version 
of each variable. Differenced versions of the variables will represent the annual change in the 
variable from the previous year. Lagged versions of the variables will use the value of the 
variable in the previous year. 
 
Analysis and Results 
Since this analysis is conducted on time series data, it can be assumed that 
autocorrelation is an issue. Still, I conducted tests for detecting autocorrelation in panel data to 
confirm. Wooldridge tests for autocorrelation on the key variables in the model – Private union 
density, the two economic development policy variables, and Inward FDI - each indicated the 
presence of autocorrelation. Clearly, a modeling strategy that accounts for serial correlation is in 





Table 12. Basic Form of the Differenced and Lagged Independent Variables Used in the Macro Model 
Variable Measure Specification Data Source 
Dependent Variable   
State Private Sector Union Density Workers who are members of unions 
as a percentage of the state private 
sector workforce.  
Method of calculation and 
estimation is presented in Hirsch et 




Key Independent Variables   
Entrepreneurial Policy Intensity Interval level index based on coding 
of state economic development 
program attributes ranging from 
approximately 0 to 3 for intermittent 
years.  
Missing years interpolated. 
 Methodology for constructing the 
index is presented in Saiz 2001. 
Attributes coding based on data 
gathered by the National Association 
of State Development Agencies in 
1983, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
and Miles Friedman and Partners 
LLC in 2006. 
Locational Policy Intensity Interval level index based on coding 
of state economic development 
program attributes ranging from 
approximately 0 to 3 for intermittent 
years.  
Missing years interpolated.  
Methodology for constructing the 
index is presented in Saiz 2001. 
Attributes coding based on data 
gathered by the National Association 
of State Development Agencies in 
1983, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
and Miles Friedman and Partners 
LLC in 2006. 
Inward Foreign Direct Investment Private sector jobs in foreign-owned 
affiliates as a percentage of the state 
private sector workforce. Varies 
from 1-100. 
Calculations provided courtesy of 
Brady and Wallace 2000 and 
updates.  
Based on data from the Bureau of 










Table 12 Continued 
Variable Measure Specification Data Source 
Control Variables   
“Right-to-Work” State State that prohibits union shops 
either by state constitutional 
amendment or “right-to-work” 
statute. “Right to work”= 1. No 
prohibition of union shops = 0. 
Department of Labor, National Right 
to Work Committee. Years 1983-
2004.  
 
*Note: this variable had variation in 
only three years for three states. 
 
State Government Liberalism Interval measure based on 
ideological scores of state’s 
Congressional representatives, 
weighted by partisan control of the 
state legislature. High levels of this 
measure indicate “Left” state 
governments. 
Berry et al 1998, and updates. Years 
1983-2004. 
Democrat President Partisanship of President during the 
case-year. 1= Democrat. 0= 
Republican. 
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004. 
Democrats in Congress Percentage of Democrats in both 
houses of Congress during the case-
year.  
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004 
State Unemployment Rate Annual average state unemployment 
rate, as a share of the workforce. 
Ranges 0-1. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Years 
1983-2004.  
State Economic Growth Rate Annual percentage growth rate in 
gross state product. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Years 
1983-2004.  
Manufacturing Sector Manufacturing sector share of gross 
state product. Ranges 0-1. 
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004 
Non-white Population Share of non-whites in state 
population. Ranges 0-1. 
Based on U.S. Census data. 
Provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004.  
State Population Log of the total state population. Based on U.S. Census data. 
Provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004. 
Original Private Sector Union 
Density 
Workers who are members of unions 
as a percentage of the state private 
sector workforce for year 1983 (first 
year of study). 
Method of calculation and 
estimation is presented in Hirsch et 




*This variable was not differenced 






variables as well as the critical control variable “Right to work.” The LLC test looks for the 
presence of a unit root in a variable’s data across all panels. A rejection of the LLC null 
hypothesis means that some or all of the panels have stationary data. Each variable tested 
rejected the null, except the “Right-to-work” variable. Therefore, at least some of the panel data 
for the dependent and key independent variables are stationary. A subsequent Hadri test for each 
variable, with a null hypothesis that all panel series are stationary, was also rejected. This 
suggests that co-integration of data for the major variables may be present for some, but not all 
panels. In any case, the error correction model strategy is appropriate for analyzing both co-
integrated and stationary panel data. This feature of flexibility supports the ECM use with the 
given data. 
 The results of the ECM regression analysis appear in Table 13. The negative lagged 
dependent variable with p<.001 indicates that the error correction process is significant, 
suggesting that autocorrelation has been properly mitigated by the LDV inclusion. The LDV 
coefficient estimate suggests that the remaining deviation from equilibrium in the time lags that 
follow the immediate shock to the variables will correct at a rate of about 16% in each lag (Best 
2008).  I also predicted residuals from the ECM and tested them for presence of a unit root. A 
Levin-Lin-Chu test rejected the null that all panels have unit roots. This provides indication that 
the residuals are in fact stationary. Residuals with a unit root are an indication of the spurious 
regression problem, while stationary residuals from a model indicate either stationary or co- 
integrated data. While I did not run a diagnostic fixed effects model, the use of the LDV and 
panel corrected standard errors is regarded an acceptable fix for the “unit effects” problem 
(Keele and Kelly 2006). Therefore, I conclude that utilizing the ECM has addressed most of the 
major problems associated with using time series data in regression models. 
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Table 13. ECM Results for Annual Change in State Union Density (1984-2004) 
Variables Coefficient Estimates 
  
Lag Private Density -0.158*** 
 (0.0250) 
D. Locational Policy Activism -0.334 
 (0.397) 
Lag Locational Policy Activism -0.202 
 (0.139) 
D. Entrepreneurial Policy Activism 0.0463 
 (0.303) 
Lag Entrepreneurial Policy Activism -0.184** 
 (0.0901) 
D. State Policy Liberalism 0.124 
 (0.198) 
Lag State Policy Liberalism 0.145 
 (0.119) 
D. Democratic President -0.122 
 (0.0886) 
Lag Democratic President 0.106 
 (0.0716) 
D. Percent Democrats in Congress 0.0296*** 
 (0.00933) 
Lag Percent Democrats in Congress 0.0278*** 
 (0.00784) 
D. State Unemployment Rate 1.740 
 (4.123) 
Lag State Unemployment Rate 0.386 
 (2.593) 
D. Gross State Product Growth 1.194* 
 (0.665) 
Lag Gross State Product Growth 1.707* 
 (0.946) 
D. Inward FDI 0.225*** 
 (0.0684) 
Lag Inward FDI 0.00928 
 (0.0206) 
D. Nonwhite Population -2.840 
 (13.11) 
Lag Nonwhite Population 0.453 
 (0.332) 
D. Manufacturing Share of GSP 1.690 
 (2.105) 
Lag Manufacturing Share of GSP 0.0878 
 (0.428) 
D. State Population (log) -2.761 
 (3.292) 
Lag State Population (log) -0.0774** 
 (0.0373) 
D. “Right-to-Work” State 1.464*** 
 (0.457) 
Lag “Right-to-Work” State -0.0638 
 (0.0639) 










As for hypothesis testing, the model reveals some interesting findings about economic 
development and its impact on unionization. I hypothesized that locational development 
strategies would most likely have a negative impact on union density. However, the model 
provides little indication that locational policy activism has either a short term or long term 
impact, either positive or negative, on the annual change in state union density. As for 
entrepreneurial policy activism, I tentatively hypothesized that it would have a positive impact 
on union density due to its “quality jobs” focus. However, this hypothesis came with some 
reservations due to the existence of competing theories.    
The model results indicate that higher levels of entrepreneurial policy actually have a 
negative long-term impact on union density - that is, it causes union density to fall, given the 
negative coefficient and p< .05 on the lagged independent variable. Yet entrepreneurial policy 
appears to have no short-term impact on union density due to the finding of no significance on 
the differenced form of the entrepreneurial policy variable. This lack of impact in the short-term 
is not an unreasonable finding, as economic development policy tends to address economic 
processes as a long-term strategy. Nonetheless, the negative sign on the lag suggests that 
entrepreneurial strategies to build “quality” jobs may in fact fail to produce union jobs. The 
innovation economy promoted by entrepreneurial development appears to either 1. lower overall 
demand for unionization due to better pay and working conditions, or 2. produce workers who 
are less inclined to join unions as a matter of individual preference.  
 Moving to Inward FDI, I find support for Susan Hansen’s argument that international 
capital mobility does not necessarily impede worker standards. At a short term basis, FDI- 
created jobs appear to have a positive impact on union growth, given the significance level of the 
differenced coefficient. It is important to remember that this variable was measured as the share 
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of FDI employment in the total workforce, not the flat amount of FDI jobs. Given this 
specification, the results suggest that foreign ownership itself, not simply the creation of 
additional jobs by foreign companies, initially creates opportunities for union growth, at least in 
the short term. I will explore this possibility at greater length in the next chapter. At the very 
least, I find little support that inward FDI is the main culprit for the longer-term erosion of 
unions, which has been argued by proponents of the neo-liberal convergence perspective.  
 Interestingly, “right-to-work” is found to be unrelated to long-term unionization levels, 
given the lack of significance on the lagged value. However, the differenced term yields a 
somewhat puzzling positive and significant finding. Again, the differenced value captures a 
change in the RTW status of a state. As addressed in the first chapter, there are only three states 
in my data set that adopted a RTW law during the period under analysis, and there were no states 
with a RTW law that moved to abolish it. Upon examination of each of these three cases, in the 
year the state adopted RTW, union density did in fact increase. However, in two of these cases – 
Texas and Oklahoma - union density fell in the following year. In Idaho, union density continued 
to grow in the year following the RTW law adoption.  
These few cases appear to be idiosyncratic. It is difficult to theorize a general argument 
for how adoption of a RTW law would produce a short-term positive effect on private sector 
union density. However, it may be that in these particular cases adoption of RTW initially 
provoked greater worker demand for unions and subsequent labor mobilization to confront the 
heightened management and government attacks on employment protections and labor rights. In 
any case, given the results on the lagged RTW variable, in the long-term the independent 
statistical impact of RTW adoption appears to be insignificant, concurring with findings of at 
least one previous study (Moore 1998). My results here suggest that other economic and 
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employment-related policies, such as development strategies, have been more important 
indicators of long-run union growth potential during the late 20th century than have been “right-
to-work” statutes. 
 As for the governmental partisanship and ideology variables, there are a few conclusive 
findings. Percent of Democrats in Congress, a national-level variable, does reveal the expected 
positive relationship to unionization, both in the short and long-term; while Democrat President 
appears to have no impact. Higher levels of state government liberalism do not appear to have a 
statistically significant influence on unionization. My findings come from a dataset including 
years that both pre-date and post-date significant policy devolution to the states in 1994 (See 
Kelly and Witko 2012 for more on this). My inclusion of “pre-discretion” years may explain why 
the general policy liberalism of state legislatures is not significant in my model. In those years 
where the national government retained control over more aspects of economic policy, which is 
about half of the years included in my dataset, the policy-ideology of state legislators appears to 
have exerted limited influence on economic outcomes. 
 Looking at the economic and demographic controls, only growth in state gross product 
and state population yield significant findings. Growth of the state economy (GSP) is positively 
related to union growth in both the long and short-term as expected, but it is only statistically 
significant at the 90% confidence level.  Unemployment appears to have no significant impact, 
nor does manufacturing percentage of GSP. This is somewhat surprising, since the 
manufacturing sector has been a primary arena of unionization in the past. However, the variable 
is expressed as manufacturing’s share of the entire GSP, rather than the rate of growth or decline 
of the GSP for the sector- which may be more meaningful to union success. The size of the state 
population is related to negative union density growth in the long term, as expected. Non-white 
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proportion of the workforce was not found to be significant. Finally, the original value of union 
density in the first year under examination was associated with union density growth, indicating 
that net of other factors, union density levels in the past are associated with ability of unions to 
successfully organize workers in future years. 
 As mentioned earlier, in an error correction model the overall long term impact on the 
dependent variable (the enduring causal relationship that lasts over more than one time period) is 
actually a function of both the coefficient of the lagged independent variable and the error 
correction rate, which is given by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The ratio of 
these two coefficients is the long run multiplier (LRM)- which is the total impact the 
independent variable has on the dependent variable over all time periods in which it endures. If 
both the lagged independent variable and the lagged dependent variable are highly significant, 
generally the LRM is as well.  Table 14 provides the LRMs of lagged independent variables 
with p<.05 in the model, as well as the coefficients of significant differenced variables. Since this 
is not a standard OLS linear regression model, the lagged dependent variable coefficients can not 
be interpreted as producing a simple unit-for-unit linear change effect, but the total long-term 
impact can be evaluated by calculation of the LRM. In the table I report the substantive impact of 
a one unit increase of X on Y. If the variable has a significant lagged dependent variable the long 
run multiplier effect on Y is given. If only the differenced independent variable is significant 
only the immediate impact of a change in X on Y is listed.   Note that the coefficient on the 
differenced independent variable does have a unit-for-unit impact. A change in X of 1 unit 
produces an initial shock to Y equal to the coefficient of the differenced variable.  
The long-term impact of entrepreneurial policy is perhaps modest, but still statistically 
significant.  A one unit annual increase in the entrepreneurial activism index would result in a  
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Table 14. Effect of Significant Independent Variables in the ECM (p<0.5) 
 
Variable  Short Term Impact of One Unit 
Change in X on Y 
Long Range Multiplier 
Impact on Y 
   
Entrepreneurial Policy Activism Not sig -1.164 
   
Percent Democrats in Congress .0296 .1759 
   
Inward FDI 0.225 Not sig 
   
Log State Population Not sig -.4899 
   
Right-to-Work 1.464 Not sig 
 
 
long-term multiplier effect of a little over a percentage point decline in union density, occurring 
in portions over multiple time periods. Saiz’s index ranges from 0-3. A change of one unit on 
Saiz’s entrepreneurial index would be analogous to a state moving from the lowest level of 
entrepreneurial policy use to a slightly-below-average level of use relative to the other states.   
 
Discussion 
 The finding that entrepreneurial policy has a significant negative long-term impact on 
state private sector unionization suggests that strategies which promote job growth in higher-
skilled and innovation sectors do not necessarily complement labor union mobilization. A simple 
explanation for this is that labor mobilization is best characterized as a mostly reactive process 
that occurs when workers demand higher wages and working conditions because management 
refuses to grant them. However, when companies voluntarily supply higher wages to attract 
scarce workers – those with special skills and higher productivity potential - the need for union 
representation is reduced. Collective action generally occurs only when the benefits of solidarity 
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outweigh the costs of solidarity (Olson 1965). Highly-skilled workers, as suggested by the 
“skills-biased technical change” argument, may see no need for collective action to enhance their 
own wage potential because they exert sufficient leverage in wage bargaining individually. 
Companies need them, see them as assets, and are happy to accommodate their wage demands. If 
this is the perspective of companies promoted through entrepreneurial development strategies, 
unionization may simply be unnecessary to satiate higher-skilled workers in entrepreneurial-
active states.  
 Furthermore the fact that unions could actually compress the wage spectrum between the 
highest and lowest paid workers may lead some higher-skilled workers to believe their wage 
potential actually drops if unions have power (Pontusson et al 2000, Hornstein et al 2005). They 
may find “working union” to be of little utility, since their work is widely regarded as valuable in 
today’s knowledge economy. My results suggest that the “quality jobs” that entrepreneurial 
policy attempts to produce are not analogous to the solid blue-collar manufacturing jobs of 
yesteryear. Today’s “quality jobs” may better be described as elite jobs that cultivate a particular 
way of thinking in the employees that work them. Entrepreneurial employees are likely to be 
more comfortable operating individually, rather than in unity with other workers to advance their 
interests. In addition to lowering the perceived need for unions, entrepreneurial policy may 
actually produce a different breed of workers whose individual value systems are incompatible 
with principles such as solidarity-building and collective mobilization, which are necessary for 
union growth.  
 On the other hand, locational policy adoption, independently, does not appear to lead to a 
“race to the bottom” in terms of union power. This may be because in states that pursue the 
lower-wage strategies characteristic of locational incentive programs, private sector unionization 
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was already “at the bottom” by 1984, so there was little additional loss to be experienced. The 
economics-based argument that increased competition from newly relocated businesses could 
tighten profit margins and decrease opportunity for union rent-seeking was not confirmed by the 
findings. Nor was there evidence to suggest that locational policies increase demand from 
workers for unionization due to cuts in wage and working conditions. Though there is 
convincing evidence that locational approaches do lower wages and erode public revenues (see 
Chapter 2), apparently, union growth and decline rates are affected more significantly by other 
factors.  
  FDI was shown to have no impact on long-term union decline, confirming the findings of 
the preliminary bivariate analysis I conducted in Chapter 3. Susan Hansen (2006) has argued that 
international openness is not necessarily a threat to wages and working conditions, as is often 
suspected. State policy choices, she contends, are what really matters. My results here 
complement her findings, at least in part. Granted, my measure of international economic 
openness is specific to inward investment, and it does not address the competitive pressures from 
foreign trade or outward FDI. Moreover, my dependent variable is unionization, whereas Hansen 
was largely concerned with globalization’s potential impact on wage rates. Still, my findings 
here do indicate that state choices about economic development strategy have more impact on 
union decline than does increased competition due to heightened levels of foreign investment. 
   Moreover, the significant positive short-term shock that increased shares of FDI-
generated employment has on unionization casts additional doubt on the economics-based 
argument that increased competition limits union rent-seeking potential. Apparently, increases in 
employment share by foreign-owned subsidiaries exert some positive effects on union 
membership. This may be related to the fact that in many cases FDI shares increase due to 
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foreign acquisition of existing businesses.  Some labor relations research suggests that a union’s 
likelihood to successfully organize a facility increases when there is a change in operations or 
ownership (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004).  
The positive short-term impact of FDI to unionization may also occur because foreign-
owned companies are in fact more amenable to unionization than are U.S. companies. 
Volkswagen once again provides an interesting example. When VW moved to Chattanooga in 
2008, it immediately began plans to form a “work council” structure, similar to the one operating 
in its home-country facilities. This cooperative management-labor approach was regarded by the 
company as a successful and proven business strategy. Prominent Tennessee politicians, many of 
them noted business leaders, were less enthusiastic about VW’s tolerant union position. As noted 
in Chapter 2, the union election in Chattanooga was lost, despite VW and union efforts, but a 
subsequent “card check” agreement has cleared the way to union representation, in any case (See 
Chapter 2 for reference).  
This however is just a single example of how foreign nationality of firms may provide 
opportunity for unions to grow. Moreover, it is an exceptionally nuanced case, with idiosyncratic 
features that may not be generalizable over the entire population of attempted union campaigns. 
In the following chapter I will present a “micro-level” multivariate statistical analysis of 
individual union election contests for recent years in order to better examine the causal 
relationship that foreign ownership has on the ability of unions to organize worksites. 
I will also analyze the impact that economic development strategy has at the micro level. The 
findings in this chapter suggest that only entrepreneurial policy significantly relates to union 
decline at the macro-level. Does this negative effect also hold when looking specifically at newly 
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Chapter 5:  A “Micro” Model of Unionization 
 In the previous chapters I analyzed the impact that economic development policy and 
foreign direct investment has on state level unionization outcomes from a “bigger picture” 
macro-economic perspective. This approach emphasized over-time change occurring in the share 
of unionized workers in the private sector workforce of each state. Overall, I found that while all 
states lost private sector union density in the long-term, cross-sectional variation existed when 
examining annual change in union density and basic level of union density. I found, somewhat 
surprisingly, that increases in entrepreneurial development policy played a role in the long term 
decline of unions. I also found that “right-to-work” status had no significant long term impact on 
unionization during the years of study. Moreover, growth in foreign direct investment had a 
positive impact on the annual change in macro-unionization. 
Clearly much of the macro-story emphasizes the longer-term erosion of unionization that 
occurred from previous decades, while the marginal annual growth in unionization that occurred 
in some states is secondary. Yet it is critical to point out that despite the decline in unionization 
from a macro-perspective, attempts to organize unions in individual workplaces continue to 
occur even in a day and age unfavorable to labor activism. Thousands of union elections are 
conducted each year in the private sector labor force, with many others occurring in public sector 
worksites. In fiscal year 2009, 1,339 union elections occurred in private sector worksites 
throughout the country, and 915 of these were union victories. This added about 36,000 new 
union workers nationally after accounting for member losses due to union decertifications 




Despite the gains that union organizing makes each year, union member loss from plant 
closures and downsizing of existing unionized facilities also occurs, meaning that nationally, 
union membership hardly ever experiences net annual growth (Farber and Western 2001)13. Thus 
Labor is commonly depicted as a dysfunctional, aging dinosaur when viewed from the “big 
picture” perspective. Nevertheless, when unionization is conceptualized as an ongoing activity 
(that is, labor organizing), rather than a status (membership shares secured in the labor force), it 
is harder to discount the relevance of unions. Labor organizing continues to be a frequent, 
important social and political activity.  
To put this in perspective: the number of worksites with successful union elections in 
2009 was approximately equivalent to the average number of new churches organized yearly in 
the last decade of the 20th century (915 for unions versus about 1,000 for churches) (U.S Census 
referenced by Francis Schaeffer Institute 201514). Prominent scholars have shown that church 
participation is not as widespread as it was in the early 20th century (Putnam 2000), but 
nonetheless, social scientists do not deny the important role that church-going continues to have 
in shaping American political outcomes from the micro-level.  State leaders evaluate the efficacy 
of economic development activities similarly - from an individual-level perspective. Most 
political assessment of the benefits of economic development occurs at a case-by-case level. 
Elected leaders frequently laud one more new factory recruited in-state or one more new 
innovation business launched. As discussed in Chapter 2, state leaders are hard-pressed to 
                                                 
13 Year 1999 was an exception. It actually experienced a net growth of 265,000 union members nationally 
(Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2005). However, even with the growth in the number of members, union density – 
members as a percentage of the workforce still slipped (Hirsch and MacPherson 2001).  
14 I used 1990-2000 numbers for church membership due to availability of data. 
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quantify the macro-economic benefits of economic development activities over the long-term, 
but they continue to engage in them anyway. Because of this continued engagement both 
politicians and political scientists alike consider economic development policy an important 
political factor to study.  
 The same is true when evaluating union outcomes. Micro-analysis is important to this 
study because despite union density declines in recent decades, I must account for the fact that 
unions continue to attempt to organize workers, and workers continue to both embrace and reject 
their attempts. Proper analysis of unionization outcomes requires an investigation of the 
dynamics of labor mobilization at the “ground-level.” What factors impact whether or not an 
individual unionization attempt will be successful, especially in a day and age in when broader 
union density growth is so difficult?  
In this chapter, I focus primarily on firm nationality as a factor impacting unionization 
success. This is an individual-level variable, unique to each worksite. In Chapter 3 I offered 
some preliminary analysis suggesting that foreign ownership of firms, in addition to macro-level 
state FDI, presented favorable conditions for union organizing. I also discussed how the market 
economy type of the country from which a firm originates may theoretically impact its 
propensity to tolerate union organizing in its facilities abroad. In this chapter, I will conduct a 
full regression analysis to address these research questions. 
 The before mentioned research questions are largely economic in nature. I also want to 
account for macro-level factors in the state political system that impact unionization success at 
the micro level. I will control for the influence of state development policy on likelihood of a 
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union to successfully organize a worksite, along with state citizen and government political 
ideology. “Right-to-work” status will also be included as a policy-related control variable. 
 
Data and Methods 
 This chapter examines the results of individual union certification elections conducted by 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to recognize a union as the official representative of 
employees. The union elections are drawn from three years - 2005, 2007, and 2009. These years 
were tapped because first of all, at the time I began this study 2009 was the most current year 
available. I added other years to increase N. Each additional case added to the set involved 
considerable research in coding on some variables. After coding observations for these three 
years the dataset included over a thousand cases, which provided sufficient N for accurate 
statistical testing. These years of coding (2005, 2007, 2009) offer some variation in Presidential 
administration (Bush versus Obama), as well as state of the national economy (years of growth 
and recession).  
The unit of analysis for my examination is union contest. (An election is conducted by 
the NLRB allowing eligible employees to vote either for or against the union – hence, my use of 
the term “contest”). There is no time series component to this examination. I pooled observations 
from three years to increase the number of observations, not to evaluate the factor of interest 
over repeated points in time. In fact, the observations only exist at one point in time- the year 
when the worksite experienced the certification election. Under current U.S. law, labor unions do 
not have to re-certify in an election once officially recognized unless there is a specific de-
certification election requested by covered workers, which does not often occur. As a result, the 
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observations from each year in my data set involve an entirely different set of cases. This is not 
longitudinal panel data. 
 I made several types of exclusions to the total list of NLRB elections. First of all, I 
excluded the non-profit sector, because my key factor of interest is nationality of corporate 
ownership, which is irrelevant to non-profit organizations. Many hospitals, charity agencies, and 
educational/arts facilities are excluded. If I found evidence that a hospital or other association 
was run for profit, the case was included. I also excluded any election contest which covered less 
than 50 workers. This was a large number of elections- in fact the majority, because most 
elections take place in very small bargaining units, though these elections do not necessarily 
cover the largest share of workers. This is common practice from prior union election research. 
The well-respected Bronfenbrenner study from 1999-2000, referenced in Chapter 3, utilized this 
approach to make the project more feasible; thus I also adopted this exception for efficiency.  I 
also excluded multi-union elections, when several different unions were vying for representation 
simultaneously, and union decertification elections. Such cases are only a small number of 
elections, and they originate from qualitatively different circumstances than the majority of 
elections, such as particular episodes of worker dissatisfaction or claims of fraudulent union 
operations by management15. In this study, I wanted to capture the dynamics related specifically 
to new organizing, so these idiosyncratic cases are not included. It is also critical to point out that 
my dataset of election contests does not include public sector worksites. Government employees 
are covered by entirely separate labor laws than are private sector employees. State and local 
government employees are subject to individual state level labor relations laws which vary 
                                                 
15 See Dwarkin and Fain 1989 and Sandver and Ready 1998 for a discussion of multi-union election outcomes. 
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considerably (Sanes and Schmitt 2014, Valetta and Freeman 1988) rather than the NLRB 
certification process, which is consistent across all states. Moreover, the data on state public 
sector union elections is not as available as is the data from the NLRB, and my focus in this 
dissertation is on private sector union organizing in any case.  
OLS regression is not appropriate for this analysis, because the dependent variable, union 
contest result, is a dichotomous nominal-level variable, expressed as either a union win or union 
loss. All observations for y will be either 1 or 0, meaning that y does not vary continuously (no 
values can be < 0 or >1 or even between 0 and 1). If one attempted to use OLS with this 
dependent variable, errors would not be normally distributed and would be heteroskedastic, 
which would render significance testing inaccurate. Moreover, OLS assumes that y is a linear 
function of x, meaning that the regression coefficients generated are interpreted as producing a 
linear unit-for-unit change.  But OLS coefficient estimates that are interpreted linearly with a 
dichotomous dependent variable can yield y values (the predicted probability of y=1) outside the 
range of 0 to 1, which is in reality impossible (Williams 2015, based on Aldrich and Nelson). 
Thus, OLS should not be used with a binary dependent variable.  
My data requires a strategy that can produce coefficient estimates that express the 
predicted probability of y=1 (that is, a union win) as a non-linear function of x, limited to a range 
of 0 to 1 (0 to 100% probability). Bivariate logistic regression is a method that accomplishes this, 
modeling the impact of x on the probability that y=1 as an S-shaped curve. Differences in the x 
variables in the middle of the range of observations have more of an impact on the predicted 
probability of a union win than do differences at either the higher or lower end of the range 
(Williams 2015). This ensures that coefficient estimates will be less biased. It also shores up the 
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efficiency of the standard error estimates to increase the validity of significance testing. I should 
point out that my particular dataset requires additional fixes to ensure more accurate standard 
error estimates beyond the use of standard logistic regression. This will be discussed shortly. For 




As already noted the dependent variable is Union Win. The NLRB election report lists all 
contests as a “Win” or “Loss” for the union.  A win is defined as 50% plus 1 of eligible 
employees casting a “For” vote for the union. Union Win is coded 1=Win and 0=Loss. Basic 
descriptive statistics for this variable were provided in Chapter 3, Table 10, indicating that the 
dependent variable demonstrates variation. There were 980 contests, with 465 union wins, 515 
union losses, and an overall union win rate of 47.4%. 
 The key independent variable in the micro-level analysis is Foreign Multi-national 
Company (FMNC). I am most interested in the difference between foreign-originating firms and 
American-firms overall, in order to examine whether or not  U.S. businesses are particularly 
hostile to union organizing attempts, and foreign firms in general, are less so. Therefore the 
baseline for comparing the FMNC variable is all U.S. firms. These include both wholly domestic 
American firms and U.S.-owned multi-national firms with production facilities abroad. Chapter 
3, Table 10 lists the descriptive statistics for each of these groups. FMNC worksites posted 
higher rates of wins than did domestic firms, U.S. multinational firms, and all U.S. firms in 
aggregate. I expect FMNC to be positively related to the likelihood of a union win. 
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 The NLRB reports do not provide the nationality of the firms where union elections take 
place. It only provides the name of the business site. Therefore, firm nationality had to be 
researched and coded for all observations. Firm nationality is actually a rather complex 
characteristic, and it can be a difficult to ascertain. First of all, larger firms are owned by multiple 
shareholders, sometimes with a mix of foreign and domestic ownership. Moreover, companies 
are often subsidiaries of other parent firms, and although they may do business under a 
“domestic” firm name, they could in fact be owned wholly or partly by another U.S. or foreign-
based multi-national entity. In order to determine ownership, I traced all election worksites to 
level of the highest parent company. Additionally, most franchise situations were coded by the 
parent firm nationality, if a parent could be traced by the name given on the NLRB election 
reports.  
 Several sources were used interactively to make the most accurate determination 
possible regarding firm ownership and nationality. First of all, I conducted an individual internet 
search on every contest worksite name, which was listed by firm name on the NLRB reports. 
Most firms identified and described their parent-firm owner, if they had one. I researched the 
annual reports and corporate history information provided on the company websites to determine 
the actual year the parent acquired the company, because firm ownership frequently changes 
hands. For example, if I was coding firm nationality for a union election contest that occurred in 
year 2005, I looked for an explicit reference on the firm website that it was in fact owned by the 
listed parent firm in that year. Often, if the ownership changed hands in recent years, the name of 
the previous controlling firm would be listed. Once I located a year-specific name of a parent 
company I cross-referenced this name to the Uniworld Directory of Firms. Uniworld provides 
two separate catalogs– one for multinational firms headquartered in the U.S that operate in 
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foreign locations, and another for foreign firms operating in the U.S. I examined both catalogues 
per appropriate year for a listing of the parent company name. If the parent was listed in the 
American guide, I coded firm nationality as U.S. multinational; if in the foreign guide, I coded it 
as a foreign multi-national and also recorded the specific country-of-origin. However, in most 
cases the business name (or parent name, if applicable) was not located in either guide. I coded 
these cases as U.S. domestics. Occasionally, I would attempt to code nationality for a company 
that had no website or provided no ownership history on its website. The first case was often due 
to the firm having gone out of business or having changed names. In each of these situations, I 
conducted a broader internet search looking in the state and city papers where the worksite was 
located for news stories that contained company expiration, acquisition, or creation details. In a 
handful of cases, about 20 or so, I could not locate any information at all about the company, and 
hence, I tossed these cases out of the dataset. In most cases, using the collaborative strategy of 
firm website research, Uniworld directory cross-check, and occasional on-line media search, I 
was able to make a reliable, year-specific assessment of firm nationality.  
If a company self-described itself as a subsidiary of a parent firm, I assumed the parent as 
primary–interest owner, under the rationale that if the firm openly acknowledges the parent-firm 
identity, that parent firm likely had the controlling or majority interest. In the event that I was 
able to also locate the parent firm name in the Uniworld guide, it was given that the parent firm 
had a 50% plus ownership stake, as the Uniworld guide uses majority ownership as a criterion 
for listing the firm. Once I had coded all union contest sites as FMNCs, US MNCs, or domestic 
firm, I collapsed the US MNC and domestic categories together. This yielded a bivariate 
independent variable coded 1=Foreign-owned firm and 0=American-owned firm. 
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I also created dummy variables indicating the market economy of the country-of-origin of 
all foreign firms to use in an alternate model. This was done to pursue the hypothesis that the 
market economy type from which a firm originates, as developed in the Varieties of Capitalism 
paradigm (Hall and Soskice 2001), impacts management attitudes toward unionization. Hall and 
Soskice contend that firms in coordinated market economies (CMEs) have less contentious 
relationships with unions than do firms in liberal market economies (LMEs) due to the specific 
institutional capacities that market economies provide for unions.16 It is not entirely clear how 
management labor relations approaches in a home-country will translate to subsidiaries located 
abroad. Assuming that management adopts the same attitudes toward labor in its foreign 
worksites, foreign firms from CMEs could be expected to engage in less resistance to U.S. union 
organizing attempts than do foreign firms from LMEs.  In my data set the CME Firm variable is 
coded 1=CME. Firms headquartered in liberal market economies outside of the U.S. are coded 1 
for the variable Foreign LME. The omitted group (U.S. firms) serves as the base group for 
comparison. 
I included the same Saiz indices that appeared in the macro-model as key variables 
indicating entrepreneurial policy activism and locational policy activism to explore the impact 
that economic development policy may have on micro-level union election results. Admittedly, 
this variable is measured only at the state level. I used the indices values for the state in which 
the contest worksite was located, listed on the NLRB reports, for year 2006. This is the most 
recent year the indices values are available, and the closest year to observations tracked in the 
micro-level data set. I begin by offering the same initial hypotheses about economic development 
                                                 
16 See Chapter 3 for a complete discussion. 
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policy as were offered in the macro-analysis. I expect locational policy in the state of the election 
contest to be negatively associated with likelihood of a union win in that contest. Entrepreneurial 
policy impact is harder to predict. The indication that entrepreneurial policy promotes firms that 
views labor as an asset, not a cost, suggests that unionization attempts may have more likelihood 
of success in entrepreneurial-activist states, because there may be less resistance from firms in 
the event that the workers desire union representation. The macro-level model results from the 
previous chapter revealed that entrepreneurial policy activism actually had a negative impact on 
mass state union density numbers. However, the factors that explain macro union density may 
differ in how they impact the probability that an individual worksite will vote pro-union. I 
tentatively begin with the hypothesis that entrepreneurial policy will enhance likelihood of a 
union win at the individual level of analysis.  
I use other state-level control variables, some of them also used in the macro-level data 
set. State government liberalism is provided as it was in the previous chapter to control for 
leadership ideology of the state government. State unemployment rate appears to control for 
economic circumstances, as the observations are taken from years both preceding and during the 
Great Recession. I include the right-to-work status of the state where the contest occurs because 
the prohibition against union shops in RTW states may impair unions’ ability to convince 
workers that union membership will actually give them more power. I include state union density 
in this model as an independent variable, because the ability of unions to secure members in the 
greater state economy could also impact workers’ perceptions of the power of unions. 
Additionally, I included industry union density (measured at the national level) for the NAIC 
industry sector code of the worksite listed on the NLRB reports in the year of the union contest. 
Union organizing may be more successful in industries such as utilities and transport/ 
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warehousing that have higher levels of unionization than other industry sectors, such as finance 
and food service.  
Ideally, I would include an individual level variable in this model that accounts for the 
ideological attitudes of those workers directly eligible to vote about unionism. If workers making 
a decision about representation are conservative and/or have a negative personal assessment of 
the labor movement overall, they would be less likely to join unions. Though in this model I 
emphasize the level of hostility of firm management toward unionization as the primary factor, 
the individual ideology of workers themselves also must be accounted for. One can not assume 
that if the firm refrains from union retaliation, all workers will individually prefer union 
representation. Alas, there is no individual level data available indicating the personal opinions 
that workers in contest worksites have toward labor unionism. I can however, provide a state-
level proxy for worker support for unionism by including Berry’s citizen ideology index in the 
model. This measure was developed as a companion to the Berry et al government liberalism 
scores used in the last chapter. The citizen liberalism measure assesses the level of citizen left-
ideology for each U.S. state by weighting Congressional ideology scores (partly based on labor 
union policy coding) along with the partisan voting percentages of elections in that state. I use 
this measure for the years 2005, 2007, and 2009 corresponding to the state where the contest 
occurs to proxy for workers’ union sentiment.  
I include two other control variables measured at the individual level: union power and 
bargaining unit size. Union power is a measure of the level of resources available to the union 
organization that is attempting to organize the worksite. Unions vary in resource levels, quality 
of staffing, and their reputation of effectiveness. Small, independent unions unaffiliated with 
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national and international unions are less likely to have the money, staff, and technical skills to 
carry out a successful organizing attempts. Big international unions, such as the Teamsters or 
Service Employee International Union have more assets available to conduct longer, more 
strenuous organizing campaigns. Union power is measured as the total assets (in $ millions) 
reported by the highest-level of the union (that is, at the international or national level) as listed 
on the Office of Labor and Management (OLMS) report, a yearly publication of the U.S. 
Department of Labor. All U.S. unions and labor associations of sufficient size are required to 
report their financial assets each year to OLM. I use the international level of the union 
organization to measure assets because much of the organizing activities of unions is directly 
provided or heavily supplemented by the highest level of the union. Local union branches 
affiliated with large international unions have access to the skills and resources that their 
national-level unions offer. Union power is predicted to have a positive impact on unionization.  
Finally, I included the log of the bargaining unit size, as listed on the NLRB election 
reports, to account for the lower probability of success for unions in large worksites. The NLRB 
pre-determines the number of employees eligible to vote in a union contest, known as a 
bargaining unit, prior to the election being held. It is likely more difficult to successfully 
organize a large group of workers, rather than a relatively small one; thus as the bargaining unit 
size increases I expect to find a negative association to union wins.  
 The accompanying Table 15 supplies a summary of all variables used in the model, 





Table 15. Variables Used in the Logistic Regression Model 
Variable Measure Specification Data Source 
Dependent Variable     
Union Win Binary variable indicating if union 
won the NLRB certification election 
contest. If  > 50% of the employees 
voting indicate “For”, union wins. 
(Win=1; Loss=0).  
National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) Monthly Election Reports 
for 2005, 2007, 2009. Accessed at 
https://www.nlrb.gov/election-
reports 
Key Independent Variables   
Entrepreneurial Policy Intensity Interval level index based on coding 
of state economic development 
program attributes ranging from 
approximately 0 to 3 for year 2006. 
This is the closest available year 
corresponding to the union election 
contests analyzed.  
 Methodology for constructing the 
index is presented in Saiz 2001. 
Attributes coding based on data 
gathered by Miles Friedman and 
Partners LLC in 2006. 
Locational Policy Intensity Interval level index based on coding 
of state economic development 
program attributes ranging from 
approximately 0 to 3 for year 2006. 
This is the closest available year 
corresponding to the union election 
contests analyzed. 
Methodology for constructing the 
index is presented in Saiz 2001. 
Attributes coding based on data 
gathered by Miles Friedman and 
Partners LLC in 2006. 
Foreign Multi-national Firm Binary variable indicating if union 
election worksite was a subsidiary of 
a foreign-owned corporation. 
(1=Yes; 0=No. If 0 the worksite is 
either a domestic U.S. firm or is 
owned by a U.S multi-national firm.) 
See Table in Appendix for full 
description of how firm nationality 
was determined. 
NLRB Election Reports, individual 
firm websites and Uni-world 
Business Publications, Inc. 
Directory of American Firms 
Operating in Foreign Countries 
Years 2005, 2007, 2009 (18th-20th 
editions) and Directory of Foreign 
Firms Operating in the United States 
Years 2004, 2006, 2008 (12th-14th 
editions).  
Media stories on Internet for 
selected cases. 
Control Variables   
“Right-to-Work” State RTW status of state where contest 
worksite is located.  “Right to work” 
state= 1. Union shops allowed= 0. 
Department of Labor, National Right 






Table 15 Continued 
Variable Measure Specification Data Source 
State Citizen Liberalism Interval index based on ideological 
scores of state’s Congressional 
representatives according to ratings 
by AFL-CIO and Americans for 
Democratic Action and vote 
distribution of citizens in 
Congressional races. High levels of 
this measure indicate “left” citizen 
ideology.  
Berry et al 1998, and updates. Years 
2005, 2007, 2009. 
State Government Liberalism Ideological orientation of state 
government in the state where 
contest worksite is located. Interval 
measure based on ideological scores 
of state’s Congressional 
representatives, weighted by partisan 
control of the state legislature. High 
levels of this measure indicate 
“Left” state governments. 
Berry et al 1998, and updates. Years 
2005, 2007, 2009. 
 
 
State Unemployment Rate Annual average unemployment rate 
in state where the contest worksite is 
located. Expressed as a percent. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Years 
2005, 2007, 2009.  
State Union Density Annual average union density (all 
sectors) in the state where the 
contest worksite is located. 
Expressed as a percent. 
Industry sector is listed on NLRB 
reports (NAIC Code). Union density 
numbers from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Years 2005, 2007, 2009. 
Industry Union Density Annual average union density of the 
industry sector corresponding to the 
work performed in the contest 
worksite. Expressed as a percent. 
Industry sector is listed on NLRB 
reports (NAIC Code). Union density 
numbers from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Years 2005, 2007, 2009. 
Union Power  The total assets in millions of dollars 
of the inter(national) union 
attempting certification in the 
election contest. 
The union name is identified on the 
NLRB reports. Assets for union 
(international level) comes from 
Department of Labor’s Office of 
Labor and Management Services 
public disclosure site 
(http://www.dol.gov/olms/). Years 
2005, 2007, 2009. 
Bargaining Unit Size (Log) Number of employees in the 
bargaining unit experiencing the 
election contest, logged. A 
bargaining unit is defined by the 
NLRB prior to the union election as 
the total number of employees 
eligible to vote in the election. 






Analysis and Results 
By implementing a logistic regression estimation methodology I aim to address concerns 
about the efficiency of the standard errors given the non-normal, heteroskedastic residuals as the 
result of using a binary dependent variable. But the selection of cases in this dataset prompts 
additional concerns about the independence of observations assumption. First of all, some of the 
independent variables used in my model are state-level measures, such as the development policy 
and liberalism variables, rather than individual-level. Therefore the errors of observations per 
each state will be correlated, and the standard errors estimated could be inefficient. There is also 
a concern due to the presence of multiple observations from the same companies. Under NLRB 
organizing rules, the individual worksites of companies, rather than the entire workforce of the 
company, are subject to certification. Unions typically organize bargaining units one work site at 
a time rather than across the firm’s entire national workforce. This is certainly the case in my 
dataset. One entity known as First Student, a school-bus contractor, experienced a very large, 
nation-wide union campaign lead by multiple transport unions.  First Student had about 90 
individual worksites experiencing their own separate union elections. While First Student 
appeared more often than any other firm in my data set, additional companies supplied multiple 
union contest observations, including Durham School Services, First Transit, Waste 
Management, and Wackenhut.17 
A widely-used approach to deal with the violation of independence assumption that 
occurs when there are multiple observations supplied from the same unit is to employ clustered 
standard errors (Zorn 2006). This strategy simply estimates adjusted standard error calculations 
                                                 
17 A complete list of companies experiencing election contests in the dataset can be found in Appendix 1. 
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to mitigate Type 2 error. Hierarchical modeling strategies, handy for estimating models that have 
variables measured at multiple levels of analysis, have also come into vogue recently (Gelman 
and Hill 2006), but when used with logistic regression this is a tedious approach which 
complicates coefficient interpretation. I choose to use the clustered standard error strategy in this 
analysis due to ease and straight-forwardness. 
 I have two units –state and firm- that need to be accounted for in the estimation of the 
robust (clustered) standard errors. In a nested situation, an analyst simply needs to cluster on the 
highest common level where multiple observations occur. 18 However, the data situation here is 
not nested. Clustering the standard errors on the state unit does nest within a common unit all 
instances of multiple observations occurring in the economic policy variables, the right-to-work 
variable, the government and citizen ideology variables, and the state union density variable. 
However, the multiple observations from individual firms are not nested within each state. Some 
of the bigger organizing drives listed in the dataset include union election worksites spread 
throughout the nation. FirstGroup, for instance experienced union election contests in about 28 
states. 
To address the need for clustered standard errors on two units – state and firm – I use a 
calculation methodology developed by economists Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006).  Their 
estimation strategy for non-nested multi-way clustering is applicable not only to OLS, but also 
maximum-likelihood modeling such as logit and probit. I use Guan and Peterson’s logit2 
program, an ado file developed for use with the STATA software package, to estimate the logit 
                                                 
18 For instance, if a data set contained multiple observations per state and per county, clustering would only be 
necessary on the state unit, because all observations for a given county are “nested” within the same state. 
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regression model. Guan and Peterson first applied their ado file to models which clustered on 
time and firm units, but Cameron et al provide examples of how two-way clustering is  
appropriate in a cross-sectional, non-longitudinal design (such as my own). The researchers 
confirmed that use of more robust standard errors improved estimation in their models with a 
Monte Carlo analysis (Cameron et al 2006).  
I conducted an additional diagnostic to assist with model estimation. Since I use Berry’s 
state government liberalism and citizen liberalism scores as independent variables in the same 
model, I was moderately concerned that multicollinearity might present an issue. Berry et al. did 
use similar, though not identical data to estimate these measures, and moreover, high correlation 
between the ideological policy scores of legislators and the citizens that elect them seems 
plausible, simply on its face. I estimate Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance scores 
specific to logistic modeling strategies for all variables as a check. Scores generated did not 
indicate a high degree of multicollinearity between variables.  The VIF generally indicates how 
much of the inflation of a variable’s standard error could be caused by collinearity. A base-line 
of 1 indicates the complete absence of inflation due to collinearity.   VIF readings produced were 
less than 3 for all variables, with citizen liberalism and right-to-work showing the highest 
readings. State government ideology had a VIF of only 1.74.  Tolerance, which indicates how 
much collinearity that a regression can tolerate, ranged from .34 and .38 for RTW and citizen 
ideology, respectively, to .97 for union power. UCLA’s Institute for Digital Research and 
Education suggests that a tolerance <.1 and VIF>10 is the “red flag” threshold. Using this as a 
guide, I conclude that multicollinearity does not pose a serious concern. 
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The results of the logistic regression analysis are provided in Table 16. In the first 
column I estimate my primary model, which emphasizes the impact of foreign firm nationality as 
the key independent variable. In the second column I present a supplemental model that 
considers the impact of the market economy type, as developed by Hall and Soskice, that 
substitutes variables for CME Firm and Foreign LME Firm in place of Foreign Multi-national 
firm. 
Turning to the first model, Foreign Multi-national Firm is positive as expected, 
indicating that foreign nationality is associated with greater likelihood of a union contest win. 
Entrepreneurial policy activism is also positive, suggesting that at the individual level of 
analysis, this economic development strategy is associated with favorable opportunities for labor 
organization, in contrast to the results from the macro-model in the earlier chapter.  However, in 
the case of both foreign nationality and entrepreneurial policy the level of significance only 
meets the 90% confidence level. This offers marginal support for my original hypotheses for 
each variable. Locational policy is signed negative, as expected, but it is not significant at the 
90% confidence level; thus it appears to have little impact on the likelihood that union contests 
are wins for labor. 
A number of control variables were associated with greater likelihood of union wins. 
State unemployment rate had a positive association with union wins, which is perhaps counter to 
the conventional wisdom that unemployment creates negative conditions for union organizing. 
However, if workers experience greater workloads or wage and benefits cuts due to company 




Table 16. Logistic Regression Results for Union Win 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
   
Foreign Multinational Firm 0.5543* -- 
 (0.2943)  
   
CME Firm -- -0.1753 
  (0.3947) 
   
Foreign LME Firm -- .7701** 
          (0.3110) 
   
Entrepreneurial Policy Activism 0.3441* 0.3546* 
 (0.2015) (0.2068) 
Locational Policy Activism -0.0035 0.0246 
 (0.3131) (0.3214) 
   
“Right-to-Work” State -0.0769 -0.0804 
 (0.3617) (0.3740) 
   
State Union Density -0.0246 -.0.0259 
 (0.0184) (0.0186) 
   
State Unemployment Rate 0.0955*** 0.0883*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0274) 
   
Industry Union Density 0.0068 0.0022 
 (0.0119) (0.0116) 
   
Citizen Liberalism 0.0198* 0.0186* 
 (0.0102) (0.0101) 
   
State Government Liberalism -0.0068* -0.0062* 
 (0.0036) (0.0037) 
   
Union Power 0.0004* 0.0004** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
   
Bargaining Unit Size (Log) -0.180** -0.1771* 
 (0.0888) (0.0909) 
   
Constant -1.211 -1.131 
 (0.778) (0.789) 
   
Observations 980 980 
Wald chi2 33.32*** 39.88*** 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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may prompt more demand for workers to organize. Some research shows that unionization is 
higher in regions that experience the most unemployment, because workers view union 
membership as a form of insurance against arbitrary job loss in particularly tight labor markets 
(Booth 1984, Blanchflower et. al. 1990). The result may also be an indication of a more general, 
endogenous association of unionism with higher sustained levels of unemployment. Economists 
argue that unionization increases unemployment because rents extracted by labor unions allow 
less surplus available to firms for expansion of their labor force, and there are few individual 
incentives for laid-off union workers to shift to new employment in a non-unionized 
environment (Alvarez and Shimer 2014, Nickel and Layard 1999, Summers 1986).  
Citizen left ideology is associated in the model with positive impact on union wins, 
which is expected, though at only the 90% confidence. The association between left ideology 
among citizens (a proxy for direct worker attitudes toward unionism in principle) has a 
straightforward impact on worker preferences to personally support organization of their own 
workplaces. Union power is also positively associated with likelihood of a union win, indicating 
that union organizations with more assets and resources are better equipped to wage successful 
union organizing campaigns. 
State government liberalism appeared to have a negative association to the likelihood of 
union wins, which appears counter-intuitive. It is sensible to predict that union election contests 
in states with left-leaning government leadership would offer more favorable political conditions 
for labor organization, assuming that liberal leaders are more sympathetic to Labor. Still, many 
of the indicators associated more directly with pro-labor sentiment in elected officials were 
already controlled for in the model through the citizen ideology, right-to-work, and economic 
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development variables. Additional “left” policy preferences of elected leaders captured by the 
state government liberalism variable include leaders’ support for environmentalism, pro-
immigration, and civil liberties policies which do not always clearly align with pro-unionism. 
This may explain the negative impact of heightened liberalism of government leaders. One other 
variable, bargaining unit size, showed a negative relationship to likelihood of a union victory. 
This was predicted since larger groups of employees face increased barriers to collective action 
(more “free-riding”, more coordination and solidarity-building challenges) than do small groups 
(Olson 1965). 
Neither density variable – state union density or industry union density- had significant 
impact in the model. Nor did “right-to-work”. Apparently, the individual assessments that 
workers make to join a union are not determined heavily by their evaluation of the success of 
unions more broadly in the overall labor force. Worker decision-preferences are more focused on 
the potential that unionism has to improve their individual workplaces, rather than its power 
status in the greater macro-economy or political environment. 
 It was noted earlier that logistic regression coefficients can not be interpreted as a 
straightforward linear change in y as a result of a change in x. The coefficient on each 
independent variable in a logistic model indicates that a one unit increase in x produces a 
coefficient unit increase in the log-odds of y, which is difficult to conceptualize.  The standard 
approach to interpreting the substantive impact of logistic regression coefficients is to compute 
the predicted probability of y=1 (a union win) at different values of an independent variable, 
holding the other variables constant at their means (Long and Freeze 2005).  Table 17 shows 
predicted probabilities for the FMNC and Entrepreneurial Policy variables generated using Scott  
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Table 17. Predicted Probability of Union Win for Key Independent Variables (Model 1) 
Variable at Different Values Predicted Probability 
Foreign Multi-national Firm  
    American Firm (FMNC=0) .444 
    Foreign Firm (FMNC=1) .581 
Entrepreneurial Policy Activism  
     At minimum value (.67) .370 
     At mean value (1.9) .473 
     At max value (3.0) .567 
* Predicted probabilities were generated using the spost13.ado program for STATA. See Long, J. 












Long’s spost13 program for Stata. The probability of a union win in a foreign firm is 58%, 
versus only 44% in an American-owned firm, holding the other variables at their means. The 
probability of a union win increases from about 37% at the lowest value generated for 
entrepreneurialism, to about 47% at the average value, to about 57% at the maximum value, 
when holding the other variables at their means. 
 Returning to Table 16, in the second model I focus on the impact of the market economy 
from which foreign firms’ originate, rather than foreign nationality more generally. The CME 
variable indicates a negatively signed, but insignificant coefficient estimate, offering no support 
for the prediction that foreign firms headquartered in countries with coordinated market 
economies (such as Germany, Sweden, and Denmark) offer more favorable unionization targets. 
Though I highlighted the Chattanooga Volkswagen organizing drive several times in this 
dissertation as an illustration of a CME firm tolerant to unionization, this does not hold generally 
for the CME firms in my dataset. The organizing attempt at VW is probably best analyzed as a 
special case, not generalizable to the wider population of union elections. Interestingly, the 
Foreign LME variable in my model does have a significant positive impact on likelihood of 
unionization. It is important to remember that this variable is being compared against a baseline 
of U.S.- owned firms, which was the omitted group variable. The significant result on Foreign 
LME is likely due to the high rate of success in the British-owned FirstGroup school bus 
organizing drive. This drive supplied nearly 100 observations in the data set, therefore the U.K. 
as a country-of-origin is heavily represented. However, these results do not provide clear 
evidence that LME market economy type of a firm favorably impacts likelihood of a union win, 
because the U.S. is also a liberal market economy, and I found in Model One that union victories 




The results of the regression analysis suggest that foreign-ownership of a company 
worksite experiencing a union election increases likelihood of a union victory. It is interesting 
that among foreign firms, companies from liberal market economies, which generally have 
combative labor relations approaches similar to the American system, demonstrated higher 
likelihood of union victories. The failure to find support for the corresponding hypothesis - that 
firms from “pro-union” coordinated market economies are more likely to unionize - casts some 
doubt on the application of the varieties-of-capitalism (VoC) paradigm to the prediction of 
unionization outcomes. Varieties of capitalism does illustrate how different national political 
systems vary in their ability to view unions as constructive institutions within the overall 
business environment. This is supported by my findings that American firms are significantly 
less likely to unionize than are foreign firm. But VoC also emphasizes the similarities between 
clusters of countries. Firms from foreign Liberal Market Economies, such as the United 
Kingdom and Canada, would be expected to display contentious labor-management dynamics 
similar to U.S. firms according to VoC. Yet my analysis suggests that U.S. firms show 
heightened levels of union-avoidance when compared broadly to all foreign firms, especially 
those originating from other liberal market economies.  
My results support the view that union opposition is best attributed to American 
exceptionalism and a U.S. business model that is particularly at odds with unionization (Kelly, 
Witko, and Young 2013, Logan 2006).  My individual level analysis indicates that increased 
entry of foreign firms into the U.S. economy provides unions with more, rather than less 
favorable targets for organizing. This is consistent with the earlier findings in the macro-level 
time series regression showing that FDI shares of employment had a short-term positive impact 
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on private union density growth. The confirmation of a positive relationship at both levels of 
analysis provides considerable support that inward foreign investment does not run counter to 
American labor movement goals.  
A more puzzling finding is that entrepreneurial development policy had a positive impact 
on unionization outcomes in my micro-level analysis, but a negative impact on long-term 
unionization at the macro-level. Entrepreneurial policy seems to affect overall demand for 
unionization among workers differently than it affects company behavior in response to 
individual unionization attempts.  Growth of a “wealth economy” where workers enjoy higher 
wages and better benefits is likely to reduce the perceived need for unions because the most 
important functions of unions involve the protection of worker wages, working conditions, and 
job security (Bennett and Kaufman 2011). Entrepreneurial policy attempts to produce an 
economy where the market itself generates higher wage potential and job quality, essentially 
offering a substitute for the organizational advocacy provided by unions.  
Still, at the same time entrepreneurial policy encourages creation of firms that value labor 
as an asset, which is important in the particular cases when workers do desire collective 
representation. The population of labor organizing campaigns manifests a certain “selection out” 
effect prior to a union election actually being conducted.  Union organizing will actively occur in 
those worksites where conditions for unionization success is best. The most successful unions are 
strategic in the campaigns they choose to pursue (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004), and unions 
are averse to taking on a campaign if there is little indication that it can succeed (Farber 2001, 
referenced in Farber and Western 2001). Therefore, NLRB election contests are more likely to 
materialize in situations where there is both a unique desire among the employees for organizing 
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(micro-level demand for unionization) AND the overall legal and business environment presents 
favorable conditions for victory. In the relatively improbable event that workers actually demand 
unionization, unions will succeed when the policy environment presents them with the best odds 
of success. Entrepreneurial development lures and promotes firms that are more likely to 
accommodate employee demands. When employees in an entrepreneurial state do demand 
unionization, they are less likely to encounter push-back from management and could benefit 
from a more favorable legal environment for organizing.  
Understanding that entrepreneurial policy impacts unionization at the macro and micro 
levels differently helps to explain some of the anecdotal evidence discussed in Chapter 2 that 
suggests entrepreneurial policy and unionization are compatible, both in principle and at times in 
practice. Though entrepreneurialism does not apparently incite mass demand for unions in the 
labor force, it does promote more cooperative relationships between labor and management. 
Since entrepreneurial development programs sometimes condition eligibility on firms 
recognizing worker protections and collaborating with unions (see the Labor Relations 
Provisions table in Chapter 2), it discourages the “union-busting” activities typical of most U.S.-
owned companies during episodes of labor organizing. All of this indicates that entrepreneurism 
is associated with higher odds of successful unionization, when analyzed at the individual level 
of analysis. 
“Right-to-work” status showed no significant impact in these micro-level models, similar 
to the finding in the macro-model regarding its impact on long-term union density. This may be 
because the motivation to vote in support of union representation is not equivalent to a 
willingness to pay union dues. A worker could vote for union representation, and then 
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subsequently “free-ride” and opt out of dues payment once a union is recognized by the NLRB. 
Such a scenario is plausible and even predictable as a means of individual utility maximization. 
It increases benefits to an individual worker due to protections s/he will receive under a union 
contract, while avoiding the dues-extraction costs of union membership. RTW’s impact at the 
micro level is probably most salient in its reduction of the number of attempted union elections. 
Open shop environments offer less potential returns to labor unions even in the event of winning 
a union election. Previous research has shown that union organizing effort is reduced in states 
that prohibit union security clauses (Ellwood and Fine 1987). The descriptive comparison in 
Chapter 2 and 3 also showed that organizing attempts were fewer in RTW states such as 
Tennessee and South Carolina than in union-shop Missouri. Nonetheless, my findings in Model 
2 indicate that likelihood of union success in the election contests that do occur is not 
significantly impacted by state RTW status, concurring with the findings of at least one other 
individual-level analysis (Martin 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter reaffirms the discoveries of the previous chapter that the impact of right-to-
work as a policy determinate of unionization is overemphasized. Entrepreneurial economic 
development strategy has a more notable impact on changes in state union density as well as 
union election results, though its impact on each is qualitatively different. Entrepreneurial policy 
depresses the union share of the private sector workforce over time, but it actually enhances 
chances of union victory in an NLRB election. Locational economic development strategies do 
not appear to influence either the union density of a state or the likelihood that union organizing 
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attempts will succeed. Foreign investment and firm ownership had a consistent positive impact 
on unionization at both the macro and micro levels, indicating that at least one aspect of 
international economic openness – increased entry of foreign companies into the country - does 
not hinder labor movement power.  
 The next chapter will offer an analysis of how economic development policy and 
unionization impacts the quality and equity of state economies. I will shift focus from 
unionization as the dependent variable to examine how it impacts state level income inequality. I 
will also consider economic development policy as a factor affecting inequality directly, as well 
as how it conditions the relationship between unionization and inequality. This will push my 
research toward an assessment of both the empirical and normative implications of development 













Chapter 6: Unionization, Income Inequality, and State Economic Development Strategy 
Please note: a version of this chapter is currently being reviewed for publication in 
State and Local Government Review. Some sections of text in this chapter bear close 
resemblance to the manuscript sent to SLGR. 
 
 Previous chapters have noted how policy devolution to state governments in a federalist 
system, coupled with the growing openness of the U.S. economy has peeked scholarly interest in 
state programs to promote economic development. I discussed the body of research that analyzes 
state economic development impact on job growth and inward investment (Brace 1993, Atkinson 
and Andes 2010, Saiz 2001a) and the lack of conclusive evidence that development policies 
deliver net employment gains.  Chapter 2 noted the relationship of development strategy to 
public sector spending, indicating that locational strategy activism adversely impacted the 
availability of revenues for education and social programs (Burkdull and Tuman 1999, Hansen 
2001).   I highlighted the “race to the bottom” premise, and the evidence showing that 
development policy may encourage competitive bidding for investment among rival states at the 
expense of regulatory protections (Saiz 2001b, Hanson 1993, Peters and Fisher 2004). Most of 
the original empirical analysis in this dissertation focuses on the effect of economic development 
and foreign inward investment on unionization outcomes in the private sector, revealing that 
entrepreneurial policy reduces union density but increases likelihood of union victory in 
certification elections, while foreign investment benefits both union density growth and union 
contest wins. In this chapter, I shift focus away from unionization as the outcome variable to 
consider how it, along with economic development programs, influence income distribution in 
the state economies.  
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 Even though scholarship on economic development is prolific, there is less attention 
given to the distributional consequences of these policies. Laura Langer’s 2001 article is one of 
the few economic development studies that analyzes income inequality as the dependent 
variable. She finds that demand-oriented strategies aimed at producing higher skilled jobs and 
emerging industry sectors decrease income inequality, while more traditional supply-side 
strategies that attract outside investment by cutting factor costs increase inequality. She also 
finds higher overall levels of economic policy activism to be associated with increased 
inequality.  
There are several reasons to revisit her findings. First, Langer’s study was a policy-
intensive investigation, but it did not include other political variables such as ideological or 
partisan composition of government, nor did it include unionization as a key control. The 
inclusion of these classic “power resources” variables is essential to estimate a fuller model of 
the factors that influence income distribution. Secondly, since Langer’s pioneering study new 
measures have been developed to more comprehensively track variation in economic 
development strategy (Saiz 2001a) and  market-based inequality (Kelly and Witko 2012), which 
can help refine model estimation. Third, Langer’s dataset ended in the early nineties, just before 
the Republican take-over of Congress in 1994. The period following 1994 is generally regarded 
as the time when the federal government accelerated the delegation of traditional policy roles to 
the states, which also included critical aspects of economic development.  State development 
policies were likely to have even more impact on economic outcomes post-1994 (Kelly and 
Witko 2012); thus including data from these years in an updated examination is advantageous. 
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An important way to analyze the state-level variation in income inequality levels is to 
consider how political resources of social classes –that is, partisanship and ideology in 
government and unionization in the labor force - may impact redistributive outcomes. Recent 
research on this subject emphasizes political and governmental institutional factors, such as 
union density and left liberalism of state legislators, as drivers of distributional consequences 
(Kelly & Witko 2012). However, policy variables are still important to the examination, as 
specific economic development programs are likely to be the mechanisms through which 
politicians affect economic outcomes. Policy features are also likely to be influenced by the level 
of participation of key organized interests, such as labor unions, who could lobby allies in 
government to create policy that secures benefits for their members. Including unionization and 
state government ideology along-side important policy factors will produce a more 
comprehensive model to explain distributional differences across states.  
This chapter works from the premise that both development policy and power resources 
matter. First, it revisits Langer’s original research question: do various types of economic 
development policies increase or decrease inequality? My results indicate that contrary to 
Langer’s findings, entrepreneurial strategies to development increase inequality after controlling 
for unionization and left governments, while locational strategies have no significant impact. I 
suggest that this is due to a “skills premium” effect that is exacerbated by entrepreneurial 
development approaches. I find a significant independent effect that private sector unionization 
has in the long-term and left government has in the short-term in decreasing inequality.   
Secondly, I consider how entrepreneurial development policy conditions the ability of 
unionization to effectively abate inequality. I have already shown how entrepreneurialism 
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decreases macro-level private union density over time, a finding which matters to proponents of 
unionization in particular. But even for scholars disinterested in the decline of labor unions as 
organizations, there is a bigger associated issue regarding the role of unions in the economic 
system. Does development policy confound unions’ abilities to deliver an economy of widely-
shared wealth?   I find that entrepreneurialism interacts with unionization to hinder its equity-
inducing capacity. Entrepreneurialism undermines unions as a power resource for lower-income 
and working-class citizens. 
 
Economic Development Policy Variation and Distributional Consequences 
 Langer’s study of state level inequality levels operationalized its major independent 
variables in multiple ways. First, it questioned if overall economic policy activism in a state was 
associated with rising or declining income equity. Over the last three decades states have pro-
actively pursued business relocations and new capital growth through a wide variety of 
government-sponsored programs, ranging from tax incentives to job training to public- private 
venture capital firms (Brace 2002, Gray and Lowery 1990, Eisinger 1990, Peterson 1995). The 
priority that state governments placed on implementing development policy pre-dated the age of 
devolution as competitive pressures between states to lure businesses accelerated during the 
eighties, and it continued to increase at a fast clip after the Republican “contract with America” 
in 1994 (Saiz and Clarke 2012). However, some states have been more active in strategic 
development of their economies than others. Langer found that higher levels of economic policy 
activism were associated with rising levels of income inequality in her analysis. This suggests 
that over all, state development efforts place low priority on the equity outcomes of job growth 
and increased investment and focus more on sheer number of jobs or investment dollars secured. 
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 Even though she concluded that economic development activism in general is related to 
higher inequality levels, Langer’s main research question addressed the difference in outcomes 
from use of various types of development policy. Recognizing that economic development 
policy tools are abundant (NASDA 2002, Friedman and Associates 2006), and that states engage 
in a wide and varied mix of these programs, she contended that type of development strategy 
utilized could result in divergent distributional consequences. A number of scholars have 
compiled economic development typologies, categorizing strategies according to their approach 
to labor relations, capital accumulation, regulatory enforcement, and degree of state 
interventionism (Gray and Lowry 1990, Leicht and Jenkins 1994, Grant et. al. 1995, Saiz 2001, 
Langer 2001).  Langer’s approach to classifying development policy draws mostly on Peter 
Eisinger’s contrast of supply-side and demand-side strategies during the early to late eighties 
(1989), as do the Saiz measures used in previous chapters.  
  To review, supply-side policies advocate maintaining a low cost business environment, 
usually by promoting a base of cheap, available labor with reduced tax burdens (Eisenger 1989). 
Job credit tax exemptions, subsidized worker training, state sponsored loan guarantees for 
construction, and accelerated depreciation of industrial machinery are examples of incentives 
provided according  to this low-cost, “business friendly” strategy (Schweke, Rose, and Damson 
1994). On the other hand, demand-side policies prioritize new capital growth, rather than capital 
relocation as the key to economic development. These strategies focus on creating a wealth- 
generating economy often by state support of high tech, finance, “green” energy, or 
communications industries. Public-private venture capital funding, business incubation through 
state higher education institutes, and research and development partnerships are features used in 
the entrepreneurial, demand-oriented approach (Langer 2001). 
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 Langer hypothesized that the quality jobs focus of the entrepreneurial approach, with its 
goal of overall wealth accumulation in the economy to fuel demand, would have a negative 
impact on inequality levels (that is, it would lower inequality). Conversely, she predicted that 
supply-side programs would increase inequality, due to their promotion of lower wages for 
workers and the subsequent reduction of public revenues available for education and social 
programs.  The results of her time-series, cross sectional regression analysis supported these 
hypotheses, causing her to conclude that the propensity of a state to use demand-side strategies 
(entrepreneurial) over supply-side strategies (locational) was associated with reduced inequality 
over the years 1976-1994.  
 Since Langer’s emphasis was on the policy impact of development strategy to determine 
distributional outcomes, she did not include other standard political variables in her analysis, 
namely ideology or partisanship of state government leaders. While she did include some 
national policy-related variables, such as spending on social programs, Langer opted to leave out 
national government partisanship and ideology variables. Nor did she include unionization levels 
in her analysis. Her examination is to date one of the few to explicitly examine reasons for 
variation in state levels of inequality with a development policy-centric focus. 
 
Power Resources Theory, Unionization, and Inequality  
While American politics researchers, including those interested in federalism and state-
level government, often emphasize policy impacts when formulating research questions about 
socio-economic outcomes, literature from the comparative politics sub-field frequently utilizes 
sociological perspectives. Scholars of the “power resources” school view economic outcomes 
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from a class-analytic perspective, contending that they are a function of the access that different 
social classes have to mobilize for political and economic change.  Left governments, voted in by 
working and middle class citizens, are the key political factor that lower classes access for 
reducing economic inequality. Moreover, unions, which organize workers into a cohesive 
political force, are needed for strong Left governments to be elected. Unions also give workers a 
direct route to influencing economic conditions in the market through wage and benefits 
bargaining. Thus, unions and left-leaning parties are essential factors to consider in 
understanding variation in wage inequality (Korpi 1989, Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; 
Miles and Quadogno 2002). 
This examination focuses primarily on the role of unionization in influencing state levels 
of inequality, while also controlling for left governments. Beyond the general association that the 
power resources theory (PRT) draws between unionization and income equality, a more detailed 
discussion of the mechanics of this relationship is in order. Unions’ impact on the income 
distribution can be conceptualized through two distinct processes – the political route and the 
labor market route. First of all, as PRT emphasizes, unions politically lobby for social and 
economic policy that has broad impact on inequality levels in state macro-labor markets. Unions 
are sometimes disparaged as “monopolistic” and “special interest” organizations (Brugiavini et 
al 2001), but history reveals that the policy agenda pushed by unions has wide effects throughout 
the entire labor force. Unions have been the major organizational interests lobbying for national 
and state minimum wage floors (Freeman and Medoff 1984), Davis-Bacon prevailing wage 
requirements (Whittaker 2007), and over-time pay protections (AFL-CIO 2015).  Such laws help 
union members, but more importantly they push up the wage floor for workers in general, 
regardless of union membership.  Through their lobbying efforts, unions essentially pay the 
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collective action costs needed to accomplish economy-wide pay increases for the low-wage 
workforce, which is mostly non-union and politically unorganized (Olsen 1965). Unions and the 
left parties they politically support are also key actors in passing non-transfer economic policies 
that provide for industrial safety regulations and public education producing healthier, better-
informed workers. Such programs arguably have the effect of raising the wage-earning potential 
of lower-income citizens (Kelly 2005).  American unions pushed for the passage of direct 
redistributive policies, such as Social Security, the Affordable Health Care Act, and welfare 
programs, which provide resources to union and non-union workers, as well as people outside 
the labor force. Analysts acknowledge the tension apparent in the broader social “welfare-
enhancing” functions of unions and the more narrow “rent-seeking activities” of their members 
(Brugiavini et al 2001). Nonetheless, Labor’s political mobilization is understood to be an 
essential condition for the growth of welfare states and broadly redistributive policies (Huber, 
Ragin, and Stephens 1993). Unions work to decrease inequality in the overall labor force through 
their political efforts.  
The other route by which unions decrease inequality is directly through the market. It is 
generally accepted that an important effect of collective bargaining is the compression of the 
wage spectrum observed in the labor force. Numerous studies empirically support this view 
finding that historically, union contract bargaining benefits the wage position of lower-skilled, 
lower-educated workers more than higher-skilled workers. Since unions historically raise the 
wages of workers near the bottom of the income distribution into the middle-income strata, 
researchers conclude that unionization mitigates wage inequalities (Card 2001, DiNardo and 
Fortin et al 1997, Hirsch and Schumacher 1998). Unionization does cause differences in average 
wage rates between union and non-union workers in comparable occupations because union jobs 
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generally pay premium wages over non-union ones. However, positive spill-over effects also 
elevate non-union wage rates when institutional protections for unions are strong (OECD 2012). 
Mishel (2012) found that non-union employers in industries with substantial union densities 
often pay employees higher wage rates than they would absent the presence of unions, both to 
stave off the threat of organizing drives and to offer competitive wages to attract workers. 
Another study found that the upward pressures exerted by unions on total non-union wages were 
“almost as large as their impact on total union wages,” even though union workers still enjoy a 
wage premium over non-union workers (Walters and Mishel 2003). Moreover, multiple studies 
trace the rise in male wage-earner inequality during the Reagan years to the decline of 
unionization (Card 2001, DiNardo and Fortin et al 1997, Freeman 1993).  
Unionization also has significant compression effects on the wage spectrum within firms, 
with union firms displaying less dispersion between the highest and lowest paid occupations than 
is observed in non-union firms (Card 2001). Unions likely promote wage compression between 
different occupations as a tool for solidarity-building, as well as a utilitarian strategy of meeting 
the wage demands of the maximum number of members (Freeman 1982). Analysts have even 
found that higher rates of unionization are associated with lower levels of executive pay within 
firms and that unionized companies tend to employ fewer managers (DiNardo, Hallock et al 
1997).  
Even given the evidence for union wage compression, arguments abound that unions do 
not operate out of a mission to promote broad equality.  This view depicts unions as self-
interested entities existing mainly to advance their members’ interests and regards any positive 
externalities generated by union advocacy as un-intended consequences. From an empirical 
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frame of reference this is an artificial distinction, because real-world effects, not organizational 
intent, are the primary factors of interest in empirical studies. Using a normative frame of 
reference, the contention that unions do not act out of a desire to foster greater social equality is 
more noteworthy. However, unions do express that their mission is to achieve an economy of 
shared prosperity, claiming to coordinate and organize as a labor movement, not just a union 
movement.  Consider these words posted on the national website of the American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a major political coalition of U.S. labor 
unions: 
“No matter what type of job workers are in, by building power in unions, they can speak 
out for fairness for all working people in their communities and create better standards 
and a strong middle class across the country (AFL-CIO 2015).” 
 
Taking this vision statement on face value, the goal of unions is to build an economy of widely-
shared wealth. Pay fairness and broader income equality across both the union and non-union 
sectors of the labor force is the expressed objective of American unions. 
The application of power resources theory to explain levels of inequality in the 
economies of the American states is the important theoretical contribution offered by Kelly and 
Witko’s recent 2012 analysis. Unionization and left-leaning state governments are associated 
with lower levels of state economic inequality, not only after taking state and national 
redistributive spending into account, but also on pre-transfer, or “market conditioned” income 
inequality (2012). However, their exploration of the policy routes which allow unions and 
governmental actors to impact market inequality needs further development. While the authors 
find some limited evidence that state minimum wage laws negatively impact pre-transfer 
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inequality following “devolution” in 1994, they do not account for the role of economic 
development strategy as a policy variable which could influence market-conditioned inequality. 
Kelly and Witko base their study on the assumption that unionization influences 
inequality by acting as a working class power resource.  Its upward pressure on wages is 
expected to occur mainly for workers in the lower levels of the income distribution, thus 
reducing overall levels of wage inequality. As already noted, this view has been confirmed by 
studies looking at industry-level and national-level labor force inequality prior to the 1990’s 
(Pontusson, Rueda and Way 2002, Card 2001, 1998, Dinardo and Fortin et al 1997, Freeman 
1993). However, given the severe erosion of union density across the American states in the past 
two decades, mostly in industrial sectors (Hirsch, MacPherson et al. 2012), there is cause to 
question the effectiveness of unions as articulators of lower-class interests more recently. 
Evidence in Figure 3 suggests that through the 1990’s union membership growth (in terms of net 
number of members) occurs in the professional-skills sector, and even in management positions 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).  Meanwhile, we see only a modest increase in union 
membership in the fast-growing service sector, where a large number of America’s lower-paid 
workers are concentrated, and a precipitous erosion of representation in the declining 
manufacturing sector (referred to as “operators, fabricators, and laborers” and “precision 
production” in the graph), which was once the anchor of the working-class trade unionism. The 
assumption that American unions provide a power resource to lower-skilled or “blue collar” 
workers, at least in the recent years following deindustrialization, demands rethinking.  
State economic development policy could also factor significantly into the fortunes of 
workers in the lower tiers of the income distribution. States only have partial authority in re-  
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distributive and labor relations policy making (Kelly and Witko 2012, Peterson 1995, Witko and 
Newmark 2010), while economic development policy is largely within their discretion. As 
Eisinger and Langer contend, different economic development strategies have the potential to 
grow different skill and income classes of workers. This could threaten the ability of unions to 
act as a power resource to the lower-skilled working class, as certain development policies may 
erode the unionized share of lower-income workers in the overall workforce.  
 
Interaction of Unionization and Development Policy in Impacting Wage Inequality 
  Theoretically, entrepreneurial policies will not necessarily equalize distributional 
outcomes, even though they may generate wealth in the overall economy. While Langer 
emphasized that these policies prioritize production of “quality” high-paying jobs, this could 
actually serve to exacerbate inequality levels between workers at different skills-levels, as 
professional and high-tech workers could command a “skills wage premium”, especially if there 
is no sufficient countervailing force to place upward pressure on lower-skilled employees wage 
rates (Greenspan 1996, Berman and Bound 1996).  While quality jobs may increase productivity 
and surplus for governments to use for redistributive purposes, they may also disperse wage rates 
paid across the labor market skills spectrum. Moreover, professional and “knowledge economy” 
employees may be more assertive and individualistic in their approach  to wage bargaining, 
demanding premium wages above those made by their peers, while lower-skilled workers are 
more likely to accept the wage rates that prevail, without demanding individual premiums 
(Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002).   
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 Thus, the equalizing impact of entrepreneurial policy as posited by Langer depends on 
the power of strong working-class labor unions to maintain higher wage rates for lower-skilled 
workers and to ensure that such workers are beneficiaries of the emerging sectors nurtured by 
entrepreneurialism. If industrial or lower-paid service sector unions have an active political voice 
in entrepreneurial policy development, they may be able to lobby for projects which include a 
role for “blue-collar” labor. But if unions are weak and locked out of entrepreneurial strategies, 
economic development efforts to produce high-paying jobs are likely to magnify the income 
differences between low and high-skilled workers. We have already seen that entrepreneurial 
policy has a negative impact on unionization as the dependent variable, suggesting that overall 
unions are not active players in entrepreneurial policy-making. The erosion of labor union 
strength from such policies probably weakens the capacity of unions to safeguard income 
equality in the state economy.  
 So far, I have failed to find a significant impact of locational policy on unionization, but 
what about its effect on income inequality? On first glance, locational policy does seem likely to 
increase inequality because it attempts to lure already developed industries, usually 
manufacturing-based, by suppressing wages for the lowest-skilled workers.  Cutting wages at the 
bottom end of the income distribution would seemingly increase inequality. However, if 
locational approaches lure jobs to places where few employment opportunities exist for lower-
skilled workers, which is also an aim of these strategies, they may have an equalizing impact on 
distributional outcomes, even while maintaining stingy wage rates. Low wages provide more 
opportunity than no wages, adherents of this approach would claim.  
154 
 
In summary, this paper concurs with Langer that placing economic development policy 
front-and-center is important to understanding variation in state level inequality. However, it also 
contends that power resources variables are necessary to include for two reasons. First, 
unionization and left governments need to be accounted for as key control variables, given the 
independent effect they may have on inequality outcomes. Secondly, unionization should be 
considered in light of how development policy, especially entrepreneurialism, interacts with it to 
affect distributional outcomes. Langer’s examination was straight-forward in characterizing 
entrepreneurial policy as more equalizing, and locational policy as less so. I contend that the 




I will first test hypotheses which consider economic development variables along with 
inclusion of power resources variables to specify a fuller model explaining variation in state level 
income inequality. I re-visit Langer’s original hypotheses using updated data and variable 
measures to reconsider the direction and the significance of the independent effect of the two 
types of economic development policies, while controlling for the impact of unionization and 
left-leaning state governments.  
 H1: Greater use of locational policy will be associated with higher inequality. 
 H2: Greater use of entrepreneurial policy will be associated with lower inequality. 
 
If entrepreneurial policy does in fact exacerbate the “skills premium” paid to higher SES 
workers, Langer’s original findings about the equalizing effect of demand-side strategies will not 
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be supported. If I find support that either of these economic development strategies has a 
significant impact on income inequality, I will then explore the conditioning effect that these 
strategies have on unionization in impacting income inequality. 
 Of course that means that I am also testing for the independent effect of private sector 
unionization and left governments on inequality. Private sector unionization has declined greatly, 
and there is reason to question whether or not it still has any power to promote economic 
equality. While my main focus is on the equalizing capacity of unionization, I also test for the 
impact of ideological left governments as a second power resource factor. 
 H3: Increases in private sector union density will be associated with lower inequality. 
 H4: Increases in left state government liberalism will be associated with lower 
 inequality. 
 
The model estimation method for this study follows the same one used by both Langer 
and Kelly & Witko. Given that the data for the model is both cross-sectional (different states) 
and time series (different years), the model must adjust for autocorrelation so as not to violate the 
assumption of independent observations, critical to OLS regression.  Use of panel corrected 
standard errors along with a lagged dependent variable is recognized to be an appropriate method 
for estimating over time change (Kelly and Witko 2010, De Boef and Keele 2008, Beck 2001). I 
employ the same error correction model (ECM) strategy as used in Chapter 4. To review, ECM 
equations compute the change in the dependent variable (∆Y) between time points, rather than 
the actual value of the Y given a value of X. ECMs estimate two coefficients for each 
independent variable – a differenced value and a lagged value.  The coefficient on the 
differenced value applies to the initial impact of the change in X to the change in Y, which 
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occurs entirely at one point in time. The coefficient on the lagged value applies to the impact of 
X on the change in Y that is felt over a longer time span. It requires division by the coefficient of 
the lag of Y (the error correction rate), also included as a right-side variable in an error correction 
model, to assess the total long term impact of the change in X on the change in Y. As Kelly and 
Witko contend (2012), if either the differenced or lagged value of the independent variable is 
significant, then one can conclude that variable impacts the dependent variable. 
 
Variables and Data 
The data for this study also comes largely from Kelly and Witko’s 2012 examination. 
This study utilizes their measure of household pre-transfer market-conditioned inequality as the 
dependent variable, for years 1983-2004. This is a Gini coefficient (ranging from 0-1) calculated 
from income figures of private earnings collected from the Census Bureau Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement. It leaves out any income earned through government programs such as 
Social Security, welfare, or disability. I am most interested here in examining state policy and 
unionization impact on market-based inequality, and states have limited influence in many 
national level transfer programs (TANF is an exception). Therefore, the use of the pre-transfer 
Gini, which measures the amount of market-based inequality existing in the state economy prior 
to the redistributive effects of national transfer programs, is more appropriate. Langer’s approach 
used a post-transfer Gini as the dependent variable, so employing Kelly and Witko’s measure is a 
new contribution I offer to the study of development policy consequences.  
The key explanatory variables are state private sector union density (Hirsch et al 2001), 
entrepreneurial policy intensity and locational policy intensity. The economic development 
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variables are again measured with the Saiz’ interval indices used in Chapter 4 and 5, each 
ranging continuously from 0-3. These take into account a wider range of programs used by states 
in their development efforts than did Langer’s measures, which focused on a more limited range 
of 16 policy tools. Indices values span years from 1983- 2004, thus my examination includes 
observations from before and after devolution in 1994. I also include the state policy liberalism 
variable to measure left power in state governments, which accounts for ideology and policy 
liberalism of state legislatures, rather than simple partisan control (Berry el al 1998 with 
updates). This is provided, as was private sector union density, as a critical “power resource” 
control variable. 
As did Kelly & Witko, I include national level governmental variables to control for 
Presidential Party and percent Democrats in Congress. Given the federalist structure of the 
United States political system, the partisanship of national leaders could impact state-level 
inequality outcomes. Even economic inequality that exists at a pre-transfer level is impacted by 
the federal government due to its capacity to fund and promote infrastructure, education, and 
other non-transfer programs, as well as to regulate industries and financial markets (Kelly 2005). 
Higher values of both of these variables are associated with greater Democratic control and are 
predicted to be negatively related to inequality. 
Outside of power resources, economic development policy, and national level 
government indicators there are some additional state policy factors that I anticipate to impact 
inequality levels. Although this examination focuses on market-based inequality, rather than 
post-redistribution inequality, I do include a measure of welfare share, the fraction of state 
expenditures devoted to means-tested transfers, as a control variable. This is to consider the 
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conservative view that higher levels of social assistance could lead to more inequality in the 
market itself through less labor force participation.  Right-to-work is also included to account for 
the common belief that adoption of RTW could lower wages for workers due to reduced 
unionization. Still, I found in Chapter 4 that only three states adopted RTW in my data set, and 
all of those actually saw a short-term increase in unionization. Thus, the results regarding RTW’s 
impact on inequality could be idiosyncratic to these few observations. State minimum wage 
level, as tracked by Kelly & Witko (2012), is also included as a control variable, because many 
states require a wage higher than the base floor established by the federal government, which 
could help to compress the wage spectrum in those states by exerting an upward push on 
incomes at the lower end of the distribution.  
 Finally, I control for general state economic and demographic conditions that could be 
associated with inequality.  State unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics) is anticipated 
to be positively related to inequality, and growth in gross state product is expected to decrease 
overall inequality. Proportion non-white workforce is expected to lead to more inequality. 
Minority workers tend to make lower average wages than whites potentially creating conditions 
for greater pre-transfer inequality. I also include variables to account for manufacturing share of 
GSP, as well as government sector share of employment (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012) to 
proxy for share of workers in government employment. Higher values of government share are 
anticipated to be related to less inequality as governments may have a more compressed pay 
spectrum with higher average wages than are observed in the private service sector. Higher 
values of manufacturing share could be related to less inequality because the manufacturing 
sector may pay better wages for lower-skilled workers than do service-sectors such as food 
service and hospitality. 
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Neither Langer nor Kelly and Witko accounted for international economic openness and 
its potential impact on inequality levels. The conventional argument is that globalization could 
lead to increased income disparities, since more mobile capital may exit if workers refuse to 
accept low wage rates and labor protections (Reich 1991); while Hansen’s research found that 
international openness did not lower wages (Hansen 2006).  While data on outward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) would be ideal to test this argument, only inward FDI jobs data is 
readily available at the state level (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Brady and Wallace 2000, 
updated). Thus I include percentage of total state employment attributable to inward FDI, as used 
previously in Chapter 4, to control for globalization impacts. If the common argument is correct, 
higher values of FDI jobs will be positively related to inequality.  Table 18 summarizes all 
variables, measure specification, and data sources. 
 
Model and Results for Impact of Economic Policy Strategies on Inequality  
 The first model in Table 19 tests H1, H2, H3, and H4 regarding the independent effect of 
the two economic development strategies and power resources on state inequality.  The results 
do not confirm Langer’s original findings that locational policy activism leads to more 
inequality, while entrepreneurial policy activism leads to less. My model, which contains power 
resource variables as key controls, indicate that locational policy has no significant impact on 
inequality, and that entrepreneurial policy has a positive impact on inequality in the long-term, 
given the significance level on the lag. Moreover, the independent effects of the power resources 




Table 18. Basic Form of the Differenced and Lagged Independent Variables Used in the Inequality Error 
Correction Model 
Variable Measure Specification Data Source 




Gini coefficient (0-1) measuring 
average income inequality existent in 
the state economy before transfers 
from redistributive programs (Social 
Security and TANF, for example). 
Method of calculation and estimation 
developed by Kelly 2005 using Census 
Bureau Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement data.  Years 1983-2004. 







Interval level index based on coding 
of state economic development 
program attributes ranging from 
approximately 0 to 3 for intermittent 
years.  
Missing years interpolated. 
Methodology for constructing the index is 
presented in Saiz 2001. 
Attributes coding based on data gathered 
by the National Association of State 
Development Agencies in 1983, 1986, 
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 and Miles 
Friedman and Partners LLC in 2006. 
Locational Policy 
Activism 
Interval level index based on coding 
of state economic development 
program attributes ranging from 
approximately 0 to 3 for intermittent 
years.  
Missing years interpolated. 
Methodology for constructing the index is 
presented in Saiz 2001. 
Attributes coding based on data gathered 
by the National Association of State 
Development Agencies in 1983, 1986, 
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 and Miles 
Friedman and Partners LLC in 2006. 
State Private Sector 
Union Density 
Workers who are members of unions 
as a percentage of the state private 
sector workforce. 
Method of calculation and estimation is 
presented in Hirsch et al 2001. Years 
1984-2004. Downloaded from 
www.unionstats.com. 
Private Union Density* 
Entrepreneurial Policy 
(Used in second model) 
Factor term of Entrepreneurial Policy 
and Private Sector Union Density. 
Used to test H5 regarding the 
conditioning effect of entrepreneurial 
policy (z) on the impact of private union 
density(x) on inequality (y). 
State Government 
Liberalism 
Interval measure based on 
ideological scores of state’s 
Congressional representatives, 
weighted by partisan control of the 
state legislature. High levels of this 
measure indicate “Left”governments. 




Table 18 (con’d) 
Control Variable Measure Specification Data Source 
Democrat President Partisanship of President during the 
case-year. 1= Democrat. 0= 
Republican. 
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1984-2004. 
Democrats in Congress Percentage of Democrats in both 
houses of Congress during the case-
year. 
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004 
Welfare Share Fraction of state government 
expenditures due to means-tested 
transfers. 
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004. 
“Right-to-Work” State State that prohibits union shops 
either by state constitutional 
amendment or “right-to-work” 
statute. “Right to work”= 1. No 
prohibition of union shops = 0. 
Department of Labor, National Right to 
Work Committee. Years 1984-2004.  
*Note: this variable had variation in only 
three years for three states. 
State Minimum Wage The minimum wage rate required for 
the majority of the labor force per 
state statute (different from the 
federal minimum wage). In states 
with no state minimum wage statute 
using the prevailing fed minimum 
wage, the value is 0. 
Department of Labor, Wage and Hour 
Division. Years 1983-2004. 
State Unemployment 
Rate 
Annual average state unemployment 
rate, as a share of the labor force. 
Ranges 0-1. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Years 1983-
2004. 
State GSP Growth Annual percentage growth rate in 
gross state product. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Years 
1984-2004. 
Manufacturing Sector Manufacturing sector share of gross 
state product. (Ranges 0-1) 
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004 
Government Sector Government employee share of 
employment in the entire state labor 
force.(Ranges 0-1) 
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and 
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004. 
Non-white Population Share of non-whites in state 
population. Ranges from 0-1. 
Based on U.S. Census data. Provided 
courtesy of Kelly and Witko 2012. Years 
1984-2004. 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) Jobs 
Private sector jobs in foreign-owned 
affiliates as a percentage of the state 
private sector workforce. Varies from 
1-100. 
Calculations provided courtesy of Brady 
and Wallace 2000 and updates.  
Based on data from the Bureau of 




Table 19. ECM Results for Annual Change in State Market Income Inequality 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Base Model Model with Conditional Effects 
   
Lag Market Inequality -0.239*** -0.242*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0362) 
Key Independent Variables:   
   
D. Locational Policy Activism 0.0101 0.00992 
 (0.00829) (0.00827) 
Lag Locational Policy Activism 0.00298 0.00303 
 (0.00233) (0.00234) 
D. Entrepreneurial Policy Activism 0.00646 0.00636 
 (0.00577) (0.00577) 
Lag Entrepreneurial Policy Activism 0.00342** 0.00104 
 (0.00166) (0.00220) 
D. Private Union Density -5.84e-05 -6.36e-05 
 (0.000626) (0.000626) 
Lag Private Union Density -0.000272** -0.000554** 
 (0.000137) (0.000238) 
Lag Entrepreneurial Policy * Private 
Density 
-- 0.000268 
 -- (0.000163) 
D. State Policy Liberalism -0.00843* -0.00814* 
 (0.00431) (0.00431) 
Lag State Policy Liberalism 0.00773*** 0.00799*** 
 (0.00258) (0.00256) 
National Politics Controls:   
   
D. Presidential Party 0.00761*** 0.00740*** 
 (0.00242) (0.00241) 
Lag Presidential Party 0.00401** 0.00371* 
 (0.00198) (0.00199) 
D. Democrats in Congress -0.00187*** -0.00189*** 
 (0.000277) (0.000277) 
Lag Democrats in Congress -0.000903*** -0.000929*** 
 (0.000225) (0.000227) 
Additional State Policy Controls:   
   
D. Welfare Share -0.0455* -0.0446 
 (0.0276) (0.0276) 
Lag Welfare Share -0.0214** -0.0200* 
 (0.0109) (0.0110) 
D. “Right-to-Work” -0.0171** -0.0169** 
 (0.00702) (0.00701) 
Lag “Right-to-Work” 1.51e-05 0.000435 
 (0.00180) (0.00181) 
D. State Minimum Wage 0.00323** 0.00316** 
 (0.00150) (0.00150) 
Lag State Minimum Wage -0.00115*** -0.00114*** 
 (0.000437) (0.000436) 
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Table 19 (Con’d): 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES (Continued) Base Model Model with Conditional Effects 
   
State Economic and Demographic 
Controls: 
  
   
D. Unemployment Rate 0.135 0.128 
 (0.0826) (0.0828) 
Lag Unemployment Rate 0.108*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0403) 
D.GSP Growth -0.0488*** -0.0480*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Lag GSP Growth -0.104*** -0.102*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0207) 
D. FDI Jobs -0.000476 -0.000383 
 (0.00123) (0.00123) 
Lag FDI Jobs -0.000262 -0.000211 
 (0.000361) (0.000364) 
D. Non White Population 0.426** 0.428** 
 (0.177) (0.176) 
Lag Non White Population 0.00979 0.00985 
 (0.00676) (0.00674) 
D. Manufacturing Share of GSP 0.0666 0.0666 
 (0.0436) (0.0434) 
Lag Manufacturing Share of GSP 0.0236*** 0.0237*** 
 (0.00849) (0.00847) 
D. Government Share of Employment -0.156 -0.153 
 (0.229) (0.229) 
Lag Government Share of Employment -0.0351** -0.0337** 
 (0.0160) (0.0160) 
   
Constant 0.160*** 0.164*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0264) 
   
Observations 1,049 1,049 
R-squared 0.264 0.265 
Number of statefip 50 50 
   
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 






severe erosion of the labor movement in the private sector, annual growth in private union 
density has a significant relationship to lower inequality levels, but only in the long term.  The 
equity-generating role of unions is still relevant in a day of declining membership. State 
government liberalism appears to have a negative initial impact on inequality, but over time 
higher levels of Left-government strength increase inequality, according to this model. Kelly and 
Witko’s original analysis found that left government liberalism was negatively related to 
inequality only after 1994 and only in the short term. My examination, with observations from 
before and after devolution, suggests that the cumulative long-term impact of state government 
liberalism does not necessarily lead to more equitable income distributions. Left state 
governments are not a particularly potent power resource for working class interests. 
 This finding flies in the face of expectations about how left policy liberalism should 
impact distributional consequences at the state level. It may indicate a recent shift among U.S. 
liberals toward the emphasis of cultural and social issue platforms over economic policies. Some 
political commentators claim that many aspects of economic growth entail a tradeoff between 
cultural enrichment and changing genders roles, which are supported by liberal policy positions, 
and the marginalization of the traditional family structure essential to working-class prosperity 
(Muller 2013). My findings may also be connected to recent trends in most post-industrial 
countries indicating that left parties have shifted to the center on economic policy, especially in 
the long-term as income inequality rises (Barth, Finseraas, and Moen 2014). The lack of 
response from state left politicians to enact redistributive policies during an era of rising income 
inequality may further wealth disparities in the market. Even when left party actives do demand 
redistributive policies, liberal politicians generally do not respond with economic programs 
unless the wider electorate also mobilizes around such demands (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). 
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This combination of conditions may not exist in most American states, especially in the long-
term, resulting in state governments controlled by liberal leaders who fail to enact enduring left 
economic platforms, even while inequality continues to increase.  
 The national level control variables indicate that Democratic Congresses do decrease 
state level inequality overall, but a Democratic President, counter to expectations, has a positive 
impact on state level inequality in both the lagged and differenced terms. This is interesting, but 
in my data set only one Democratic President, Clinton, is represented, so there may not be 
sufficient variation to account for this finding. 
Turning to the additional state policy factors, contrary to some claims from the Right, 
welfare generosity appears to reduce, rather than intensify market-inequality, although it is 
important to note that in the mid-nineties essential changes were made to promote labor force 
participation as a condition of receiving temporary means-tested assistance. In any case, states 
with higher shares of welfare spending as a part of their overall expenditures appear to have 
annual declines in pre-transfer inequality. Over the long-term RTW does not significantly impact 
state income inequality, but adoption of a RTW law appears, surprisingly, to lower inequality in 
the short term. Again, I attribute this mostly to the presence of only three idiosyncratic cases 
where RTW laws changed. One could speculate that the adoption of RTW in these three states 
(Idaho, Texas, and Oklahoma) equalized wage levels between union and non-union workers in 
the short-term, perhaps reducing between-worker inequality, but the long-term impact of RTW is 
nil. For most states RTW laws apparently had their critical impact on economic outcomes, both 
unionization rates and inequality, in the years when they were first adopted, and for most states 
that was over four decades ago. As for state minimum wage laws, I find that state minimum 
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wage laws do not reduce inequality in the short-term. My results suggest that their initial 
implementation actually raises inequality, but that over time they do have a significant impact in 
decreasing inequality. The initial short term increase in inequality is counter-intuitive, but I 
speculate that it could be the result of firms raising the wages of well-paid workers higher 
relative to the increases they give to low-paid workers to compensate for the overall elevation of 
the wage floor. 
Some of the demographic and economic control variables conform with expectations. 
Unemployment raises long-term inequality, as does higher percentage of non-white residents in 
the short term; while higher rates of economic growth are linked to lower levels of inequality in 
both the long and short term. Interestingly, higher percentages of manufacturing as a share of 
GSP appear to be significantly related to increases in inequality. This was unexpected, as 
manufacturing is generally thought to provide better pay for workers than many low-skilled 
service sector jobs. Government employment shares were related to lower inequality in the long-
term, suggesting that governments do compress the wage spectrum across different sectors of 
workers.  
Finally, increases in inward FDI jobs do not demonstrate a significant relationship to state 
inequality levels, again confirming Hansen’s findings that domestic forces, rather than 
international trade and investment, are at the heart of distributional outcomes in America. While 
I have shown that foreign-firm employment shares aid union membership growth in the short-




Modeling the Conditioning Effect of Entrepreneurial Policy on Unions as a Power Resource 
Since I find that entrepreneurial policy does exert a significant impact on inequality, I 
now move forward to test the hypothesis that it may also condition the equality-inducing effects 
of private sector unionization. I did find that private sector unionization still exerts a negative 
independent effect on inequality for the working classes. But in states with a heavy emphasis on 
entrepreneurial policy, there is less activity to grow jobs in sectors for the lowest-skilled 
employees, due to the promotion of positions for high-tech and professional workers. This could 
produce a “skills premium” effect that exacerbates inequality among different classes of workers 
and stymy union advocacy for lower-skilled employees in various ways. First, it could produce 
more jobs in non-unionized “white-collar” sectors, decreasing union membership shares in the 
workforce and lowering unions’ status to bargain for lower-skilled workers as a result. Second, it 
could motivate employers to redirect more of their surplus profits to raising wage rates for 
higher-skilled workers relative to lower-skilled ones or encourage them to downsize their less-
skilled workforce. Third, it may even encourage unions to concentrate new organizing efforts in 
the professional and skilled-classes, since that is where more job growth occurs, as hinted at in 
Figure 3, and decrease advocacy for the working poor.  As a result I offer the following 
hypothesis regarding the conditioning effect of entrepreneurial policy on unionization: 
H5: Private sector unionization will have a negative impact on inequality in states with 
low use of entrepreneurialism, but not in states with high use of entrepreneurial policy. 
 
 The second model in Table 19 tests the interaction of unionization with entrepreneurial 
policy. I created four pairs of interaction terms from these variables, composed of the lagged 
values, the differenced values, and the combination of lagged and differenced values for the two 
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variables. I list only the interaction term composed of the lagged values of both variables, as it 
was the only term with a high p value. (None of the interaction term coefficients were significant 
at 90% confidence, but the lag*lag term was nearly significant at p=.101.)  It is necessary to take 
caution when interpreting the coefficients and significance levels on the separate constitutive 
terms making up the interaction term (Brambor et al 2006). For instance, in the second model the 
coefficient on the lag of private union density (the x variable) refers to its impact on market 
inequality (y) only when the lag of entrepreneurial policy (the z variable) is 0. The nearly 
significant coefficient of the interaction term provides some indication that private density’s 
impact on inequality is in fact conditioned by entrepreneurial policy. Private union density’s 
significance is likely to apply on some, but not all values of entrepreneurial policy. A graph 
charting x’s impact across the range of values for the z-variable is needed to adequately assess 
the effect of entrepreneurial policy on inequality.  
 Figure 4 shows how the lagged value of union density impacts inequality at different 
levels of the lag of entrepreneurial policy. Values above the x axis baseline of 0 indicate where 
union density has positive effect on inequality, while values below the baseline of 0 indicate a 
negative effect. Significance is indicated where confidence intervals do not include the base line 
of 0. The line indicates that in the long-term unionization does have a significant effect in 
reducing inequality when the value of entrepreneurial policy is below about 1.25. However, as 
entrepreneurial policy use rises the impact of unionization on inequality becomes insignificant. 
At the highest values of entrepreneurial policy (over about 2), the association of unionization 
with inequality is actually positive, though insignificant. This finding suggests that 
entrepreneurial development policy acts as a roadblock to private sector unionism in equalizing 
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half of the observations in the data set have entrepreneurial policy values greater than about 1.25, 
confirming that the significance of this conditional relationship holds for a substantial number of 
cases in the model. Thus, H5 is supported and the interpretation of unions as an effective 
working class power resource in states which prioritize use of entrepreneurial development is not 
confirmed by these findings. Private sector unionization is rendered irrelevant as a force for 
promoting an economy of shared wealth in the presence of entrepreneurialism. 
 
Discussion 
 This paper shows that power resources are important variables to be considered in models 
which attempt to explain variation in state income inequality. Overall, private union density 
exerts a significant negative impact on inequality over the long term, and state government 
liberalism appears to equalize income in the short term, though it increases inequality in the long 
run. Even in the United States, where our “left” party tends to operate as a centrist one, and 
union density levels are lower than almost anywhere else in the developed world, these power 
resources make a difference to distributional outcomes. 
 When I included power resources indicators along with economic development policy 
strategies as key independent variables, I did not find support for Langer’s findings. Namely, the 
impact of entrepreneurial policy appears to increase disparities in income rather than equalize the 
income distribution. Why are my findings about entrepreneurial policy counter to Langer’s? First 
of all, Langer examines inequality levels beginning nearly a decade earlier than those I use, and 
her series ends ten years prior to mine. These years pre-date the information revolution, the dot-
com boom, and the expansion of investment and financial markets around the turn of the 
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millennium. Perhaps entrepreneurial approaches during the period she researched were geared 
toward growing new manufacturing and industrial sectors, areas where working class employees 
may have been more direct beneficiaries of skill and wage advancement. If entrepreneurialism 
generated more high paying working-class jobs during these years, it would likely have an 
equalizing effect on the income spectrum. In contrast, my data set includes the years of the 
information boom, when entrepreneurial approaches more likely supported the computing, 
communications, and high finance industries. A different breed of workers, equipped with 
specialized, technical skills in these emerging industries have been able to command a higher 
premium for their labor than the manufacturing workers of first-wave entrepreneurial policies.  
The results of my analysis suggests that the “skills premium” exacted by higher-skilled 
professional workers, often the direct recipient of entrepreneurial development gains, may in fact 
be driving income inequality among the different skill classes of workers. It is important to note 
that while economics researchers endorse the view that skills-biased technical change among 
“knowledge economy” workers effects distributional outcomes, there are also studies that 
discount its role in increasing inequality (Lemieux 2006, Mishel and Bernstein 2003). While the 
“skills premium” thesis has been highly debated, its application to the findings here help to 
explain why entrepreneurial strategy aimed at producing “quality jobs” may be contributing to 
rising inequality . 
Another reason that entrepreneurialism may lead to more inequality in the years I cover is 
that while it may create quality jobs, it may create less jobs due to productivity gains from better 
technology and skills advantages. Some noted experts claim that productivity gains could result 
in more joblessness for lower-skilled workers (Greenspan 1996).  Unemployment is controlled 
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for in this analysis, but joblessness due to dropping out of the workforce or under-employment 
by working part time or temporary positions is not.  My results here suggest that 
entrepreneurialism may fail to provide good job opportunities for the lowest-skilled workers, 
thus leading to more inequality. 
 An unexpected finding is that entrepreneurial strategies breed more income inequality in 
the market, because the stated intent of the programs is to offer a “high-road” approach to 
development (Eisenger 1989, Brace 2002). These programs concentrate on promotion of human 
resources and core assets in communities to promote industries from within and seek to avoid the 
worst consequences of inter-state competition for investment. Entrepreneurial policy advocates 
claim that it transcends narrow “zero-sum-game” thinking and encourages “win-win” solutions 
to development.  However, its emphasis on generating more consumer demand could 
unintendedly foster economies of elitism. Recent media examples of price and rent inflation in 
the San Francisco Bay area, Boston, and other gentrifying centers show the frustration of lower-
end consumers who are locked out of the wealth created by the Knowledge Economy. The recent 
“Google bus” protests in Oakland erupted as rental rates in working-class neighborhoods 
skyrocketed due to in-migration of affluent tech-workers (Berniker and Lipton 2014). Revenues 
from entrepreneurial expansion often bypass public schools, public transit, and other important 
services in the community, drive up the proximal costs of real estate, and increase inequality at 
least in the early stages of growth (Isenberg 2015, Jones and Kim 2013). While academic 
research on the association between entrepreneurialism and inequality is slim, effected citizens 
and politicians have taken notice.  Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has been quoted as 
depicting “Silicon” inequality as "bad for individuals, bad for our economy, bad for our 
democracy" (Quoted in Isenberg 2015). My research findings confirm this unfortunate “dark 
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side” to entrepreneurial development and indicate that more analysis is needed to fully 
understand its impact on economies. 
As for the lack of impact from locational policy, it may be that the increased job growth 
in states that use these strategies does provide at least some sort of income opportunities to 
lower-skilled workers who would otherwise have none. I do not find, however, that inequality 
actually declines with greater use of locational policy, but apparently its use does not result in 
more income dispersion in most states. This may be because locational approaches lower wages 
for all workers, whether working or professional class, thus maintaining relatively low levels of 
income inequality between workers, but resulting in declining incomes for everyone, overall.  
 The confirmation of the hypothesis H5 suggests that although private sector unions act to 
decrease inequality in general, they may have lost their position as articulators of lower-class 
interests in states that actively engage in entrepreneurial development. Higher levels of 
entrepreneurialism appear to erase the equalizing effects that private sector unions have on 
income distribution. If inequality is in fact related to the “skills premium,” union success in 
representing lower income workers slips because of membership loss in sectors where unions 
once thrived. Private sector unions may also be shifting their scarce resources to advocate in the 
more premium-skills professional sectors. The union wage premium for organized workers 
relative to non-union workers (Pontusson et al 2002) may actually reinforce and magnify the 
skills wage premium in entrepreneurial-oriented states. In either case my results suggest that 
entrepreneurialism presents a challenge to the American labor movement in advancing the 
interests of the lower-skilled workers who need their advocacy the most. Unions need to retool 
their efforts to develop effective strategies for addressing the plight of lower-class workers in the 
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presence of an entrepreneurial policy environment, especially if they want to regain their 
reputation as a force of social justice for more equitable economic outcomes.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter endeavored to sort out how power resources, economic development policy, 
and state level variation interact to impact income inequality in the United States. My findings in 
regard to entrepreneurial policy suggest that labor unions in states that utilize this approach have 
lost their ability to act as a power resource for the lowest-income citizens. A future direction of 
research would be to directly test how variation in the relative unionization levels of different 
occupational groups (varying among high-skilled and low-skilled) across the states impact 
income inequality levels. This chapter did not offer a direct test of this relationship due to lack of 
availability of data for each state on this variable at this time. However, the somewhat counter-
intuitive finding that entrepreneurialism, with its “quality job” focus, reduces union power to 
abate income inequality indicates that unions have failed to effectively participate in this policy 
strategy for the benefit of the traditional working class. Moreover, as with its impact on 
unionization, I can not conclude that locational policy has a significant relationship to inequality 
levels. While locational policies probably do suppress wages and incomes given findings of 
previous scholarship (Hansen 2006), low-wage strategies do not appear to exacerbate inequality 
between classes of workers. Finally, this chapter does reaffirm the general independent effect of 
private sector unionization in reducing inequality, though this effect is significantly conditioned 
by the presence of entrepreneurial activism. It also found that the independent effect of left-
leaning governments was to decrease inequality in the short term, although in the long term they 
appear to have a less equalizing effect. 
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The major lesson from this research project is that entrepreneurial development does not 
promote equality, and that the variables of unionism and state left government liberalism are 
necessary to consider when making claims about the impact of these policies on distributional 
outcomes. These socio-political factors need to be examined along-side important economic 

















Summary of Empirical Findings 
In summary, the conclusions of this dissertation regarding its empirical research questions 
are:  
 Entrepreneurial development strategies adopted by state governments do impact 
unionization and labor movement goals. The long term impacts of such programs are 
declining private sector union density and increasing income inequality. In spite of its 
“high-road” approach to economic growth, entrepreneurialism does not lead to more 
wealth generation or union advocacy for lower-income workers. However, 
entrepreneurial strategies are associated with more likelihood of union election victories 
in individual cases when labor organizing does occur, suggesting that entrepreneurial 
policies are not directly oppositional to union mobilization. 
 Locational policies demonstrate no significant relationship to union decline or rising 
inequality, empirically. However, this does not mean that they assist union growth or 
equalize wealth in the economy. Nor does it mean that the principle underlying such 
policies - that labor is a cost-factor for business, rather than an asset - runs parallel to the 
mission of labor unions to advocate for lower-income workers. 
 Foreign investment into states has not depressed private sector union density in recent 
decades or impeded union organizing. Increased FDI jobs as a share of the labor force 
actually had an immediate positive “shock” effect on union density. Foreign firms are 
more likely, not less, to contribute union wins in certification elections. International 
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economic integration is not necessarily bad for unions, and it does not cause more income 
inequality. 
 Right-to-work laws have limited ability to explain union outcomes in the recent 
decades of this examination. Economic development policy and other variables better 
explain long-term variation in unionization during the years of this study. 
 
Normative Perspectives on this Research 
 
  Now, in these concluding pages I will address more normative questions.  In Chapter 1 I 
offered an alternate framing of my central research question, as follows: “Is there an economic 
development strategy that actually aligns with the agenda of the union movement? Are some 
development strategies compatible with unions and their efforts to nurture economies of shared 
wealth?” 
 Given the results of my original analysis I conclude that currently there are few, if any, 
state economic development strategies “in sync” with the labor movement. Outside of some 
unique programs, unions are largely irrelevant to economic development agendas in the states. 
There is some marginal evidence of Labor’s participation in a limited number of policies crafted 
by states with historically high rates of unionization, as identified in Chapter 2. However, for 
most states development policy-making ignores labor unions. A 1990 article by respected 
researchers Virginia Gray and David Lowry predicted that this would happen over 20 years ago. 
They found that among state “corporatist” policy-making institutions the higher education lobby 
had largely replaced Labor’s seat at the table alongside business interests and government 
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development agencies (Gray and Lowry 1990). My research findings confirm their prescient 
insight. Economic development programing seeks little input from unions, and protection for 
labor interests in state development strategies is spotty, at best. 
 Locational policy, defined as a strategy that seeks to lower factor-costs such as labor 
wages to entice inward location of businesses, had no significant effect on unionization or 
inequality in my models. Empirically, I found little association, either positive or negative, 
between this strategy and union goals. However, there is no indication that locational policy 
activism actually parallels labor movement goals in principle. A normative appraisal of this 
policy strategy suggests that its values are in fact at odds with unionization.  
 The largely negative impact that entrepreneurial development approaches exerted on 
unions and their goals is a somewhat surprising finding.  I discovered that entrepreneurial 
policy’s relationship to the fortunes of unions is rather nuanced. The underlying approach of 
entrepreneurial development policy and unionization in regard to employee relations seems to 
gel: labor is an asset, as well-off workers are thought to contribute more demand to the economy. 
Therefore, both factors are based around the notion that workers should be amply compensated 
as a means of economic growth. I find that pro-union election opportunities are enhanced in 
entrepreneurial activist states. But more importantly, I demonstrated that the longer-term impact 
of entrepreneurialism on the unionized share of the private sector labor force was negative. I 
offered an explanation for this: entrepreneurial policy substitutes for union wage negotiations in 
raising wage levels of workers. Entrepreneurialism decreases demand for union advocacy in the 
labor force, because “high-skilled” workers who are the beneficiaries of this policy approach are 
less inclined to need or want the collective action of unions overall.  
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 Importantly, my models indicate that entrepreneurial policy use produces outcomes out-
of-line with the union goal of wealth dispersion. Entrepreneurialism had an independent effect of 
exacerbating inequality levels, and it counteracted union abilities to mitigate inequality. 
Entrepreneurialism rendered private sector unions irrelevant as a force for promoting equality.  
 The overall picture of entrepreneurial policy is that it is a hindrance to working-class 
power, not because it offers direct opposition to the interests of lower-income workers, but 
because it allows higher-income workers to eclipse their share and role in the economy. There 
appears to be an unfortunate, counterintuitive trade-off between creation of higher-quality jobs 
for skills-privileged workers and the fortunes of lower-income citizens. The skills-bias of 
entrepreneurial policy promotes a situation where more “cream” can rise to the top, but it does 
less to address the needs of those who slip through the cracks. Entrepreneurialism does not 
appear to include unions as an articulator of lower-class interests in any serious way; but neither 
does it directly promote “union-busting”.  It may even offer unions some opportunities for 
successful advocacy, if and when their efforts are channeled to advancing the interests of higher-
skilled professional and management workers. Still, entrepreneurial policy has not promoted 
conditions for raising the fortunes of all workers in state job markets and the labor movement. 
 This view is a grim and negative appraisal of entrepreneurialism’s promise of wealth 
generation. Yet from a normative perspective, it would probably be mistaken to conclude that 
this strategy to development, one which avoids competitive bidding between states and values 
skill-development, is bad for the workforce. While the unfortunate unintended consequences of 
this approach do appear to be at odds with the labor movement’s mission to create an economy 
of widely-shared wealth, the foundational principles of unionization and entrepreneurial growth 
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strategies are not incompatible. If entrepreneurial policy can correct for some of its negative 
consequences by including working-class voices and the needs of lower-skilled citizens in its 
framework it may still be an instrument to nurture prosperity. Entrepreneurial policy strategies 
should not only emphasize opportunities for the most educated, skills-savvy employees. They 
must include solutions for dispersing the wealth that technical innovation generates in the 
economic interests of all classes of workers.  
 As for my secondary focus on FDI, I consistently found, across various units of analysis, 
that inward investment is not a roadblock to unionization. FDI jobs as a share of employment 
relate to increases in union density, and foreign firms are more likely targets for union organizing 
success than are American firms. The influx of management approaches from countries with less 
combative labor relations approaches than our own, which is practically every other highly-
industrialized country, bodes well for union organizing in the private sector.  Moreover, foreign 
inward investment does not increase inequality. This does not mean that all aspects of 
international economic integration benefit the U.S. labor force, as increased trade and outward 
investment may endanger union jobs. However, entry of foreign capital into our domestic labor 
market is a plus for union movement strength and does not hinder union goals regarding income 
equality. 
 Finally, my focus on economic development shows that “right-to-work” laws alone are 
insufficient for explaining unionization and inequality. My findings revealed no long-term 
impact of these laws, perhaps because the impact of most union shop prohibitions have run their 
course since their original enactment. I found positive associations between the initial shock-
effect of RTW on both unionization and equality, which I conclude is idiosyncratic to the three 
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cases in this data set. I must note that in the most recent years, increasing numbers of “rust-belt” 
states have adopted these laws, and once data becomes available the effect of RTW should be 
revisited. RTW does not aid wealth-sharing or union advocacy in any meaningful way, but other 
economic policy statutes adopted by the states surpass these laws in generating significant 
effects. 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 There are a number of directions to take for future research on this topic, both to shore up 
the validity of the present findings and to expand understanding of the nature of the causal 
connections between development policy, unionization, and economic inequality.  
 First of all, to address the research question using unionization as the dependent variable, 
qualitative methods would enhance understanding of ways that entrepreneurialism can be 
reinforcing, instead of at odds with unionization. Entrepreneurialism is not in conflict with 
unionization in principle, as is the case with locational policy, but my analysis revealed that 
entrepreneurialism is deleterious to union power in practice. This was even after finding some 
anecdotal evidence of collaborative relationships between government development agencies and 
labor associations as a part of entrepreneurial programming. Better understanding of interactive 
relationships which condition the impact of entrepreneurial policy on unions is needed. 
Qualitative case studies could uncover and analyze the unique situations where the two forces 
actually reinforced one another. An emphasis on the exceptional cases that do not conform to the 
norm would illuminate how and under what circumstances development policy works in tandem 
with organizations representing the interests of lower-skilled workers. Qualitative research 
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designs could also examine “typical cases” more deeply to unpack why and how the “innovation 
industries” promoted by entrepreneurialism inhibit union growth. 
 There also needs to be more direct testing of the premise that skills-bias supplies the 
causal link between entrepreneurial policy and union decline. Tapping skills-bias as a theory to 
explain private sector unionization loss is reasonable on its face, but ideally one would test 
directly for how more activist use of entrepreneurialism leads to erosion of union density 
specifically in the “blue collar” industry sectors. Industry union density data is readily available 
(Hirsch and Macpherson 2001), but unfortunately not at a state level. Developing a way to 
directly test for how policy-induced skills-bias erodes the working-class in state economies 
would shore up the validity of this dissertation’s findings.  
 Given the recent adoptions in four states of “right-to-work” laws (Ohio, Michigan, 
Indiana, and Wisconsin), a new examination of the impact of these laws on unionization levels is 
necessary in the future. Since the changes were as recent as five years ago, I was not able to 
obtain accompanying economic development data and FDI jobs numbers to cover these years, 
which is why these cases were not included in this analysis. Clearly, RTW adoption is an 
important example of policy diffusion, however, and the effects of recent state adoptions need to 
be analyzed.    
 A fundamental improvement for exploring this research question is to find new and better 
measures to track locational and entrepreneurial policy activism. Given the periodic, every-
fourth- year publishing schedule of the NASDA incentives guide on which the Saiz development 
variables are based many years had to be interpolated, which is not desirable. A number of 
scholars and think tanks have developed unique measures to track differing types of economic 
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development policies, as explained in Chapter 2.  The Saiz measures I used are the best, most 
consistently available metrics. However, the last year available for coding was 2006, so even 
these measures are now dated.   Given new standards and conditions endorsed by many states in 
recent years to their corporate incentive program (claw-back agreements, job quota guarantees, 
requirement of health insurance with new jobs) an updated measure, separating locational 
strategy types into two distinct classes - one for more conditional, strings-attached programs, the 
other for more business-accommodating programs - would be ideal.  
 Finally, an interesting supplemental examination would be to consider how differing 
economic approaches possibly impact public sector unionization. I focused on the private sector 
in this dissertation, but there may be a public sector effect as well. The causal linkages to the 
public sector are likely looser given that economic development policy aims to create new 
businesses, primarily. However, entrepreneurial policy strategies offer an expanded role of 
government agencies in engineering the industry-sector mix in the economy, which may have an 
effect on membership growth in public sector unions. 
 There are also a number of improvements and areas of future research regarding the 
relationship of economic development, unionization, and inequality. I posited that skills-biased 
technical change is the force that causes entrepreneurial policy to lead to inequality and that 
lowers unions’ abilities to negate inequality. However, as with the first research question, I was 
not able to test for skills-bias directly as a factor leading to inequality through entrepreneurial 
policy activism. Development of better measures to directly account for skills-bias are needed to 
show that different policy types do in fact produce and exacerbate this bias, and that it has 
consequences on the income distribution.   
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 Using more nuanced measures of inequality could be advantageous. I have used summary 
Gini coefficients for pre-transfer inequality, which measure the overall inequality that exists 
across the entire income distribution. Deeper examination of the inequality existing between 
specific quartiles of the wage distribution may better assess the degree to which “between-
worker” inequality skews the income distribution.  Also, in this project I left the impact on post-
transfer inequality levels unexamined. Entrepreneurial policies may produce more market 
inequality, but they may also offer compensation mechanisms for this negative consequence 
through welfare redistribution, progressive tax structures, and re-training programs, which 
ultimately result in lower post-transfer inequality.  Qualitative research designs could help to 
better establish the link between development policy strategies and accompanying social welfare 
provisions, as well as which industries targeted for development produce greater wage-gains for 
lower-income citizens. Certain types of entrepreneurial programming, like those aimed at “green 
energy” development or health fields may increase the needs for production and service workers 
as much as for professional-skills employees, and may benefit lower-income strata, in contrast to 
the information-technology and finance sectors. 
The findings here demand the attention of government leaders in the economic 
development field and labor union officials, in particular. Governments and unions must 
recognize the role that development policies, especially entrepreneurial ones, have on 
distributional consequences and should be willing to work together collaboratively to promote 
the best distributional outcomes. 
First of all, state government leaders must be responsible and willing to evaluate these 
policies’ broadly, according to their impact on all classes of citizens, rather than assuming that 
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wealth dispersion will occur “naturally” on its own. State performance managers should monitor 
the consequences of these programs on inequality, median household income, and poverty rates 
as frequently as they assess their impacts on number of jobs created and FDI attracted. 
Governments should vigorously pursue claw-back provisions and job standards in the 
negotiation of locational incentives packages to ensure that the jobs created offer long-term 
employment opportunities with middle-class earning potential. When funding incubator 
businesses development officials would be wise to cultivate projects that have the potential to 
provide employment opportunities for less-skilled workers through job training, internship, and 
apprentice opportunities. Higher tech industries tend to be high-productivity enterprises that do 
not require as much human labor as low-tech enterprises, but incubator financing should still be 
targeted with the goal of skill-enhancement and employment for lower income workers in mind.  
Unions must work to find a greater voice in the deliberation of economic development 
strategies if they want to remain viable. More well-organized unions in the upper Midwest and 
Northeast have had some success in appointing labor representatives to economic development 
advisory boards, and unions in all regions should prioritize this activity. Unions, especially those 
in the skilled-trades, should exploit their natural position as training providers, expanding 
apprenticeship and industrial certification programs and demonstrating the usefulness of these 
programs in entrepreneurial strategies. Unions must focus their lobbying and political action 
efforts toward economic development policies, as much as they do toward labor relations 
statutes. While unions should not ignore proposals to enact “right-to-work” and state collective 
bargaining prohibitions, fighting these policies is reactionary.  If unions already served a critical, 
productive role in state development programs, it would be less politically advantageous for 
elected opportunists to attack them.  
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One additional prescription for unions suggested by this project is that they should target 
their organizing activities toward foreign-owned firms. These companies appear to be more 
willing to accept unions than are American-owned multi-national corporations. Building greater 
trans-national ties to the union movements in these firm’s home companies also reinforces 
opportunities for American unions to successfully organize in their U.S.-located subsidiaries.   
Development policies are the products of state governments; therefore their consequences 
should not be left to the whims of the market’s invisible hand. Governments and unions need to 
be active, long-term stewards of these strategies to ensure an equitable and successful 
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APPENDIX: Firms Experiencing Union Elections in the Micro-Model Dataset 
MOST FREQUENTLY APPEARING FIRMS 
Worksite Name Parent Firm, if Any Firm 
Nationality 
Number of Cases 
First Student FirstGroup  UK 90 
Durham School Services National Express Group PLC UK 11 
First Transit FirstGroup UK 7 
Laidlaw Transit Laidlaw International US 7 
Waste Management  US 7 
Help at Home Inc.  US 5 
Jacobs Technology Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. US 5 
MV Transportation  US 5 
Wackenhut Services, Inc. G4S INTERNATIONAL (GROUP 
4 SECURICOR) 
UK 5 
    
ALL OTHERS 




178 Lowell Street Operating 
Company/ Lexington Health Care 
Center 
HealthBridge US  
3-V Inc. 3V Group Italia S.p.A. Italy  
Cedar Hill Healthcare Center HealthBridge Management US  
A&A Electrical Company of 
Beaumont, Inc. 
 US  
A.T. Massey Coal Company Inc.  US  
AAA Residential Services Inc.  US  
ABC Professional Tree Service  US  
Acme Engineering  Canada  
ACPAC Packing (Acupac) Outsourcing Services Group US  
Adame  US  
ADT Security Services Inc. Tyco International US  
Advanced Life Systems Inc  US  
Advanced Student Transporation  US  
Advent Heating & Cooling  US  
AECOM Technology  US  
AEG Facilities Anschutz Entertainment Group US  
AFCO Steel, LLC of Arkansas WW Steel  US  
AGAR Supply Company  US  
Ahern and Associates  US  
AHTNA Government Services 
Corp. 





Air System Components Tomkins PLC UK  
Airgas  US  
Airport Ramada Inn Ramada Worldwide, subsid of 
Wyndam Worldwide 
US  
Akal Security Inc.  US  
The Glidden Company Akzo-Nobel Paints Netherlands  
Alamo Car Rental Vanguard Car Rental USA US 2 
Alan Ritchey Inc.  US 2 
Albert Eaddy/ Recana Solutions  US  
Albert Lea Select Foods Hormel Foods US  
Albertson's Inc.  US  
Howmet Castings Alcoa Howmet US  
Alden Rehab  US 2 
All City Transporation Incorporated  US  
All Star Transportation  US  
Allen Freight Systems Inc P.A.M. Transportation US  
Allens  US  
Allied Construction Services, Inc.  US  
BFI/Allied Waste  US 3 
Allina Health system  US  
Alta Dena Certified Dairy, Inc.  US  
Altamont Ambulance Service, Inc.  US  
Alutiiq Professional Servics LLC Afognak Native Corporation US 2 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. Operates TAPS, which is owned 
by consortium of companies, BP 
has largest share 
US  
Brighten Health Brighten Health Group US 2 
AmCane Sugar LLC  US  
American Ambulette and 
Ambulance Service, Inc. 
 US  
American Bottling Company Dr Pepper Snapple Group US  
American Cooling Inc.  US  
American Fuji Seal Inc. Fuji Seal International Japan  
American Seafood Southern Pride American Seafood Groups US  
American Sugar Refining Inc. Subsid of Florida Crystals, subsid 
of Flo-Sun 
US  
ResCare  US  
Americold Logistics  US 4 
Americsource Bergen  US  
Ames/True Temper Castle Harlan Inc. US  
Amicable Healthcare  US  
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Angelica Textile Services Angelica Corporation US  
Anixter  US  
Apex Environmental  US  
Appalachian Precision Hardwood 
Flooring 
 US  
Archer Daniel Midlands  US  
Ash Grove Cement Company  US  
Asplundh Tree  US  
Associated Milk Producers, Inc.  US  
Apple, LLC (Retail Stores) Apple Inc US 4 
ATC Vancom  US  
Atlantic Express  US  
Automated Health Systems  US  
Avalon Health Care of California Avalon Health Care Group US  
Avante At Inverness  US  
Aviall Services Inc.  US  
B&L Freight  US  
BAE Systems BAE Systems, PLC UK  
Bagcraft Papercon II, LLC Packaging Dynamics US 2 
Balfour Beatty Community Balfour Beatty PLC UK  
Barton Protective Allied Security LLC US  
Baumann and Sons ABA Transportation US  
Baycrest Village Farmington Centers US  
Bayshore Health Care Center  US  
Beacon Information Technology & 
Staffing Services 
 US  
Bechtel BWXT, Idaho McDermott International Inc  US  
Benchmark Assisted Living LLC  US  





 US  
Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc. Grupo Bimbo Mexico  
Blossom Health Care Center Compassionate Health Care US  
Blount International  US  
Boars Head Provisions  US  
Bobwell Productions  US  
Boeing Company  US 2 
Braden Sutphin Ink Company  US  
Bredero Price Company Inc. BrederoShaw, subsid of Shawcor 
LTD 
Canada  
Bonsal American Oldcastle, arm of CRH plc Ireland  
Bozzutos  US 2 
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BPAmoco Chemical  UK  
Briarfield at Ashley Circle Briarfield Health Centers US  
Kindred Nursing Centers West LLC Kindred Healthcare US  
Bridgestone Firestone North 
America Tire LLC 
Bridgestone Corporation Japan  
Brighten Health Group  US  
Brightside Academy, Inc.  US  
Brinks Inc  US  
Bristol Hospital EMS, LLC  US  
Britthaven Nursing Center  US  
Broadmeadow Healthcare LLC Cadia Delaware Rehabilitation US  
Brody Mining  US  
Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, 
Inc. 
RailCrew Xpress US  
Bruister and Associates  US  
Brunner International  US  
Buckeye Technologies  US  
Budget Rent a Car Cendant Corp. US 2 
Buffalo Air Handling  US  
Loomis Armored US, Inc. Securitas AB Sweden 2 
Burritoville Systems Inc.  US  
C & D Security  US  
C. Martin Company, Inc.  US  
Cable Tech Inc.  US  
Cablevision Systems Corp.  US 2 
Caesars Indiana Caesars Entertainment US  
California Almond Growers  US  
Cambridge Brands Tootsie Roll Industries US  
Caption Colorado  US  
Caraustar  US  
Cardinal Health 200, Inc.  US  
Carolina Power & Light Progress Energy US  
Carson Trailers  US  
Casa Chevrolet General Motors US  
Case Farms of Ohio Inc.  US  
Case Ready Meats Inc Cargill Case Ready Meats, 
Precepts Foods LLC 
US  
Casino Aztar Columbia 
Entertainment 
Columbia Sussex US  
Catelli Brothers Inc  US 3 
CCL Custom Manufacturing CCL Industrial Canada  
CDC Systems Inc  US  
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Celanese Corporation  US  
Centerpoint Medical Center  US 2 
Central Maine Power Company Energy East Corporation  US  
Central Parking System Inc.  US 2 
Cereamic Protction Corporation of 
America 
Protective Products of America US  
BPB America Inc Saint Gobain France  
Cessna Aircraft Co. Textron US  
Morrison Management Specialists Compass Group plc UK  
Chenega Integrated Systems, LLC Chenega Corporation US 2 
Chesterfield Health Services  US  
Chestertown Foods, Inc.  US  
Chestnut Ridge Transportation The Trans Group US  
Children's Home of Detroit  US  
Chinese Daily News United Daily News Group Taiwan  
Christie's Inc. Christie's International PLC UK  
Chugach McKinley Inc.  US  
ChurchDwight  US  
Cintas  US  
City Centurion Security Services  US  
Fred Meyer Alaska, Inc. Kroger Company US 2 
Clarin  US  
Clarkston Specialty Healthcare Fundamental US  
Classic Party Rentals  US 2 
Classic Residence Management 
Limited Partnership 
Hyatt Hotels Corporation US  
Claymont Steel  US  
Clearon Corp Division of ICL Industrial 
Products 
Israel  
Clinton Memorial Hospital  US  
Coastal Communities Hospital Integrative Health Care Holding 
INC 
US  
Coastal International Security Akal Security US  
Coastal Paper Cellu Tissue US  
Coca-Cola North America Coca-Cola Company US  
Cochran Electric, Inc.  US  
Coinmach Corp. Coinmach Service Corp. US  
Cole Haan  US  
Collins and Aikman  US  
Colonial Park Care Center  US  
Comcast  US 2 
Community Education Centers Inc.  US 2 
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Compak J Baker Industries US  
Computer Sciences Corporation  US 2 
Concept Packaging  US  
Connecticut Water Company Connecticut Water Services US  
Consolidated Container Corporation  US  
Consolidated Storage  US  
Continental Tire North America Continental AG Germany  
Cooper Tire and Rubber  US  
Coral Gables Hospital Inc.  US  
Core-Mark International, Inc.  US  
Coreslab Structures (Omaha) Inc.  Canada  
Cornell Corrections of Texas Cornell Companies Inc. US  
Costco Optical Lab 908 Costco Wholesale Corporation US  
Covenant Care Ohio Inc. d/b/a 
Fairview Skilled Nursing and Rehab 
Center 
Covenant Care US  
Covidien Health Care Covidien PLC Ireland  
CPC Logistics Inc.  US  
Crash Rescue Equipment Service  US  
Crest Transportation Services, Inc. Assist Ambulance US  
Cristi Cleaning Service  US  
Cruiselink II  US  
CSC Applied Technology  US  
Daffy's  US  
Daiohs First Choice Services First Choice US  
Dairy Farmers of America  US  
Dakkota Integrated Systems Joint venture of Rush Trucking 
LLC (US) & Intier Automotive 
Interiors, subsid of Magna 
(Canada) 
US 2 
Daley's Medical Transportation Inc. Bud's Ambulance Service US  
DANA Corp  US  
Danard Electric  US  
Dartmouth College - Hanover Inn  US  
Day & Zimmermann Hawthorne 
Corp. 
 US  
Deco Inc.  US  
DermaRite Industries LLC  US  
Thomas Built Buses Subsid of Freightliner, owned by 
DaimlerChyrsler 
Germany  
Dillon’s Bus Service  US  
Dimondale Nursing Care Center NexCare Health System US  
DISH Network  US  
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DITTO Express  US  
DMI Industries Otter Tail Corporation US  
Doll Distributing LLC  US  
Dorman Products  US  
DTM Walnut Creek, Inc. Hilton Hotels Corporation US  
Duerr Tool & Die Co. Inc.  US  
Dunkin Donuts Distribution Center Bain, Carlysle Group US  
Durrett Shepphard Steel Co. Inc. Reliance Steel and Aluminum Co. US  
Dutch Manor Nursing Home & 
Rehabilitation 
Capital Living and Rehab Centers US 2 
Dyncorp International Veritas Capital, Dyncorp 
International Inc. 
US 4 
Eby-Brown Company LLC  US  
ECOLAB, Inc.  US  
Ecology Services Inc  US  
Eden West convalescent Hospital Solnus Five US  
Edens Corporation/RTS  US  
Edgewood Vista Senior Living Inc. Edgewood Management Group 
LLC 
US  
Educational Bus Inc. Trans Group US 2 
Ohio Edison FirstEnergy Corporation US 2 
El Paso Disposal  US  
Elbar, Inc. Pat Salmon & Sons US  
Elberta Crate & Box com  US  
Emerald Correctional Management 
LLC 
 US  
Emerald Polymer Additives LLC Emerald Performance Materials US  
Emergency Ambulance Inc.  US  
Enersys Delaware Inc.  US  
Engine Power Components  US  
Entergy Nuclear Northeast  US  
Entergy Operations Inc.  US  
Epworth Villa  US  
Equity Residential  US  
Erie Interstate  US  
Evergreen Health Care Center Boulevard Health Consulting US  
Evergreen Healthcare Management 
LLC 
EHC Management US  
Evergreen Properties LLC of North 
Carolina 
 US  
Exel Logistics Exel Global Logistics UK  
Extendicare Health Facilities, 
Richfield Health Center 
 Canada  
Fairhaven Health Systems  US  
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Farner-Bocken Company  US  
Federal Mogul  US  
Felbro Inc.  US  
Ferro Corporation  US  
Fidelity Health Care Premier Health Partners US  
Filtrona Extrusion USA Inc. Filtrona PLC UK  
Firstline Transportation Security Inc SMS Holdings US  
Fitzgerald's Casino & Hotel Magestic Star Casino LLC, 
ultimate parent is Barden 
Development 
US  
Five Star Parking L&R Group of Companies US 2 
Flight Safety Servies Corporation FlightSafety Intl, a Berkshire 
Hathaway Company 
US 2 
Florida Power & Light NextEnergy US  
Fluor Industrial Services  US 2 
Flying Food Group  US 2 
Food Service of America Services Group of America US  
Foothill Waste  US  
FPL Energy Nextera Energy US  
Freda Custom Foods  US  
Fresh Direct UTF Trucking Fresh Direct Holding US  
Freshko Produce Services  US  
Pepsi Bottling Group PepsiCo US  
Fuel Systems LLC  US  
Fulton Precision Industries  US  
G.E. Holman Holman Distribution US  
Gainesville Rehab and Nursing 
Center LLC 
 US  
Garda CL, Atlantic, Inc. Garda Canada  
GCA Service Group  US  
General Cable Corp  US  
Geo Group Inc.  US  
Georgia-Pacific   US 2 
Gibraltar Strip Steel, Inc.  US  
Givaudan Flavors Corp. Givaudan Switzerland 2 
Global Expertise Outsourcing GEO group US  
Global Spectrum L.P. Comcast US  
GMH GMH Community Trust US  
Godin Grocery Inc.  US  
Golden Krust Caribbean Bakery Inc  US  
Golden Living Center Golden Health Group US  
Golden Oriental Foods  US  
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Goodyear Tire and Rubber  US  
Grace Baking  US 2 
Graham Packaging Plastics 
Products 
Blackstone Group US 2 
Grain Processing Corporation Muscatine Foods Corporation US  
Gray Interplant Systems Inc.  US  
GreenWaste of Palo Alto, GCP  US  
Griffith Energy Services Inc. CH Energy Group US  
Gross School Bus Service Inc  US  
Gulf Chemical & Metalurgical Eramet Group France  
Hampton Corporation  US  
Hana Engineering  Korea  
Hanard Machine, Inc.  US  
Harborside Healthcare Sun Healthcare Group US 4 
Harding and Hill Inc  US  
Hargrove Electric Company  US  
Bally's Park Place, Inc. Harrah's Entertainment US  
Haven Health Center  US 2 
Haverford Nursing and Rehab 
Center 
Platinum Health Care US 2 
Hawthorne House First Atlantic Corporation US  
HealthSport  US  
HearthstoneCarestone Assisted 
Living 
Hearthstone Senior Services US  
Heartland of Holly Glenn HCR ManorCare US  
Heidelberg USA Heidelberger Druckmaschinen 
AG  
Germany  
Henderson Enterprises, Inc.  US  
Hersey Meters Mueller Company US  
HGI-Lakeside Inc. Herbst Gaming Inc. US  
Highgate LTC Management, LLC Northwoods Rehabilitation US  
Highlands at Brigton University of Rochester affiliate US  
Hill's Pet Nutrition Inc. Colgate-Palmolive US  
Hilo Hawaiian Hotel Castle Hotels and Resorts US  
Hoboken Floors HWF Holdings US  
Hollingsworth Management Srvc Hollingsworth Logistics North 
America 
US  
Holman Contract Warehousing  US  
Holy Family Home Catholic Sisters US  
HomeLife Inc.  US  
Honeywell Technology Solutions Honeywell International US  
Howard S. Wright Construction  US  
HQM of Spencer County Inc.  US 2 
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HFS North America HAVI Group US  
HTH Corp  US  
Hudson News Distributors LLC Hudson Group, subsid of Dufry 
AG 
Switzerland  
Hydrochem Industrial Services Inc. Aquilex Company, subsid of 
Harvest Partners 
US  
IAP Worldwide Services Cerberus Capital Management LP US  
IKO Pacific Inc. IKO Canada  
Imperial Parking  Canada  
Imperial Sheet Metal Imperial Manufacturing Group Canada  
Industrial Hard Chrome/Bar Tech/ 
Fludi Power Manufacturing 
 US  
Industrial Specialists LLC  US  
Indyne Inc.  US  
Ingersoll Rand, Inc.  Ireland  
Inner City Nursing Home, Inc.  US  
Inter-con Security  US 2 
Intercos America Inc. Intercos S.p.A. Italy  
International Paper  US  
Irby Construction Quanta Services US 3 
Iron Mountain Record Storage  US 2 
Ironwood Communications Division of 180 Connect Canada  
Irwin Telescopic Seating Company  US  
ITR Consession Company, LLC Cintra Concesiones Spain 3 
J&M Precision Machining  US  
J.B. Hunt Transport, inc.  US  
J.F. Sobieski Mechanical Inc.  US  
J.P. Mascaro & Sons  US  
Jacaranda Manor Nursing Home  US  
Jaco Transportation  US  
JB Smith Manufacturing Co. Inc. Anvil International, subsid of 
Mueller Water Products 
US  
Jet Plastica Inc  US  
Jing Fong Restaurant Inc.  US  
Johns Mansville Berkshire Hathaway US  
Johnson Controls World Services  US 2 
Joint Venture The Ride  US  
JP&D Digital Satellite Systems Inc.  US  
Jupiter Aluminum Corporation  US  
KABCO Pharmaceuticals Inc  US  
Kardex Systems Inc KRI Group Switzerland  
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KDH Defense Systems, Inc.  US  
Kellogg Snack Division  US  
Kelly Box Packaging company  US  
Kerry Inc. Kerry Group Ireland 2 
Kiessling Transit Inc.  US  
Kings Aire, Incorporated  US  
King's Country Shoppes Inc. Kings Family Restaurants, Inc. US  
Koch Foods  US 2 
Koenig & VITS  US  
Kontos Food  US  
KOR Hotel Group/ Sheraton 
Delfina 
 US  
Kozy Shack Enterprises  US  
K-ply  US  
Kroger Limited Partnership  US  
Kronos Products, Inc.  US  
L-3 Communications L-3 Communications Holdings  
Inc. 
US 3 
La Casa del Pueblo  US  
LaFarge North America LaFarge S.A. France  
Lakeside Transportation  US  
Lakewood Engineering Jarden Corp US  
Lakewood Manor North S.N.F.  US  
Lancaster Preferred Partners  US  
Laurel Baye Health care of Lake 
Lanier, LLC 
 US  
Lehigh Press Von Hoffman US 2 
LeJeune Support Services LLC  US  
Lemont Nursing and Rehabiliation 
Center LLC 
 US  
Levitz Furniture  US  
Lexmar Distribution /LDI Trucking  US  
Life Care of Lawrenceville Life Care Centers of America US  
Lifestyle Support Services  US  
Locating Inc. Subsid of Dycom Industries, inc. US  
Lockheed Martin Services  US 2 
Locust Grove Facility Operations  US  
Los Angeles Times 
Communications LLC 
Tribune Company US  
Lowe's HIW INC. Lowe's company US  
LP Sebring, LLC Signature HealthCARE US  
LuckyCab  US  




M & B Services  US  
M&M Restaurant Supply Keystone Foods, owned by 
Lindsay Goldberg LLC 
US  
Maac machinery  US  
Maid Brigade Franchised to Alexandria Business 
Group 
US  
Main Motors Sales Company Inc.  US  
Management & Training 
Corporation 
 US 4 
Manning Construction Company 
Inc. 
 US  
Marina District Development Corp Borgata Hotel Casino and Spa US  
Marshalls Department Stores TJX Companies US 2 
Massey Glass  US  
MasTec North America Inc.  US 2 
Master Foods/Cal Can Foods Mars Inc. US  
Maui Coast Hotel Coast Hotels Canada  
MBM Food Service  US  
McCormick & Company  US  
McDonald Wholesale Co.  US  
McKenzie Drywall Finishers Corp.  US  
MDV Nash-Finch US  
Mecalux  Spain  
Med Star- Medicar Universal Transportation LI? US  
Medallion Foods  US  
MedCorp Inc.  US  
Medford Hamlet  US  
Medical Express Ambulance 
Service Inc. 
 US  
MedicWest Ambulance, Inc.  US  
Members Building Maintenance  US  
Mesker Door  US  
Metaldyne  US  
Meteor Sealing Systems LLC Meteor Gummiwerke K.H. Bädje 
Gmbh & Co. Kg 
Germany  
Metro Disposal Inc.  US  
Micro Gauge Mueller Industries US  
Midstates Express  US  
Midwest Metal Products Company  US  
Millard Refrigeration  US  
Millennium Rail, Inc. Watco Company US  
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Motor Wheel Commercial Vehicle 
Systems 
Precision Partners Holdings US  
Mountaineer Park, Inc. MTR Gaming US  
Moyer Packing Company  US  
Myer's Investigative and Security 
Services 
 US  
Nash Finch  US 2 
NCR Corporation ATT US  
NeilMed Products  US  
Nestle Waters North America Nestle Waters France  
Netversant Solutions LLC  US  
New Era Cap  US  
New Page Duluth Mill  US  
NewStar Fresh Foods, LLC  US  
NGC Industries National Gypsum Company US  
Norbord  Canada  
North Miami Medical Center RDC Healthway US  
Northern States Power Xcel Energy US 2 
Northwest Florida Facilities 
Management, Inc. 
 US  
Northwoods Rehab  US  
Norwalk Custom Furniture  US  
Norwood Hospital  US  
Nursing Unlimited Services Inc.  US  
OfficeMax Inc.  US  
Ohio Mattress Company Licensing 
and Component group 
Sealy Corporation US  
Oldcastle Retail Inc. CRH PLC Ireland 2 
Olympic Steel Iowa, Inc.  US 2 
Omnimold LLC  US  
Oncor Electric Delivery Company  US  
One Source Building Services, Inc. ABM Industries Incorporated US  
OPTERA, Inc. Magna International Canada  
ORCON Corporation  US  
Ouhu Publications Inc. Sound Publishing US  
PACON VanHoff Companies US  
Pactiv Corp  US 2 
Palm Terrace of Lakeland Cypress Health Care Management US  
Pankl Aerospace Pankl Racing Systems AG Austria  
Park B. Smith  US  
Park 'N Go of Minnesota  US  
Park Place Center- Genesis Genesis Health Care US 2 
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Parking Concepts  US  
Parkway Regional Medical Center  US  
Parr Lumber Co  US  
Partylite Worldwide Blyth inc US  
Penske Logistics Penske Corporation US  
Pepsi Northwest Beverages LLC Pepsi Bottling Group US  
Petermann Ltd.  US 2 
PHC-Elko Inc. Life Point Hospitals Inc. US 2 
Philly Transportation  US  
Pilgrim Rehabilitation and Skilled 
Nursing Center 
 US  
Pilgrim's Pride  US  
Pivotal Staffing Services Safer Foundation (Non-profit) US  
PKL Services  US  
PM Beef Holdings LLC  US  
Polyone Corporation  US  
Pondera Medical Center  US  
Ponderay Newsprint Company The McClatchy Company US  
Portec Group International PNC Equity Partners, subsid of 
PNC Financial Services Group 
US  
Posterloid Corp. Steelcase US  
PPG Industries, Inc.  US 2 
PrattWhitney United Technology Corp US  
Praxaire Distribution Inc.  US  
Precoat Metals Sequa (US); owned by Carlyle 
Group (US) 
US  
Preferred Rubber Company Watermill Group US  
Premeire Home Health Care  US  
Prestige Home Attendant  US  
Prime Care Health Hunterton Care Center US  
Metropolitan Home Health Care Premiere Health Care US  
Product Action  US  
Product International Action  US  
Progress Rail Services Corporation Subsid of Caterpillar US  
Progress Transit Company  US  
Publix Supermarkets  US  
Quality Underground Services Inc. Q3 Contracting US  
Quesos la Ricura  US  
Quest Diagnostics  US  
Quikrete Northern California Inc.  US  
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco  US  
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R.W. Painting of WNY, Inc.  US 2 
Race Track Operators, Ltd. Hazel Park Racetrack US  
Raley's  US  
Rams Specialized Security Service 
Corp. 
 US  
RathGibson  US  
RCN  US 2 
REC Silicon Orkla ASA Norway  
Recticel Interiors North America, 
LLC 
The Recticel Group Belgium  
Red Mountain Entertainment  US  
Reliable Trucking Conco Company US  
Remington Arms Company  US  
Republic Services Inc.  US 2 
Republic Parking Inc.  US  
Revelle Enterprises Inc dba Pro Quo Books US  
Revera Health Systems Revera Canada  
Rexnord Industries RBS Global, Inc., Apollo 
Management LLP is majority 
equity holder 
US  
RichLee Vans  US  
Ridgewood Manor  US  
RIH Acquisitions NJ Resorts International Holding, 
affiliate of Colony Capital 
US  
Rinker South Central Concrete 
Division 
Rinker Materials Corp, subsid of 
CSR Limited 
Australia  
River Ranch Fresh Foods, LLC  US  
Rockspring Development AlphaNatural US  
Roscoe Community Nursing Home  US  
Rossi Concrete  US  
Roundy's Inc.  US  
Rugby Manufacturing Company TBEI Inc. US  
Rural/Metro Corporation  US 3 
Russell Transport  US  
Ryder System  US  
S& H Lone Star Electric Lone Star Electric US  
S&S Transit  US  
S. Bertram Inc.  US  
Sabra Blue & White Foods LLC Strauss Group Israel  
Safeway Transportation  US  
SAIA Motor Freight  US  
Saint Francis Extended Care, Inc. Vintage Estates US  
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Saint Vincent Hospital Vanguard Health Systems US  
Saladino's Inc.  US  
Saputo Cheese  Canada  
Satellite Services Inc SSI US  
SCA Tissure, North America LLC Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget 
SCA 
Sweden  
Sealed Air Corporation  US  
Sears Roebuck  US  
Secure Health LP  US  
Security Consultants Group Inc  US  
Sequoyah Electric, LLC  US  
Shepard Exposition Services  US  
Sherijan Broadcasting Company 
Inc. 
 US  
Sierra Pacific Industries  US  
Silver Lining Interiors  US  
Sioux-Preme Parking Co.  US  
Small Tube Manufacturing Corp Three Rivers Capital US  
Smart Pick Inc Penny Transportation US  
Smarte Carte Inc.  US  
SMG Saenger Theatre  US  
Smith Frozen Food  US  
Smithfield Packing Company Smithfield Foods US 3 
Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort Owned by Saginaw Chippewa US  
Sodexho Sodexo Worldwide France 2 
Solutia  US  
Solvay Chemicals  Belgium  
Somers Thin Strip Olin Brass, under Global Brass 
and Copper 
US 2 
Spartech Plastics  US 2 
Special Touch Home Health Care 
Services 
 US  
Spirit Trucking Company  US  
Southern Hills Medical Center LLC  US 2 
Southern Nuclear Southern Company US  
Southern Ocean County Hospital  US 2 
Springwood Nursing and Rehab 
LLC 
 US  
STA of Connecticut Inc Student Transportation of 
America/ Student Transportation 
of Canada 
Canada  
Staff Source  US  
Standard Register  US  
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Staples  US  
Stericycle  US  
STS Dycom US  
Student Transportation of America  US 2 
Summit Cold Storage  US 2 
Sunnyview Convalescent Hospital Longview Management 
Corporation 
US 2 
Sunrise Assisted Living at 
Fleetwood 
Sunrise Senior Living INC US  
Sunrise Convalescent Hospital  US  
Sunrise Mountainview Hospital  US 2 
Superior Asphalt Company, Inc.  US  
Superior Farms  US  
Superior Laundry Services  US  
Supervalu Inc  US  
Sutphen Towers Sutphen US  
SVC Manufacturing  US  
Sverdrup Technology, Inc; SRC and 
ERC 
 US  
Swan Pointe Facility Operations  US  
Tasting Baking (Tasty Baking)  US  
Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc. Teck Cominco, now Teck Canada  
Tecstar LLC, Dixie Staffing, Kinder 
Staffing 
 US  
Teeples IGA, Browning MT Teeples Markets US  
Tendercare Nursing Home  US 2 
Terex Telelect Inc. Terex US  
Tetra Pak Materials LP Tetra Lavel International LA Switzerland  
Adelphia Communications Corp. TimeWarner bought in April 2005 US  
The Camp Recovery Centers, L.P. CRC Health Group US  
The Children's Place The Childrens Place Retail Stores 
Inc. 
US  
The Corey Steel Company  US  
The Dannon Company, Inc. Groupe Danone France  
The Point at Poipu Diamond Resorts International US  
The Waters of Three Rivers  US  
Tilton Terrace  US  
Timber Point Healthcare Center  US  
Tin Inc/ Performance Sheets Temple-Inland US  
TNI Partners Tuscon Newspapers US  
Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation Todd Shipyards Corporation US  
Toll Bros Inc.  US  
Tolman Building maintenance Inc.  US  
226 
 
Total Health Home Care Corp  US  
Totem Electric of Tacoma, Inc.  US  
Towne Bus LLC We Transport US  
Townsend Inc.  US  
ToysRUs  US  
Tractor Supply Company  US  
Trans Healthcare Inc.  US  
Transportation Solutions, Inc.  US  
Tree of Life Inc. Royal Wessanen nv  Netherlands  
Tree Top Inc.  US  
Trend Western Del-Jen, subsidiary of Fluor US  
Tri-County Industries, Inc.  US  
Tri-Seal Holdings Inc.  US  
Tropicana Casino & Resort Tropicana Entertainment US 2 
TXI Cement Co.  US  
Tyson Fresh Meats  US 2 
Union Tribune Publishing Co.  US  
UnionTools Inc.  US  
United Natural Foods Inc.  US  
Upper Cumberland Electric 
Membership Corporation 
 US  
USF-Dugan Yellow Roadway Corporation US  
UTi Integrated Logistics, Inc. Uti Worldwide (British Virgin 
Islands) 
UK  
VAE Nortrak North America Inc. Voestalpine AG Austria 2 
Valero Energy  US  
Valley View Manor Nursing Home  US  
Valmont Industries  US  
Vantage Management Services LLC Vantage Building and 
Management Services 
US  
Veolia Transportation Veolia Environment France 4 
Verizon  US  
Veterans Transportation Services 
Inc. 
 US  
Vision of Elk River, Inc.  US  
Visteon  US  
Von Hoffmann Corp Kohlberg Kravis Roberts US  
Vonachen Services Inc.  US  
Vought Aircraft Carlyle Group US 2 
VT Griffin VT Group plc UK 2 
W.R. Meadows, Inc.  US  
W.W. Grainger Inc.  US  
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Wackenhut Corporation Group 4 Falck A/S Denmark 2 
Wagner Equipment Co. Wagner formed a partnership with 
Barloworld Equipment LTD to 
service East Siberia 
US  
Walgreens Distribution Center  US  
Walker International Transportation  US  
Walt Disney World Company  US  
Ward Trucking  US  
Warner Brothers Pictures  US  
Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab  US  
Wayne Bare Trucking  US  
Wellsville Namor  US  
Wenner Bread Products  US  
West Hills Medical Center  US 2 
West Liberty Foods Iowa Turkey Growers Association US 2 
West Side Corporation Elder Group US  
Western Refining Company  US  
Whemco -Steelcasting Inc. Whemco US  
White Engineering Surfaces 
Corporation 
 US  
Whittier Hospital Medical Center  US  
Whole Foods Market  US  
Wild Oats Markets Inc. acquired by Whole Foods in Aug, 
2007 
US  
Willow Crest Nursing Pavillion, Lt.  US  
Wilson Trailer Company  US  
Wilt's Emergency Services and 
Transport, Inc. 
 US  
Winco Foods  US  
Woodman Food  US  
World Yacht  US  
Wynn Las Vegas, LLC Wynn Resorts LTD US  
Yakima HMA Inc Yakima Regional Cardiac Center US  
Yellow Enterprise System/Yellow 
Ambulance 
Procarent US  
Yonkers Racing Corporation  US  
York Linings International York Forter Australasia Pty 
Limited (Austrialia), subsid of 
Beroa (Germany) 
Germany  
Young Manufacturing Company  US  
YUHSHIN USA LTD U-Shin Group Japan  
Inland Northwest Darigold US  




The Avenue Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Centre 
Capital Living and Rehab Centers US  
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 
Company 
FirstEnergy US  
Akzo Nobel Surface Chemicals Akzo Nobel Netherlands  
National/Alamo Car Rental Vanguard Car Rental USA US 2 
Alcoa - Excel Extrusions Inc. Alcoa (in 2005) US  
Quaker Oats-Gatorade Division PepsiCo US  
Cornell Abraxas Group Inc. Run by the GEO Group US  
Dixie Consumer Products Georgia Pacific, subsid of Koch 
Industries 
US  
GGNSC Glendale LLC Golden Living Centers US  
Boardwalk Regency Corporation Harrah's Entertainment Inc. US 2 
Red & Tan Charters Subsid of CoachUSA, subsid of 
Stagecoach Group PLC 
UK  
Allied Waste and Urban Services of 
America 
 US  
Roswell Nursing & Rehab. Center Cypress Health Care Management US  
Voorhees Center Genesis Health Care US  
Priority Home Care Premiere Health Care US  
Sonaca NMF America Sonaca SA Belgium  
Sony DADC Sony Japan  
Sportsystems Gaming Management 
at Buffalo Raceway LLC 
Delaware North US  
U.S Foodservice Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and 
Clayton, Dunbilier, and Rice 
(equity firms) 
US  
International Converter Packaging Dynamics US 2 
Tower Hill Nursing, LLC Kindred Healthcare US  
Pinkerton Government Services Securitas AB Sweden  
Certainteed Corporation Saint Gobain France  
City Market Kroger company US  
Detroit Deisel Corporation Canton 
Parts Distribution Center 
Daimler AG Germany  
Hilton Philadelphia Airport Hilton Hotels Corporation US  
The Crossing Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Center 
Capital Living and Rehab Centres US  
Edwards Electrical and Mechanical 
Inc 
FirstEnergy Corporation US  
Americanos USA, LLC Greyhound, subsid of FirstGroup UK 3 
Vanguard Car Rental Enterprise Rental Car US  
Harrah's Imperial Palace 
Corporation 
Harrah's Entertainment US  
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Freightliner LLC DaimlerChrysler Germany  
Cardinal Transportation FirstGroup UK  
Home Care of Washington ResCare US  
Securitas Security Services USA, 
INC 
Securitas AB Sweden  
Smith's Food Kroger Company US  






























Sarah Young has spent over a decade working on the three interwoven tracks of her 
career: labor unions, academic research, and teaching. In 2000, she wrote her undergraduate 
thesis on the British Coal Miners’ Strike of 1984, based on field research conducted in Swansea, 
Wales. She then went on to land a position as a labor educator training union stewards at the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters in Washington, D.C., one of the most demanding and 
rewarding jobs of her life. She returned to academia after a number of years, earning her Masters 
in Public Administration at the University of Tennessee in 2008. Sarah continued for her 
doctoral degree and taught political science courses as a Graduate Teaching Associate for three 
years, concluding that she was actually pretty good at it. After detouring from her graduate 
studies in 2012 to work semi-full time and raise her son Patrick, born in 2013, Sarah vowed to 
complete her degree. She is joyous to be finishing the research she started four years ago. This 
dissertation unifies what she has learned from her previous career paths. 
 Sarah would summarize her most valuable discoveries from graduate school as follows: 
o Labor unions are critical institutions throughout the community of nations.  
o Middle-class economies are built by labor unions and the governments that labor 
unions support. Virtually every country that developed middle-class economies 
did so as a result of labor mobilization. 
o Governments are guardians of the market and creators of economic systems. It is 
the duty of governments to make manifest a market that shares wealth to all. 
She looks forward to continuing the exploration of these themes in the second wave of her 
career. 
